The impact of foreign aid on growth and savings in developing countries by Durbarry, Ramesh
Durbarry, Ramesh (1998) The impact of foreign aid on 
growth and savings in developing countries. PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/13187/1/243616.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Growth and Savings 
in Developing Countries' 
by 
Ramesh Durbarry, B. Sc., MA. 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, May, 1998" 
Acknowledgements 
I owe the most to both of my supervisors, Professor David Greenaway and 
Professor Norman Gemmell, who have brilliantly guided me until the end of 
the thesis. I am grateful for their invaluable comments, advice and constructive 
criticism throughout. Their suggestions have enabled me to explore the 
theoretical and empirical aspects deeper than I thought before embarking on 
this subject. I am indebted to them for all they have done for producing this 
thesis. 
I would also like to thank the Head of Department, Professor Chris Milner, 
who offered me a part time research assistantship to ease my financial position 
for the first year. That proved valuable in mastering the art of data collection 
and literature review, contributing significantly to my thesis. I am also grateful 
to him for allowing me to participate in a PhD conference held in Perth, 
Australia. This gave me an opportunity to meet other students, lecturers and 
participants of the same field to share our point of views. Comments from my 
discussant, Dr. Sisira Jayasuriya, were also highly appreciated. 
I am also most grateful to the British Council (Mauritius) and the African 
Economic Research Consortium (Kenya) in providing financial assistance for 
my PhD. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my friends who have often helped 
me in one way or the other. In addition, I would like to thank Anjusha for her 
encouragement and understanding, and to Smeeta and Nishaal who provided 
some typing assistance during my writing up. 
Finally, I would like to thank my relatives, who despite being far. have always 
been encouraging and supportive. I am indebted to my late parents who have 
never stopped motivating me and the least I can do is to dedicate this thesis to 
them. 
11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures 
List of Tables and Charts 
Abstract 
Preface 
ii 
iii 
vii 
x 
xii 
I 
Chapter One: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introductory Remarks 6 
1.2 Is there a case for Foreign Aid? 7 
1.3 Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Trends and Sources 9 
1.4 Conclusion 23 
Chapter Two: FOREIGN AID IN GROWTH MODELS 
2.1 Introduction 24 
2.2 The Harrod-Domar Growth Model 
2.2.1 An Overview 25 
2.2.2 The Impact of Foreign Aid in the Harrod-Domar Model 26 
2.3 The Neo-classical Growth Model 
2.3.1 An Overview 30 
2.3.2 The Impact of Foreign Aid in Neo-classical framework 33 
2.3.3 Raising Labour Efficiency in the Presence of Foreign Aid 37 
2.4 Endogenous Growth Models 
2.4.1 An Overview 41 
2.4.2 Foreign Aid in Endogenous Growth Models 43 
2.5 Knowledge Spillover and Technology Transfer from Foreign Aid Activities 
2.5.1 The Behaviour of the Recipient during and beyond the Transition 
Phase 50 
2.5.2 Some Reservations on Technology Transfer 56 
iii 
2.6 Aid as Intermediate Inputs 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
Appendix 2.1: The Neo-classical Model. 
Chapter Three: THE DUAL GAP THEORY 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 The Foreign Exchange Gap 
3.3 Mckinnon's Dual Gap Representation 
3.4 Chenery and Strout's Dual Gap Representation 
3.5 The Productivity of Foreign Aid 
3.6 Empirical Findings using the Gap Model 
3.7 Some Criticisms of Two Gap Models 
3.8 Which is the relevant gap, Savings or Foreign Exchange'? 
3.9 Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter Four: Some Preliminary Data Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Regional Distribution of Capital Flows 
4.2.1 East Asia and the Pacific 
4.2.2 Europe and Central Asia 
4.2.3 Latin America and the Caribbean 
4.2.4 Middle East and North Africa 
4.2.5 South Asia 
4.2.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 
4.3 Statistics on Regional Growth, Investment and Savings 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
Appendix 4.1 
Appendix 4.2 
59 
65 
68 
71 
72 
73 
77 
82 
83 
88 
93 
99 
100 
100 
104 
106 
108 
112 
114 
116 
118 
130 
132 
141 
IV 
Chapter Five: Aid and Growth: A Statistical Link 
5.1 Introduction 142 
5.2 A Taxonomy for Aid and Growth 143 
5.3 A Preliminary Statistical Exercise using the Taxonomy 151 
5.3.1 Aid and Growth 152 
5.3.2 Aid, Private Flows and Growth 155 
5.3.3 Aid, Private Flows, Savings, Investment and Growth 158 
5.4 Conclusion 165 
Appendix 5.1: List of Countries in the Sample. 1 66 
Appendix 5.2: Averages Values for the period 1970-93.167 
Appendix 5.3: List of Low Income Countries (Averages for the period 
1970-93). 169 
Appendix 5.4: List of Middle Income Countries (Averages for the period 
1970-93). 170 
Chapter Six: Empirical Aid-Growth Literature Review. 
6.1 Introduction 171 
6.2 Single Equation Studies 172 
6.3 Simultaneous Equation Studies 181 
6.4 Conclusion 189 
Chapter Seven: Empirical Testing of the Aid-Growth Relationship. 
7.1 Introduction 191 
7.2 Macroeconomic Factors Explaining Growth 192 
7.3 Description of Variables 196 
7.4 Model Specification and Results 200 
7.4.1 Cross-Section Analysis 201 
7.4.2 Cross-Section Results 203 
7.4.3 Conclusion on Cross-Section Estimation 218 
7.4.4 Panel Data Analysis 219 
V 
7.4.5 Panel Data Results 221 
7.5 Conclusion: Foreign Aid Effectiveness on Growth 222 
Appendix 7.1 235 
Appendix 7.2 236 
Appendix 7.3 238 
Chapter Eight: Aid, Savings and Investment. 
8.1 Introduction 239 
8.2 Griffin's Debate of Foreign Aid and Domestic Savings 241 
8.3 Empirical Literature Review and Criticisms 244 
8.4 Foreign Aid and Consumption: An Implication for Domestic Savings 
8.4.1 The Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis 250 
8.4.2 Impact of Foreign Aid under the LC/PI Hypothesis 255 
8.4.3 Data and Empirical Results 256 
8.4.4 Conclusion 269 
8.5 Foreign Aid and Investment 
8.5.1 Model Specification 270 
8.5.2 Empirical Results 272 
8.5.3 Conclusion 279 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 279 
Chanter Nine: Summary and Future Research Suggestions 
9.1 Introduction 281 
9.2 Summary 282 
9.3 Suggestions for Future Work 292 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 300 
V1 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 
1970-1993 11 
Figure 1.2: Nominal and Real Aggregate Net Resource Flows (Deflated 
by Import Unit Value Index 1990 
= 
100) 13 
Figure 1.3: The Main International Economic Events Between 1970 
and 1993 16 
Figure 1.4: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to Low Income Countries, 
1970-1993 19 
Figure 1.5: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to Middle Income 
Countries, 1970-1993 20 
Figure 1.6: Regional Aid Per Capita (1970-73) 22 
Figure 1.7: Regional Aid Per Capita (1988-93) 22 
Figure 2.3.1: Steady-State in the Neo-classical Growth Model 31 
Figure 2.3.2: Another Graphical Representation of the Steady-State 32 
Figure 2.3.3: The Impact of Foreign Aid in the Neo-classical Model 34 
Figure 2.3.4: The Impact of Foreign Aid under Alternative 
Assumptions 36 
Figure 2.3.5: Labour Efficiency Improvement under Foreign Aid 40 
Figure 2.4.1: Endogenous Growth Model 42 
Figure 2.4.2: The Impact of Foreign Aid in the Endogenous Growth 
Model with Labour Augmenting Technology 47 
Figure 2.4.3: The Impact when Foreign Aid Stops 48 
Figure 2.4.4: The Impact of Foreign Aid in the Poverty Trap Case 49 
Figure 3.1: The Savings and Foreign Exchange Constraints 76 
Figure 3.2: Findlay's Gap Model Representation 96 
Figure 3.3: The Foreign Offer Curve 97 
Figure 3.4: The Impact of an Increase in the Marginal Propensity to 
Save 98 
Figure 4.1: Average Net Resource Flows 1974-81 101 
Figure 4.2: Average Net Resource Flows 1982-87 102 
Figure 4.3: Average Net Resource Flows 1988-93 103 
Figure 4.4: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to East Asia and the Pacific 
US $ 1970-93 105 
Figure 4.5: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to Europe and Central Asia 
US $ 1970-93 107 
Figure 4.6: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to Latin America and the 
vii 
Caribbean US $ 1970-93 109 
Figure 4.7: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to Middle East and North 
Africa US $ 1970-93 113 
Figure 4.8: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to South Asia US $ 1970-93 115 
Figure 4.9: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa US $ 
1970-93 117 
Figure 4.10: Real GDP Growth in East Asia and the Pacific 132 
Figure 4.11: Domestic Investment as a% of GDP in East Asia and the 
Pacific 132 
Figure 4.12: Domestic Savings as a% of GDP in East Asia and the 
Pacific 133 
Figure 4.13: Real GDP Growth in Europe and Central Asia 133 
Figure 4.14: Domestic Investment as a% of GDP in Europe and 
Central Asia 134 
Figure 4.15: Domestic Savings as a% of GDP in Europe and Central 
Asia 134 
Figure 4.16: Real GDP Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean 135 
Figure 4.17: Domestic Investment as a% of GDP in Latin America and 
the Caribbean 135 
Figure 4.18: Domestic Savings as a% of GDP in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 136 
Figure 4.19: Real GDP Growth in Middle East and North Africa 136 
Figure 4.20: Domestic Investment as a% of GDP in Middle East and 
North Africa 137 
Figure 4.21: Domestic Savings as a% of GDP in Middle East and 
North Africa 137 
Figure 4.22: Real GDP Growth in South Asia 138 
Figure 4.23: Domestic Investment as a% of GDP in South Asia 138 
Figure 4.24: Domestic Savings as a% of GDP in South Asia 139 
Figure 4.25: Real GDP Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 139 
Figure 4.26: Domestic Investment as a% of GDP in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 140 
Figure 4.27: Domestic Savings as a% of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa 140 
Figure 4.28: Aggregate Net Resource Flows to the Six Regions (1970- 
93). 141 
Figure 5.1: Aid and Growth: A Direct Relationship 143 
Figure 5.2: Aid and Growth: An Inverse Relationship 144 
Figure 5.3: Mosley-Hudson's Expected Sequence 145 
Figure 5.4: Aid and Growth Relationship: Effect of Shocks 146 
Figure 5.5: Aid, Private Flows and Growth 149 
viii 
Figure 5.6: Scatter Plot of GDP Growth and Foreign Aid as a% of 
GNP 
Figure 5.7: Number of Actual and Expected Countries in Each 
Quadrant 
Figure 5.8: Number of Countries in Each Zone 
Figure 8.1: Gross Domestic Savings as a% of GDP (1970-93 ) 
Figure 8.2: Gross Domestic Investment as a% of GDP (1970-93 ) 
153 
154 
156 
240 
240 
ix 
List of Tables and Charts 
Table 1.1: Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries (1970-93) 
US $ Billions 12 
Table 1.2: Regional Aid Per Capita US $ (1970-93) 22 
Table 4.1: Average Per Capita Net Resource Flows (1970-93) 103 
Table 4.2: Average Real GDP Growth Rates (1970-93) 118 
Table 4.3: Average Real GDP Growth Rates in Different Phases 120 
Table 4.4: Coefficient of Variation in Real GDP Growth in Different 
Phases 120 
Table 4.5: Average Domestic Investment Rates in Different Phases 122 
Table 4.6: Average Domestic Savings Rates in Different Phases 122 
Chart 5.1: A Schematic Link of Aid and Economic Development 142 
Table 5.1: Movement from one State to Another 147 
Table 5.2: Description of Zones 150 
Table 5.3: List of Countries in Each Zone 157 
Table 5.4: Countries Below the Median Growth Value of 3.94 with 
Growth Intervals (Averages) 158 
Table 5.5: Countries Below the Median Growth Value of 3.94 with 
Aid Intervals (Averages) 159 
Table 5.6: Countries Above the Median Growth Value of 3.94 with 
Growth Intervals (Averages) 160 
Table 5.7: Countries Above the Median Growth Value of 3.94 with 
Aid Intervals (Averages) 161 
Table 5.8: Low Income Countries with Growth Intervals (Averages) 162 
Table 5.9: Low Income Countries with Aid Intervals (Averages) 163 
Table 5.10: Middle Income Countries with Growth Intervals 
(Averages) 1 64 
Table 5.11: Middle Income Countries with Aid Intervals (Averages) 164 
Table 7.1: Regional Inflation and Economic Growth Rates 
(Averages) 194 
Table 7.2: Selected Countries Inflation and Economic Growth Rates 
(Average 1970-93) 195 
Table 7.3: Correlation Matrix: Period Average 1970-93.235 
Table 7.4: Cross-section Regressions (OLS). Dependent Variable: 
Average Growth 1970-93.204 
Table 7.4A: Cross-section Regressions (OLS): Alternative measures 
of Openness. Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth 23 6 
X 
Table 7.4B: Cross-section Regressions (OLS): Alternative measures 
of Openness. Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth 2 37 
Table 7.5: Cross-section Regressions (OLS). Dependent Variable: 
Average Growth 1970-93.207 
Table 7.6: Cross-section Augmented Barro Regressions (OLS) 210 
Table 7.7: Cross-section Regressions for Different Phases (OLS) 213 
Table 7.8: Cross-section Regressions (OLS) for Low and High 215 
Growth Country Groups 
Table 7.9: Cross-section Regressions (OLS) for Different Country 217 
Groupings 
Table 7.10: Two-way Fixed Effects Model (OLS) 221 
Table 7.11: One-way Fixed Effect Model with Regional Dummies 
(OLS) 223 
Table 7.12: Two-way Random Effects Model (GLS) 225 
Table 7.13: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions with 
Regional Dummies 227 
Table 7.14: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions for Latin 
America and the Caribbean Region 228 
Table 7.15: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions for Sub- 
Saharan Africa 229 
Table 7.15A: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions Pooling 
Latin American and Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African Countries 238 
Table 7.16: GLS Panel Regressions for Different Country Groupings 231 
Table 7.17: Summary Results of Foreign Aid Impact on GDP 
Growth 233 
Table 7.18: Summary Results of Foreign Aid Effectiveness on GDP 
Growth 234 
Table 8.1: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions. Dependent 
Variables: Per Capita Consumption and Per Capita Consumption 
Growth 260 
Table 8.2: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions. Dependent 
Variable: Per Capita Consumption Growth 264 
Table 8.3: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions. Dependent 
Variables: Per Capita Consumption Growth, Per Capita Government 
and Private Consumption Growth 268 
Table 8.4: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions. Dependent 
Variable: Investment Rate 273 
Table 8.5: Generalised Least Squares Panel Regressions. Dependent 
Variable: Investment Rate 278 
X1 
Abstract 
Abstract 
Developing countries have received foreign aid and other forms of capital 
flows for a long time, although they have been subject to some fluctuations. 
The key question is whether these flows have helped them in achieving their 
objectives? Aid has been evaluated at two levels: micro and macro. While 
micro evaluations have found that in most cases aid 'works' (for example 
Cassen et al., 1986), those at the macro-level are ambiguous. This thesis is 
predominantly concerned with the macroeconomic impact of foreign aid. There 
have been considerable efforts to improve both the theoretical and empirical 
literature on aid effectiveness, both suffer from serious weaknesses and 
shortcomings. At the theoretical level, there are not many models which 
capture the full potential of foreign aid within a consistent, fully specified, 
growth framework, while existing empirical studies are flawed by model 
mispecification, questionable sample composition and size, and inappropriate 
econometric techniques. This has led to inconclusive and often misleading 
results in assessing the effectiveness of foreign aid. 
This thesis attempts to address some of these deficiencies. The impact of aid is 
mainly assessed on growth and savings in developing countries. Before testing 
its impact, aid is introduced into some growth models. Cases are analysed 
where an economy, after initial aid flows, can become independent of aid and 
experience sustained growth through its ability to raise labour efficiency. On 
the empirical front. two techniques are used: a preliminary statistical analysis is 
performed, followed by an econometric analysis. The former allows a better 
understanding of the geographical distribution of aid, the link and any 
correlation between the macro variables: aid, growth, savings and investment. 
Since aid flows have been influenced by major international shocks (e. g. oil 
price shocks, debt crises, etc. ), a simple taxonomy is used to indicate how these 
events have influenced the effectiveness of aid. Using a macroeconometric 
model from Fischer-Easterly to control for the recipients' macroeconomic 
xii 
environment (previously overlooked in the literature), a positive and significant 
impact of foreign aid on growth is found. This result is confirmed using both 
cross-section and panel data for the period of 1970-1993. We make use of 
Hall's (1978) life cycle/permanent income hypothesis, but do not find evidence 
that current aid flows leak into consumption, hence rejecting the fungibility 
hypothesis. Although much further work concerning the developmental 
effectiveness of aid remains to be carried out, it is hoped that this study will 
stimulate improved techniques and methods used in testing the effectiveness of 
aid in future work. 
X111 
To My Beloved and Late Parents 
Preface 
Preface 
Foreign aid is a central sphere of development policy and has probably 
received as much attention as other field within development economics. 
Foreign aid predominantly is a product of the post World War 11 era. Its roots 
lie in the Marshall Plan which helped to rebuild Europe after the war through 
an influx of financial capital. Capital (and its productivity) was perceived as the 
critical factor responsible for growth. The success of the Marshall Plan 
triggered thoughts in the 1950s of aiding the emerging nations gaining political 
independence, where economic conditions were deplorable. They were heavily 
dependent on external capital resources for investment and access to global 
markets for exports. The rationale for aid was seen "principally as a source of 
capital to sustain and spur economic growth through higher investment" 
(Browne, 1990, pp. 101). Although it was the United States who took the lead, 
institutions such as the International Development Association (IDA) and the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) were established to help the 
management and distribution of foreign aid flows. The question that many 
(donors, politicians, etc. ) are now asking is how effective has foreign aid 
proved to be in achieving its goal after decades of transfers'? 
The decision to embark on analysing the effectiveness of foreign aid dates back 
to my Master's year at the University of Nottingham where the topic was well 
covered in the module `Aid and Development' and excellently taught by Dr. 
Mark McGillivray. I became fascinated by the subject and was more interested 
when I came across White (1992b) where he stated that "we know surprisingly 
little about aid's macroeconomic impact" and went on to point out that "the 
combination of weak theory with poor econometric methodology makes it 
difficult to conclude anything about the relationship between aid and 
savings 
.... 
[and]... aid and growth" (pp. 121). This indeed surprised me because, 
although the theoretical underpinning might be poor. the proliferation of 
econometric techniques led me to presume more progress on the empirical 
I 
front. These motivated me to perform some empirical testing to find out more 
about the effectiveness of aid on growth and savings. 
The primary objective of foreign aid is to promote economic development and 
welfare of the developing countries. Controversies exist about the definition of 
`development' which make it difficult to explore all of its facets. For instance, 
Cassen (1988) defines development as "the progress of economies and societies 
towards improved material conditions and the quality of life of its individuals". 
Stokke (1996) argues that in the context of foreign aid, "development relates to 
the economic, social, cultural, political and other objectives identified with the 
development assistance" (pp. 26). To evaluate the impact of foreign aid is to 
see whether it has met its objectives. Krueger (1986) suggests that evaluation 
of foreign aid effectiveness can only be addressed with empirical evidence. 
Because the indicators of development have more qualitative and normative 
connotations, it becomes difficult to quantify aid's effectiveness. In view of 
such discrepancies it has become common practice to evaluate foreign aid's 
impact on macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, savings, 
investment and real exchange rates among others. 
The present study is mainly concerned with the effectiveness of aid on 
economic growth and domestic savings. This is not to say that the other 
macroeconomic variables are not as important, but growth and savings have 
been, and still are, at the heart of the aid debate. Ambiguous results about the 
effectiveness of aid emanate not only from poor econometric methodology but 
also from data measurement error (especially savings data), model 
specification, sample size and composition, among others. The intention here is 
to consider the deficiencies of previous studies and improve upon them to 
further the evidence on aid's effectiveness. 
The present study also provides an overview of various growth models and 
considers in turn the impact of foreign aid. We start from the simple Harrod- 
2 
Domar model, followed by the neo-classical model and finally consider 
endogenous growth models. The empirical exercise which is performed 
represents an improvement over existing literature in several aspects. First, a 
preliminary statistical exercise is carried out enabling us to establish any link 
among aid, growth, savings and investment. Second, careful sample selection is 
performed. Small countries, defined as population less than one million in 
1993, are excluded together with some outliers (e. g. countries receiving aid 
above 40% of their GDP). Third, concerning omitted variables we are guided 
by growth theory to control for macroeconomic variables which have 
previously been overlooked in the aid-growth literature. Fourth, we make use 
of cross-section as well as panel data for different country groupings. As 
regards the aid-savings analysis, we make use of the life cycle/permanent 
income hypothesis to structure our analysis of the impact of aid on savings. 
This also helps to deal with the problems of measuring domestic savings. 
The study, however, is not all encompassing. There are many issues which are 
not addressed in this thesis due to time and space. One caveat which should be 
stressed is that aid is treated here as a `bundle' rather than assessing the impact 
of bilateral aid versus multilateral aid, or project aid versus programme aid, etc. 
These can be recommended for future research. We also ignore the motives for 
giving aid. These are considered elsewhere, for instance in Riddell (1987), 
Maizels and Nissanke (1984), McGillivray and While (1993). among others. 
We assume here that donors wish to maximise the recipients' welfare and the 
motive of giving aid is essentially based on altruism. 
A brief outline of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the aid debate and discusses trends in the 
volume as well as the composition of capital flows to developing countries 
over the last two decades. The main international developments, for instance, 
the two oil price shocks, the debt crisis and the trade liberalisation episodes are 
3 
considered and shown to have influenced the distribution and volume of these 
flows. In Chapter 2 we outline some growth models: Harrod-Domar, Neo- 
classical and endogenous models. Implicit in some of these models is the 
assumption that growth is constrained by savings. We then analyse the impact 
of foreign aid in each and depict situations where growth can be sustained 
when aid stops. One mechanism of this is where the recipient can accumulate 
`knowledge' in association with (temporary) aid flows. In Chapter 3 we briefly 
discuss the foreign exchange gap as a possible constraint on growth which 
forms the basis of the dual gap theory. We also provide an exposition of 
Mckinnon's (1964) and Chenery and Strout's (1966) two gap models. Some 
critiques of the two gap model are then discussed and alternatives to gap 
modelling are reviewed. 
Chapter 4 deals with some preliminary data analysis. We first analyse the 
regional distribution of capital flows and then describe the growth 
performance, savings and investment in those regions. Chapter 5 focuses on 
establishing a link between aid and growth through a simple taxonomy. We 
then perform a simple statistical exercise to better understand any possible 
association between aid, growth, savings and investment. 
Chapter 6 critically reviews the aid-growth literature. This enables us to 
identify weaknesses in previous studies concerning, in particular, sample 
selection, model specification, data quality and econometric methodology used. 
Chapter 7 deals with the empirical testing of the aid-growth relationship using 
regression analysis. We provide details relating to definitions of variables and 
specify the model to be tested. We include some macroeconomic factors as 
suggested by Fischer (1993) and Easterly (1993) to control for the recipients' 
macroeconomic environment (e. g. stability and instability) along with the 
different sources of capital. We can therefore test for the relative effectiveness 
of foreign aid in relation to other sources of capital. We use both cross-section 
and panel data. The former will enable us to cross check our results with 
4 
previous studies. In Chapter 8 we test the aid-savings relationship implicitly by 
further developing the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis. This provides 
an explicit test of whether foreign aid leaks into consumption which provides 
some evidence on the important issue of aid fungibility. We also test the 
effectiveness of foreign aid on investment, based on a simple accelerator 
model. Chapter 9 provides some final concluding remarks and a summary of 
the thesis. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
C cuter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introductory Remarks 
The success of the Marshall Plan after World War II opened the door for the 
developing countries to seek resources from the developed world to boost their 
economic development and welfare. At this time developing countries were 
seen to suffer from a chronic shortage of capital and "would develop more 
rapidly if they could borrow more abroad or find an assortment of fairy 
godmothers.... to bless them with grants and low-interest loans" (Cairncross, 
1964, pp. 49). 
During the 1950s it was the United States which started to provide some 
developing countries with capital in the form of foreign aid. The number of 
donors and institutions has grown over time. It was thought that it would he 
possible to reduce the widening gap between the developed and developing 
worlds by allocating aid. Although the motives behind American aid programs 
at that time were complex and ranged from the selfish to the generous, the 
same motives are still in place: commercial, political evangelism, strategic, 
humanitarian and economic. Aid is hence seen as more than an instrument for 
international relationships, it is a basis for friendship, hope, dynamism, 
dependence and goodwill. 
In this chapter, section 1.2 briefly argues the case for aid, essentially based on 
moral grounds, while the case on economic grounds is argued in Chapters 2 
and 3. Section 1.3 discusses the main trends in the volume and composition of 
capital flows to developing countries and the distribution of aid. The main 
international events are traced out since they have a major influence on capital 
flows. Section 1.4 concludes. 
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Chapter One 
1.2 Is there a case for Aid 
introduction 
There have been many critics of aid both from the left and the right. Writers on 
the left (e. g. Jalee (1968), Frank (1969), Hayter (1971,1981), Wood (1980), 
Hayter and Watson (1985)) argue that aid is used to further donors own 
economic interests and to exercise their political power. Aid is seen as part of 
the process of `imperialist exploitation', it extends international capitalism 
which brings poverty. To them, aid is incapable of addressing and alleviating 
poverty in an effective way. Critics from the right (for e. g. Bauer (1972,1982, 
1984), Bauer and Yamey (1957), Friedman (1958), Krauss (1983)) view aid as 
politicising the life of the developing world. Bauer and Yamey (1982), in 
particular, see aid as promoting or exacerbating politicisation of life in aid- 
receiving countries. Aid, it is argued, extends the power of the state, frustrates 
the free operation of the market and distorts the price system so that in the end 
aid impedes the development process. Krauss (1983) suggests that 
governments' use aid to cover up their mistakes and `foolish economic 
policies'. In sum, aid sceptics argue that aid is unproductive and is wasted. 
On the other hand, there are many aid supporters who claim that aid should be 
given for moral reasons. As Chandrasekhar (1965) has put it, although "foreign 
aid is an economic problem, it may well be a political problem; but it is 
ultimately a moral problem..... it is a positive factor in the struggle of millions 
of human beings against the age-old enemies of hunger, poverty, disease, and 
ignorance" (pp. 53). The Pearson Commission on International Development in 
1969 as well as the Brandt Commission (1980) have emphasised the moral and 
humanitarian motives for providing aid. The prime purpose is not to remove all 
inequality but to reduce disparities and remove inequalities. The moral case for 
aid is debated extensively in Riddell (1987). We review here the main 
arguments. Riddell cites instances where people have been in favour of 
helping poorer countries on humanitarian grounds. Governments perceive that 
7 
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they should provide foreign aid because resources have been haphazardly or 
unequally distributed or that there has been historical exploitation of resources 
so that there is an `obligation to act'. 
Other instances where governments have a moral obligation to provide aid to 
the Third World include the degree of poverty and inequality in comparison 
with the absolute and/or relative wealth in donor countries, the lack of basic 
necessities to live a human life and to help the developing countries achieve 
development objectives which are hindered by market forces. The moral case 
for foreign aid based on `needs' is justified by the theory of justice. Dower 
(1983) supports the view along with Streeten (1981), that society has a 
collective responsibility for meeting `basic needs' and that the rich have an 
obligation to help the poor since the rich have resources in excess of their basic 
requirements. Dower argues strongly for the moral case for aid on the concept 
of the `human good'. 
Arguments for redistribution have been advanced by utilitarians who claim that 
the utility of a recipient will be increased more than any disutility to the donors 
so that in the end total utility increases. Rawls (1973) went further in 
suggesting that certain basic needs have to be satisfied even if total utility does 
not increase. He claims that the poorest should receive resources by right, 
regardless of the effect on the happiness of those whose resources are taken 
away. His idea arises from principles such as the rules for social justice which 
are `formed and legitimised by rational people'. Each person is a self interested 
agent who "wants to choose principles which are to govern the society in which 
he is to live" (in Dower's interpretation) and as Morrissey (1991) explains, 
"these principles would be those chosen by rational self-interested agents in the 
original state, that is, behind a `veil of ignorance' so that they do not know 
what position they will have in society...... (hence) if potential entrants to 
society do not know their position in the income distribution or in space (i. e. in 
which country) they will, a priori, accept that there should be redistribution". 
S 
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Not many agree with the case for aid on moral or redistributional grounds. 
Bauer (1981) challenged the moral arguments for aid based on need, 
egalitarianism and history. For Bauer, economic differences are deserved and 
`are largely the result of people's capacities and motivations'. To him, the 
developing countries are poor because they are lazy and one should not reward 
laziness through foreign aid. On top of that, Nozick (1974) argues that the state 
has no right to use its power for the purpose of persuading individuals to help 
others. 
Despite this debate, there are many other reasons why donors give aid to 
developing countries e. g. for commercial or strategic reasons which are not 
discussed here. We are mostly concerned with the outcome of transferring 
foreign aid to the developing countries. We begin by analysing the trends and 
sources of capital to developing countries since the 1970s. The reason for 
beginning with 1970 is that the OECD provides a reliable data set from this 
date and the component of foreign aid can be identified as multilateral, 
bilateral, grants and technical co-operation. 
1.3 Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Trends and Sources 
Developing countries have traditionally been net importers of capital. The 
international community has been making continuous efforts to supply 
development finance to meet their insufficient domestic saving or foreign 
exchange and to match the investment needs to promote growth. The two main 
sources of supply of capital are official financing, including Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), and private capital. Capital flows have 
fluctuated significantly over past decades. These have been associated with the 
economic environment of capital-surplus countries, the availability and cost of 
external finance. To analyse the trend of resource transfers, data have been 
Chaqw1er One Introduction 
compiled from the World Debt Tables 1994-95 and the World Bank data which 
is available on CD-ROM, version 3.0 of the STARS retrieval system (World 
Bank, 1995). The World Bank takes a developing-country/debtor approach and 
operates the Debtor Reporting System. World Bank estimates of ODA are 
based on a combination of OECD measures (donor/creditor approach) and 
recipient measures for different components of ODA. 
The use of foreign capital, private and public, by developing countries has 
varied substantially across countries and between historical periods. The 
variation has been both in the aggregate amounts of capital supplied and in the 
form in which it has been provided. Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 depict the 
different types of net resource flows to all developing countries during the 
period 1970 to 1993. As one can notice, flows of foreign capital to developing 
countries have been volatile in the past two decades. The aggregate net 
resource flows have also been deflated by the import value index (1990 = 100) 
to obtain real values. Figure 1.2 depicts the nominal and real values and it can 
be seen that they do not differ much. The period 1973-81 witnessed massive 
capital inflows to many developing countries, largely in the form of private 
loans. Such lending effectively dried up during the period of the debt crisis, 
1982-1987. But in recent years, there has been a surge in net capital flows. This 
can be explained by the fact that for the first few years after the debt crisis, 
most lending to developing countries took the form of official loans from 
international financial institutions to support policy and institutional reforms 
necessary to achieve stabilisation and adjustment. Once countries began to 
make progress in their adjustment efforts, private capital inflows towards them 
increased significantly (Corbo and Hernandez, 1996). 
During this period, foreign aid, as a major component of capital inflows, has 
been rising slowly but its share in total net resource transfers fell during the 
period 1970-1984 overall, experienced a period of increase during 1985-1987 
but fell again thereafter. There are two possible reasons for the decline. First, 
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the real volume of foreign aid from donor countries were in fact falling. 
Second, private capital flows, another major component, had been increasing at 
a much faster pace than foreign aid. In fact private capital inflows have mostly 
influenced the total amount of net resource transfers. For instance during the 
past decade when aggregate net resource transfers peaked at US $ 126 billion, 
foreign aid accounted for only 21% while private capital inflows were 51%. 
But when the world was hit by the debt crisis, private flows to developing 
countries started to decline, consequently developing countries had to rely 
mostly on official flows which did not even compensate for the fall in private 
flows. 
It is often claimed that the relatively small share of direct investment and the 
large share of debt to commercial banks were important reasons for the debt 
crisis of the 1980s. Compared to official flows, private funding has been 
especially episodic as one can see from figure I. I. This has triggered a 
substantial literature assessing the impact on recipient countries. For example, 
macroeconomic repercussions such as appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
expansion of nontradables at the expense of tradables, larger trade deficits, 
higher inflation, accumulation of foreign reserves, overvaluation and capital 
flight. Although these are important issues, they are dealt with elsewhere, see 
for example, Carmichael (1989), Schadler et al. (1993), Fernandez-Arias and 
Montiel (1996) and Corbo and Hernandez (1996) among others. 
Foreign aid has remained a vital source of financing for developing countries. 
It is defined as a resource flow "... to developing countries and multilateral 
institutions provided by official agencies.... administered with the promotion of 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective, and it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at 
least 25 per cent" (Development Assistance Committee. DAC. 1985, pp. 171, 
original emphasis). Note that food aid and technical co-operation are also 
included. The latter covers assistance for developing country individuals 
14 
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receiving education or training at home or abroad, and for teachers, 
administrators, technical experts, and the like working in developing countries 
(Cassen et al., 1986). 
Figure 1.3 depicts the main international events that have affected resource 
flows. During the 1970s there has been a massive flow of capital. both in real 
and nominal terms to the developing countries largely in the form of private 
loans (private loans include mainly commercial banks lending, bonds and other 
creditors). Between 1973 and 1982 the two oil price shocks created a 
temporary savings surplus in high-income, oil-exporting countries. Their 
surplus funds were recycled to developing countries. In addition to increasing 
their development aid, high income, oil-exporting countries placed much of 
their oil revenue with international commercial banks in the form of short-term 
Euro dollar deposits. This contributed to raising liquidity in the international 
banking system because credit demand in the industrial countries had been 
depressed by the oil price shocks. Liquidity and monetary laxity in the 
industrial countries drove real interest rates down (World Bank, 1988). As a 
result it was rather attractive for developing countries to claim more funds for 
developmental purposes and debt servicing for the cheap loans with few strings 
attached. Commercial lending to developing countries 
- 
along with official 
lending and aid 
- 
grew very rapidly during this period. 
The early 1980s recorded a different episode where lending effectively dried up 
for many developing countries. The period 1982-1987 was characterised by an 
international debt crisis. A period of very high inflation preceded the second oil 
price shock of 1982 which was accompanied by anti-inflationary macro- 
economic policies in industrial countries which led to a rapid rise in nominal 
interest rates and slowed the pace of economic growth. The combination of 
increased levels of indebtedness, increased interest charges on variable and new 
loans, the slowdown in export markets and lower prices for non-oil 
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commodities led to soaring real costs for all forms of new and existing debt. 
Developing countries with large foreign debts were hit hard. The deterioration 
of the U. S saving-investment balance caused the United States to stake a bigger 
claim on the world's savings at a time when savings of the high-income oil 
exporters was falling along with the price of oil. Rising debt service and the cut 
in lending led to a reversal of net resource transfers to developing countries 
during this period. 
With the end of the international debt crisis which witnessed a fall in aggregate 
net resource transfers in both real and nominal terms, there has been a surge in 
these flows. In fact they started to pick up by 1989, and in 1990 the total net 
resource flows reached the nominal pre-debt crisis peak level of 1981. This 
reflected the recovery in advanced countries and the recovering health of the 
business community. Many developing countries started to receive substantial 
flows of foreign capital. What is interesting to observe is the composition of 
the net resource transfers. In fact in the early 1990s, there was a surge in private 
capital inflows. In 1993 these were US $159 billion representing 75% of total 
net resource flows. The surge in private capital flows was accompanied by a 
shift in their composition toward equity in the form of foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment. Together these equity flows accounted for 
more than two-thirds of private capital flows in 1993. Debt flows have 
favoured bonds rather than commercial bank loans, with bond issuance 
accounting for one-quarter of private flows in 1993 (World Bank, 1994). 
On the other hand, foreign aid to developing countries which were stable, 
averaging US $ 36 billion in the 1980s experienced a sharp increase in 1990 
and 1991, reflecting in part higher official grants and lending associated with 
the Gulf War. Due to capital market imperfections. not all developing countries 
can rely on, or have benefited from, access to private international capital 
markets. Private capital flows have favoured mostly middle-income countries 
leaving the low-income countries to rely heavily on official loans. 
17 
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The analysis has shed light on the distribution of net resource transfers to 
developing countries as a whole, but is the scenario just described the same for 
all? Certainly not. For this purpose the developing countries have been 
clustered as low and middle income countries; the flows are depicted in figures 
1.4 and 1.5 respectively. 
From figure 1.4 it can be seen that low income countries have relied heavily on 
foreign aid. In fact official grants and official loans constituted the major part 
in net resource transfers in contrast to middle income countries. The low 
income countries attracted very little private capital during the 1970s and 
1980s. During the international debt crisis, foreign aid accounted for the bulk 
of resource transfers of which grants were even more pronounced. These 
transfers were mostly directed to finance the cost of existing debt and towards 
balance of payments support. With the end of the debt crisis, trading 
opportunities due to the recent negotiations under the GATT agreement and 
recovery in the industrial nations have motivated private capital flows to 
become an important major source of external finance. The major component 
of this source of capital is seen to come from foreign direct investment, which 
was not so popular, has surged from 14% in 1990 to 47% in 1993 of total net 
resource transfers and its share in total private capital flows rose from 47% in 
1990 to 65% in 1993. Official flows also have shown some sign of increase of 
which the component of official grants was very important. Most of these 
grants have been directed by donors towards debt relief for low income and 
highly indebted countries. 
For the middle income countries the scenario has been the other way round. As 
figure 1.5 demonstrates. for these countries private capital flows have been the 
major source of external capital. For the 1970s and 1980s foreign aid accounted 
for only around 35% of total net flows. This proportion fell to around 15% in 
1993. The volume of private capital flows to these countries has quadrupled 
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since the turn of this decade. There has been a major increase and shift in the 
component of private capital flows itself. With the end of the debt crisis, 
foreign direct investment and portfolio investment have surged spectacularly. 
With emphasis on trade liberalisation and confidence in the business 
community along with economic recovery of industrial nations. equity flows 
seem to favour, to a large extent, the middle income countries. Investment 
opportunities and incentive packages attract equity flows, but in 1994 the 
outlook for these flows points to a slowdown. This is due mainly to the 
combined effect of higher interest rates and a period of turbulence in 
international bond markets in early 1994. 
As noted earlier, although the trend of net resource flows has experienced some 
fluctuations, foreign aid flows have been relatively stable. Without doubt low 
income countries have been the major recipients of these flows. In per capita 
terms, there have been some important regional allocation differences. Table 
1.2 and figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the trends and distribution of aid per capita for 
countries grouped into six main regions. It is no surprise to see that per capita 
aid in East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia is relatively lower than any 
other region due to the presence of the two most populated countries in each 
region, China and India respectively. Although aid per capita has risen over 
time in each region, it is Europe and Central Asia that has experienced greatest 
change. In fact with the breaking up of the Soviet bloc and the creation of New 
Independent States, foreign aid has been an important source of capital transfer, 
as those countries rebuilt their economic base. In addition Turkey is one of the 
countries in the region which has been politically favoured by some donors. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
Iniroduction 
Foreign aid is controversial. Donors have been giving aid due to different 
motives: altruism, humanitarian, ties with ex-colonies of a benign nature, 
military and strategic advantage, commercial benefit, ideology and 
neocolonialism, among others. We did not explain the motives behind giving 
aid but were more concerned to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid. It has 
been noticed that the trend of capital transfers to developing countries has been 
volatile to the major international events that took place between the period 
1970-93. Overall, the trends in capital flows have indicated that the 
composition of aggregate net resource flows to developing countries by income 
groups has now become a function of access to international capital markets. 
Countries with market access now rely increasingly on private capital flows, 
while those without market access depend mainly on official flows. In recent 
years private capital flows have become an important source of capital finance 
even for low income countries. Regionally, although Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been receiving substantial amounts of foreign aid, in per capita terms, countries 
in Europe and Central Asia have recently received the highest amount. Before 
evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid empirically, in the next chapter we 
incorporate foreign aid into some conventional growth models to assess its 
potential impact theoretically. 
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Chapter Two 
FOREIGN AID IN GROWTH MODELS 
2.1 Introduction 
The main objective of foreign aid is to promote economic development. As 
explained earlier, economic development is difficult to quantity as it is 
concerned with `a changing system or an evolving structure' (Morrissey, 1991), 
it has a more qualitative and normative connotation. In the absence of any 
better quantitative indicator, although some caveats remain, we have argued to 
use economic growth as a proxy for economic development due to the 
limitations mentioned in finding data for other indicators. 
In this chapter, we try to use some growth models to evaluate the possible 
impact of foreign aid and to assess its implications. This exercise has not been 
extensively analysed in the aid literature. We start with the simple Harrod- 
Domar model of growth in section 2.2, then the Neo-classical growth model 
developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) in section 2.3 along with some 
extensions. In section 2.4 an analysis of the `new' model of endogenous growth 
is outlined. The impact of foreign aid is considered in each model. We also 
discuss within the growth models alternative forms of aid, for example, where 
foreign aid enables the possibility of knowledge spillovers (section 2.5) and 
finances intermediate inputs imports from the donor (section 2.6). Note that an 
implicit assumption in these growth models is that the developing countries are 
assumed to be savings constrained. Section 2.7 summarises and concludes the 
chapter. 
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2.2 The Harrod-Domar Growth Model 
2.2.1 An Overview 
The publication of Harrod's seminal paper followed shortly by Domar's 
similar, but independently derived, provided a stimulus to growth theory 
(Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946). The similarities between the central results of 
the models resulted thereafter in a joint title, the Harrod-Domar model. This 
approach to economic growth is Keynesian in spirit. It is built on the concepts 
and methods of Keynesian short-run macroeconomics, it concentrates on the 
necessary conditions for equilibrium between aggregate savings and 
investment in a dynamic economy. As with Keynes, they are more interested 
in ex ante than in ex post savings and investment, because savings is 
necessarily equal to investment ex-post through adjustments in income. Hence 
the Harrod-Domar growth problem is concerned with the maintenance of a 
steady rate of growth which combines the multiplier with the accelerator 
principle to determine, not the level of income, but the rate of growth of 
income that assures continued equality between ex ante savings and 
investment. 
The Harrod-Domar model can be outlined with the following assumptions: 
1. Savings (S) is some constant proportion, s, of national income (Y) such that 
S= sY (2.2.1) 
2. Investment (I), defined as a change in the capital stock, K. is in accordance 
with the acceleration principle assumed to be a constant proportion of the rate 
of growth of output so that, 
I=AKK(Y-Y_1) (2.2.2) 
I=AK=KAY (2.2.3) 
where K stands for the marginal technical capital coefficient or simply the 
incremental capital-output ratio and 0 indicates a change in the variable. 
Dividing equation (2.2.3) by Y yields: 
Their description contains some similarities and differences which is not of major 
importance in the present analysis. For a comprehensive expose see Hywel (I 975). 
25 
Chapter 2 
AK AY 
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Rewriting (2.2.4) by substituting AK for I, 
I AY 
-=x- YY 
Foreign Aid in Growth Models 
(2.2.4) 
(2.2.5) 
Rewriting AY/Y as g, the rate of growth of output can be expressed as 
11 
g__ 
KY 
(2.2.6) 
On the assumption that x is fixed, based on the assumption that the production 
function is of fixed proportions, the only constraint to growth is investment. 
Capital, hence, is seen as a bottleneck to growth. This `fact' is also used by 
Rostow (1956) 
, 
who argued that investment will bring the momentum for 
take-off in developing countries by "a rise in the rate of productive 
investment from (say) 5 per cent or less to over 10 per cent of national 
income.... ". 
2.2.1 The impart of, foreign aid in the Harrod-Dornar rrcodel 
On the assumption that ex ante savings is equal to ex ante investment we can 
deduce using equations (2.2.1) and (2.2.6) that: 
g= s/x (2.2.7) 
Hence the fundamental `trick' of economic growth, as Todaro (1994) calls it, 
is simply to increase the proportion of national income saved. This would 
imply that countries which are able to save a higher proportion of income 
could grow at a much faster rate than those that saved less. Moreover, this 
growth would then be self-sustaining. 
On the basis of the above formulation, a country can fix a target rate of income 
growth, say g, and hence determine the level of investment required to 
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achieve that rate. If the domestic savings generated cannot meet the required 
investment to achieve the targeted growth, then a savings constraint is said to 
exist. This is a particular feature of most poor developing countries which have 
a relatively low level of investment due mainly to their inability to generate 
sufficient domestic savings (e. g. through taxation). It often found that private 
capital in any single industry in a poor country is unlikely to be financially 
attractive or successful because of the small size of the market for its products. 
A reason for less private capital inflows, especially foreign direct investment, 
would be because of limited opportunities for profit that sustains the level of 
investment (Cairncross, 1962). Hence, given that domestic savings are low and 
prospects for private foreign investment bleak, the rationale for foreign aid is 
justified to substitute for these deficiencies. This would relieve the country 
from a capital bottleneck. Denoting a as the proportion of foreign capital 
inflows in the form of foreign aid to national income, the targeted growth rate 
will be given by: 
g= (s + a)/ K (2.2.8) 
which will be higher than the growth rate permissible by domestic savings 
only. Thus, this justifies one of the reasons for massive capital transfers and 
technical assistance from developed to the developing world due to the capital 
bottleneck faced by these countries. 
Rosenstein-Rodan's (1961) pioneering effort was to use the above procedure 
to determine the allocation of foreign aid in underdeveloped countries. He 
calculated the amount of foreign capital transfer in view to reducing the time it 
takes to achieve `self-sustaining' growth. To Rosenstein-Rodan foreign aid 
permits a recipient country `to make the transition from stagnation to self- 
sustaining economic growth'. This can only be achieved by the recipient's 
own effort otherwise foreign aid will be wasted. The main aim of development 
aid is to enable the recipient country to achieve steady growth. It is worth 
pointing out that `economic factors' are a necessary but not a sufficient 
27 
Chapter 2 Foreign Aid in Growth Models 
condition for sustained growth, other factors-institutional, social and political 
are also important. 
For ascertaining the length of time for the underdeveloped countries to reach 
`self-sustaining' growth, it is assumed that there is a divergence between ex 
ante savings and investment. The capital flow requirements of the 
underdeveloped countries over a certain period in relieving the savings 
constraint is calculated as follows: 
(i) From the Harrod-Domar model 
I= KAY (2.2.9) 
and assuming that the gross national product increases by r per cent and that 
the capital-output ratio, x, to be constant, 
AY 
= rY (2.2.10) 
Substituting equation (2.2.10) into (2.2.9) yields 
I, 
=xrY, 
where t is a time subscript 
. 
Hence 
E1, 
=xrEY, (2.2.11) 
(ii) The savings function is specified as 
St= bY, 
-d (2.2.12) 
so that the marginal propensity to save, b, is greater than the average 
propensity to save, (b- d/Y, ) where d is a constant. Aggregate savings will be 
given by: 
ES, =bEY, 
-Ed (2.2.13) 
and d can be determined by putting t=0, thus 
So=bY 
-d 
d- (b-S0 /YO) Yo 
where So NO is the average propensity to save in the initial period. Substituting 
the value of d in the savings function we get 
ES, 
=bEY, 
-Ed 
E S, 
= 
bE Yt 
- 
tYo (b-S0 /Y(1) (2.2.14) 
28 
Chanter 2 Foreign Aid in Growth Moder 
(iii) At any time t the amount of foreign capital inflows needed to meet the gap 
between investment and domestic savings to achieve the targeted growth is 
given by Ft = It 
- 
St. Hence the total capital inflow, E F, will be given by 
EFt=EIt 
- 
ESt (2.2.15) 
substituting for E I, and E S, yields 
E Ft = xrE Y, 
- 
[bE Yt 
- 
tYO (b-So NO )] 
E F, = (xr-b)E Yt + tYo (b-So /YO) (2.2.16) 
Rosenstein-Rodan argues that recipient countries should make some 'efforts' 
for a self-sustaining transition. What he is trying to suggest is that recipient 
countries should, among one of the `efforts', save more from the increased 
income arising from `outside capital', otherwise foreign aid will be wasted. He 
further argues that: 
"A marginal savings rate considerably higher than the average is 
the main lever of economic development of underdeveloped 
countries. Once the level of self-sustaining growth is reached, with 
average savings of 12-15 per cent, the marginal savings rate need 
no longer be higher than the average. " (1961, pp. 117) 
The idea is that aid should continue until a certain level of income is reached in 
the developing countries so that they can mobilise a level of capital formation 
sufficient for self-sustaining growth. Many writers have misinterpreted this 
idea by adding that for self-sustaining growth the marginal propensity to save 
`should exceed' the average propensity to save. For example, White (1992) and 
Thirlwall (1994) stated that this transition is achieved if the marginal 
propensity to save exceeds the average savings rate, so that the latter rises with 
income. The ratio of foreign capital inflows 
, 
F, /Y,, is given by 1, /Y, - St/Y, or 
Ft1Yt 
= xr 
- 
(b 
- 
d/Y, ). To achieve self-sustaining growth reliance on foreign 
capital inflows needs to fall. For this to happen b, the marginal propensity to 
2 But Thirlwall soon afterwards stressed that for a country to reduce external borrowing, 
marginal rate of saving should exceed the required rate of investment. 
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save, needs to be greater than Kr. But what is Kr? The above mentioned authors 
have interpreted Kr as the average propensity to save which is wrong. Kr can 
only be interpreted as the average propensity to save if and only if I, /Yt = St/Yt. 
But the very essence of foreign transfers is that h/Y, # S1/Y1. So xr should be 
defined as the required investment rate to achieve certain targeted growth rate. 
Hence, for achieving self-sustaining growth the country's marginal propensity 
to save needs to be higher than the required investment rate. 
The implication of the Harrod-Domar model is quite straight forward, foreign 
aid will enable higher growth as long it is flowing in. Growth will fall back to 
its previous level once foreign aid is removed, unless the marginal propensity 
to save matches the required investment rate which it will when the country is 
in its self-sustaining stage. 
2.3 The Neo-classical Growth Model 
2.3.1 An Overview 
The Harrod-Domar model has provided a framework for evaluating the 
impact of aid on growth. Many writers see the growth model of Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956)-- the so-called neo-classical model of growth as more 
persuasive. This was developed because in "... the Harrod-Domar version of 
the parable, the numbers s, x and n are independently given facts of nature.... If 
s, x and n are independent constants, then there is no reason at all why it (the 
steady state of growth) should happen that s= Kn, except by the merest fluke" 
(Solow, 1970). Solow then argued that at least one of the three numbers must 
be, not a given constant, but a variable capable of taking on a sufficiently wide 
range of values. Among these the more plausible candidate was to drop the 
assumption of fixed-proportion technology in production and to deal with a 
variable capital-output ratio. An advantage to this approach is that the capital- 
labour ratio is now endogenous. 
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The model is set out in Appendix 2.1 showing how an economy reaches a 
steady-state growth. We then use it to analyse the impact of foreign aid. From 
Appendix 2.1, the fundamental equation of the neo-classical growth model is 
given by: 
K=s. f(K) 
- 
nK (2.3.9) 
where s. f(K) is the saving per worker (and since saving is also equal to 
investment in this model, it is also regarded as the flow of investment per 
worker and nK is the amount that would be required to keep the capital-labour 
ratio constant (note that the labour force is growing at a constant proportionate 
rate n). The rate of change of the capital-labour ratio, K, is hence determined 
by the difference between the amount of saving (and investment) per worker 
and the amount required to keep the capital-labour ratio constant as the labour 
force grows. Equation (2.3.9) implies that the economy settles in the long run 
to a steady state. This is illustrated in figure 2.3.1. The lower of the two 
curves is equal to the intensive production function, f(K), scaled down by the 
factor s. Since 0<s<I and f(K) is well-behaved, s. f(K) is everywhere below 
f(K) and is also well-behaved. 
Figure 2,3.1: Steady-state in the neo-classical growth model. 
K K* K 
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The line through the origin is nx with slope n. Steady state growth occurs at y* 
and K* where the line nx intersects the curve s. f(K). If the saving per worker is 
greater than the amount required to keep the capital-labour ratio constant as the 
labour force grows, e. g. at K, then it is clear that the capital stock will grow 
faster than the labour force and the capital-labour ratio will consequently 
increase. Similarly, if saving per worker is less than nx, capital-labour ratio 
will decrease. Hence given the assumptions, a balanced-growth solution for 
the model exists and is stable, for whatever the initial values of all the 
variables in the model, the economy moves steadily towards the balanced 
growth path which is also unique. 
Equation (2.3.9) can be rewritten following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) as: 
k=s. f(K) 
-n (2.3.10) KK 
to illustrate the steady-state. The first term of equation (2.3.10) is a downward 
sloping curve, which asymptotes to infinity at K=0 and approaches 0 as K 
tends to infinity. The second term is a horizontal line at n. These can be plotted 
against K as in figure 2.3.2. The vertical distance between the curve and the 
line equal the growth rate of capital per person, and the crossing point 
corresponds to the steady state. 
Figure 2.3.2: Another Lyranhi 
y, n t 
ntation of the steady-state. 
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If, for instance, K> K*, then the growth rate is negative, and K falls towards K* 
and If K< K*, the growth rate is positive and K increases towards K*. The 
arrows on the horizontal axis indicate the direction of movement of the ratio 
K/L over time. 
2.3.2 The impact oforeign aid in a neo-classicalframework 
Now we can examine the impact of foreign aid on this economy. Assume that 
foreign aid is in the form of a grant and is a flow. In the existing literature 
most of the studies have used the neo-classical model to deal with international 
capital flows, mainly private, for example Borts (1964), Oniki and Uzawa 
(1965), Negishi (1965), and Kemp (1968). Eaton (1989) overviews some of 
these models in a simplified way. 
Surprisingly there has been only one study that of Crouch (1973) that has 
considered the impact of foreign aid in a static neo-classical growth model 
which is summarised below. In the first instance we consider the case where 
the donor country gives aid in the form of capital goods. Figure 2.3.3 considers 
the case where, A, the amount of the aid is tied to the capital sector (ignoring 
for the moment the broken lines). The capital-labour ratio rises from xi to K2- 
Aid-supported per capita income and per capita consumption are y2 and x1z, 
respectively. The economy stays at that point as long as aid flows in. As soon 
as aid stops, the economy shrinks back to x because the capital requirement to 
keep the capital-labour ratio constant exceeds per capita saving. Hence the 
impact or benefits of aid prove to be transitory during which the recipient has 
temporarily enjoyed higher consumption per capita. 
Now assume that the donor gives an equal amount of grant aid in the form of 
consumer goods. In this case income per capita rises from y, to y3. The aid- 
supported production function shifts to y° = f(K) and consequently the saving 
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per capita curve shifts upward to s°f(K) which is parallel to s. t(K). Because at 
K, saving per worker exceeds the capital requirement, the capital-labour ratio 
rises to K3. This further increases the income per capita to y4 and consumption 
per capita is z2x2. Again this situation will persist while aid is received. As 
soon as it is withdrawn, all the ratios drop back to their non-aid levels. 
Figure 2.3.3: The impact of Foreign Aid in the neo-classical model. 
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What is interesting to note in this analysis is that income per capita and 
consumption (saving) per capita are higher when aid is allocated in the form of 
consumer goods rather than capital goods. Also if the recipient has the ability 
to increase its propensity to save, a higher income per capita can he reached 
(hut in the long run there will be no growth in per capita terms). A rise in 
saving rate would, however, reduce current consumption per capita during part 
of the transition period. The outcome will therefore depend on how households 
weigh today's consumption against the path of future consumption. For this 
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purpose an objective function needs to be identified against which the 
desirability of an increase in the saving rate can be judged. 
From the static model just described, it can be deduced that given the 
assumptions of the neo-classical model, aid has practically no long run 
beneficial effects either in the form of capital or consumer goods. Crouch 
(1973) has attempted an exercise by modifying the assumptions of the neo- 
classical model and from which long run benefits are perceived. Crouch has 
applied demographers' explanation about the behaviour of the growth rate of 
population so that n is not exogenous but a function of income per capita. 
Population is a function of per capita income and consequently it generates a 
capital requirement curve like nK in figure 2.3.4. The saving per capita is also 
not constant but reflects the behaviour of the growth rate of the population. 
Crouch showed that given these conditions, the possibility of a steady state 
growth equilibrium exists at three different levels of the capital-labour ratio 
and only two of them are stable ( at KI and x3). Steady-state growth at K2 is 
unstable, the slightest divergence from xz sends x to either xi or x3. 
Developing countries are characterised to he at a steady-state growth at xi. 
Such a position is often referred to in the development literature as a `low level 
equilibrium trap' [Lewis (1954), Liebenstein (1957) and Nelson (1960)] and 
implies that a `big push' or `minimum critical effort' is required to achieve 
high levels of output per worker permanently. 
Hence if foreign aid in the form of grants of capital goods is not able to 
increase the country's capital-labour ratio above K2, then the benefits of aid 
will be transitory. However, if the capital-labour ratio is raised above K2, it 
would help the country to "take off' to finally reach K3 with a higher level of 
income per capita. Moreover, when the aid is withdrawn, the economy would 
remain at K3. Hence if enough capital is pumped into the economy, higher per 
capita income levels can be reached permanently. 
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In case of a generous consumer good aid which could raise the saving per 
capita curve clear above the nx curve, would once more allow the recipient 
country to "take off'. With aid support, a higher capital-labour ratio than x3 
would be attained, for example x4. If aid stopped flowing in, the economy 
would only fall back into steady-state growth at 1(3. Permanent benefits are 
hence possible in these circumstances. 
Figure 2.3.4: The impact of Foreign Aid under alternative assumptions 
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It can also be found from the figure that if foreign assistance is in the form of 
population control then a sufficient reduction in n could bring the nic curve 
below the concave from above section of the s. f(K) curve. A higher income per 
capita per worker can hence be attained in such a case. Crouch's conclusion 
was that for foreign aid (either in the form of consumer or capital goods) to 
have long run beneficial effects on the development of the recipient there must 
exist a low-level equilibrium trap and also aid must be above a critical 
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minimum. These are accordingly necessary and sufficient conditions for 
permanent benefits to occur in a neo-classical framework. 
An extension to the Solow model has been developed using Ramsey (1928) 
methodology that incorporates endogenous determination of the saving rate. 
The specification of consumer behaviour is a key element in this kind of 
optimisation model. The model was subsequently refined by Cass (1965) and 
Koopmans (1965). Many authors have elaborated on this model, for example 
Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1992) and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
In this model, the households choose consumption and saving to maximise 
their dynastic utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. The 
households' pattern of per capita consumption is mostly found to depend on 
the interest rate, the discount rate and the willingness to substitute 
intertemporally. For instance, if households have a strong preference for 
smoothing consumption over time (that is, a high willingness to shift 
consumption from the future to the present), the low rate of investment would 
imply that the transition to the steady state would take a longer time than if the 
households are more willing to postpone consumption. 
In this model even though saving is endogenously determined, it does not 
eliminate the convergence property to the steady state as in the static model. 
The effect of foreign aid whether tied to capital goods or untied would yield 
the same results as before. 
R 9 nb ur o nresence a ore 
It has been assumed so far that the level of technology is constant over time 
and following this all per capita variables were constant in the long run. This 
assumption would be too extreme in a world which is nowadays characterised 
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with innovation and improvements in the efficiency of labour. Developed 
countries' per capita growth would have been difficult to maintain by only 
accumulating capital per worker in the presence of diminishing returns. 
Technological improvements allow a country to neutralise or even surmount 
diminishing returns effects on growth, hence enabling the country to grow in 
per capita terms. 
Many donor countries give foreign aid in the form of technical assistance for 
improving labour efficiency. Attempts to model the impact of this 
improvement on labour has been ignored in the aid literature. This form of 
technical assistance can have considerable positive effects on growth in the 
long run. This type of aid includes scholarships, expert advice, access to 
sophisticated equipment to carry out research and so on. 
To illustrate how it can raise the recipient's long run growth rate, it is assumed 
that foreign aid is associated with labour-augmenting technological progress. 
The production function Y= F(K, L) becomes 
Y= F[ K, L. A(t)] (2.3.11) 
where A(t) is the technology index given by e" which starts growing at a 
constant rate x from the time the aid is obtained (assuming before that x was 
zero). The methodology is adapted from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) with 
slight modifications. Maintaining that all saving is invested: 
K=s. F[ K, L. A(t)] (2.3.12) 
Dividing both sides by L: 
K-s. F[x, A(t)] (2.3.13) 
L 
Substituting equation (2.3.13) into (2.3.8) and rearranging terms to get 
K=s. F[K, A(t)] 
- 
nK (2.3.14) 
Comparing equations (2.3.9) and (2.3.14), it can be seen that output per capita 
now depends on the level of technology, A(t). 
Dividing both sides of equation (2.3.14) by K to get the growth rate of x: 
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K ýK 
=-=s. F[K, A(t)]/ K-n (2.3.15) K 
Notice that in equation (2.3.15) the average product of capital 
, 
F[ic, A(t)]/ x, 
increases over time because of the growth in A(t) at the rate x. In terms of 
figure 2.3.2, the downward sloping curve, s. f(K)/x, now shifts continually to 
the right. 
We know that the steady-state growth rate, ý*, <, should be constant (recall that 
without technological progress, 4*K was zero in the steady state). Given s and n 
are exogenous, equation (2.3.15) implies that the average product of capital is 
constant in the steady state. Under constant returns to scale the average 
product of capital equals F[1, A(t)/x] and is therefore constant only if x and 
A(t) grow at the same rate, i. e. E*K = x. 
Since K and A(t) grow at the same rate, we can rewrite the production function 
in intensive form as 
y=F(ic, 1)=f(ic) (2.3.16) 
where y= Y/L. A(t) and ü= K/L. A(t). 
Proceeding as before we can derive the dynamic equation for x 
4k 
= s. f(ic )/ic 
- 
(n + x) (2.3.17) 
since steady-state growth of x is zero, the steady-state value ü* satisfies the 
condition 
s. f(K )/ic = (n + x) (2.3.18) 
The above equation can be illustrated in terms of figure 2.3.2 as the one shown 
in figure 2.3.5. In the new steady-state, due to a labour-augmenting 
technology, the variables x, y, c are now constant and grow in the steady- 
state at the exogenous rate of technological progress, x. Observe that the 
steady-state growth has increased from x* to x *. The economy which was 
constantly growing at the rate n is now able to grow at a higher rate n+x. All 
the variables-capital stock, income, consumption (saving) are now growing 
at this new rate n+x. Hence foreign aid in this form is able to have beneficial 
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effects in the long run as long as technical assistance is flowing in the 
economy. If foreign aid ceases, then growth will shrink hack to its former 
level. To experience permanent effects, the recipient should find ways to 
assimilate and learn in the process so that when aid stops, the economy can 
still grow at the rate n+x. The recipient should make the technology become 
'endogenous', so that it is generated within the economy. It is only then that 
aid will prove to have long run beneficial effects. The question which remains 
is whether developing countries have such technological potentials. 
Figure 2.3.5: Labour Efficiency Improvement under Foreign Aid. 
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We have been talking about long run effects, but how long is the 'long run'? 
Sato (1963) and Sato (1966) has tried to calculate the length of time that it 
might take for an economy to attain balanced growth by assuming `plausible' 
values of the parameters in the model. He found that a slight change in the 
propensity to save induced by fiscal policy can result in adjustment time to be 
very long 
- 
possibly over a hundred years! 
Recent developments in growth theory have attracted more attention into a 
new formulation in the mid 1980's. This questions the mechanisms that drive 
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an economy to its long run steady state. This kind of model inspired by Romer 
(1986), has been called the endogenous growth model to which we now turn to 
in the next section. 
2.4 The Endogenous Growth Models. 
2.4.1 An overview 
The neo-classical growth model without doubt has brought many useful 
insights about the path to steady-state growth. The fundamental mechanism is 
the variability of the capital-labour ratio (being an improvement over the 
Harrod-Domar model) while other variables such as savings rate and growth of 
labour force are assumed to be exogenous and are independent in the process. 
The model also relies on a well-behaved production function satisfying the 
Inada conditions, where diminishing returns to capital prevail. In recent years 
some growth theorists, such as Romer (1986), started to challenge the already 
predetermined long run growth which was the results of exogenous 
assumptions of certain variables. 
We have seen that the impact of foreign aid in the neo-classical model is 
transitory unless the basic assumptions are ruled out. Let us assume that now 
there is the potential for endogenous growth in the sense that there is an 
absence of diminishing returns to capital. We take a simple production 
function without diminishing returns as 
Y=AK (2.4.1) 
where A is an index for the level of the technology and is a positive constant. 
Dividing both sides by L, output per capita is given by 
y= AK (2.4.2) 
where y= Y/L and K= K/L. Notice that the average and marginal products of 
capital are constant at the level A>0. Assuming that the saving rate is 
exogenous and constant, we can substitute f(K)/K =A in equation (2.3.10), 
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k 
( ý= = s. f(K)/K - 11), of the neo-classical model from the earlier section to 
K 
get: 
k 
ýk 
==s. A 
-n 
(2.4.3) 
K 
In terms of figure 2.3.2, now the downward sloping curve, s. t(x)/x is replaced 
by the horizontal line at the level sA in figure 2.4.1. Assuming that sA > n, we 
can find that perpetual growth occurs (even when we assume zero 
technological progress as opposed to the neo-classical model). The growth of 
x, 4, is given by the vertical distance between the two lines, sA and n. 
Because the two lines are parallel, is constant and notice that it is 
independent of K. Hence K always grows at the steady-state rate. = sA - n. 
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for further details). 
Figure 2.4.1: Endogenous Growth Model. 
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Notice that because y= AK, also equals Eti at every point in time. 
Consequently given c= (1 
- 
s)y, the growth rate of c equals ýk 
. 
Hence, all per 
capita variables in the model grow at the same rate given by: 
ý_ ý 
=sA-n 
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In this model the per capita growth rate depends on the behavioural parameters 
of the model, such as saving rate, level of technology and the rate of 
population growth. For instance, a higher saving rate leads to a higher rate of 
long-run per capita growth. Even an improvement in the level of technology 
will lead to higher growth rates. 
2.4.2 Foreign Aid in Endogenous Growth Models 
If an economy is characterised by the form of production technology described 
above, then perpetual positive growth is observed and in such a case there is 
no point in claiming foreign assistance since the economy is in a self- 
sustaining position unless sA < n. In case sA <n then an inflow of foreign aid 
sufficient to raise the sA line above n would generate incessant positive 
growth rates. Again if the flow of foreign aid is relinquished, then aid's impact 
will only prove to be temporary. But in the case where a donor supplies a new 
form of technology to the recipient country, which is to remain forever with 
the recipient even though the inflow ceases, then the impact of aid might prove 
to be permanent in this context (for e. g. due to spillover effects, learning-by- 
doing, improving human capital),. 
To illustrate this, let us take a case where foreign aid takes the form of a grant 
of capital goods (CA; d) and which is a flow (e. g. project aid). Also we make 
some assumptions on the characteristics of the labour force, L. We assume that 
the attributes of the workers are such that they are endowed with some 
`dormant' knowledge which as yet has been unexploited mainly because of the 
existing technology. We also make the assumption that once a new technology 
is made available, the workers' efficiency and performance consequently 
improve (the 'dormant' knowledge becomes `active') and is then endowed 
permanently to enable a continuous labour-augmenting technology, even 
though the source of the technology is withdrawn. We can reasonably predict 
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that there might be a reduction in output when the source of the technology is 
excluded. 
It is quite evident that the rate of technological progress in a sector or activity 
is in part a response to changes in economic variables within the sector (we are 
here assuming a boost due to foreign aid). To realise potential gains from the 
foreign capital-embodied technological change, a high inflow of foreign aid 
investment is essential. We have seen from Crouch's (1973) study and the 
theory of `big push' earlier that the magnitude of foreign aid is of importance 
to developing countries, thus in what follows we will try to model this 
magnitude explicitly. Of course, the rates of investment and output are still key 
elements in theories of endogenous technical change such as Arrow's (1962) 
"learning by doing" in which labour productivity increases with the level of 
cumulative gross investment or output. In our case we rather assume that 
labour productivity increases due to the level of cumulative foreign aid gross 
investment. To model this form of endogenous technological change we 
proceed as follows. 
Suppose that the pre-aid production function is characterised by the neo- 
classical production function taking a Cobb-Douglas form as 
Y=AK`xL1 0<a<1 (2.4.4) 
where A is the domestic index of the level of technology and is greater than 
zero. The steady-state for this economy is then at Z as illustrated in figure 
2.4.2. 
Suppose that a donor country grants some capital goods to the domestic 
country and assuming that a new form of technology accompanies the capital 
goods. (This is a case where the recipient has to purchase or spend the aid 
money in the donor country). This new form of technology can be viewed to 
reflect the technology level in the donor country which can be assumed to be 
superior if the donor country is technologically more advanced than the 
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recipient, which is often the case for developing countries. Let us assume that 
the foreign aid (capital) is some proportion of the recipient country's capital 
stock, for instance CAId = %, K and the technology associated with it be B. 
As soon as this capital and technology is available labour-augmenting 
technology becomes `active', so that L in equation (2.4.4) becomes L. D(t) 
where D(t) =ex+ 1(13) or D(t) = en where p=x+ f(B). Hence, p is made up of 
x (> 0), which represents the technical progress which is autonomous and is 
permanently endowed as discussed above, and is a function of B. If B 
increases then the recipient country will benefit more in terms of labour- 
augmenting technological progress. Here it is assumed that the autonomous 
labour augmenting technology, x, will become endogenous to the recipient in 
the process when foreign aid flows in and will not stop once aid ceases. We 
can think of a case where the foreign aid encompass both physical and human 
capital. We can write the production function as3 
Y= AK° [L. D(t)]1- a+ BA. K (2.4.5) 
The first term of the production function in equation (2.4.5) exhibits constant 
returns to scale and positive and diminishing returns to labour and capital, 
however when considering the second term, assume that X>0 and is 
sufficiently large, one of the Inada conditions is violated because: 
lim Kea (F,, ) = BX >0. 
We can write equation (2.4.5) in per unit of effective labour as 
y= Ak" +Bkk (2.4.6) 
where y= Y/[L. D(t)] and k= K/[L. D(t)]. The average product of capital is 
given by: 
. 
14) 
=Ak ti-ýr> + B?, (2.4.7) k 
which is decreasing ink 
, 
but approaches B? as k tends to infinity. 
' This formulation was first brought out by Jones and Manuelli (1992). 
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The dynamics of this model can be analysed with the usual expression for 
from equation (2.3.17): 
f(k) ýk=S. ý- (n + P) k 
Substituting the expression for 
f (k) from equation (2.4.7). we get k 
ýti; 
=s. [BX+Ak-(n+p) (2.4.8) 
Figure 2.4.2 shows that the first expression on the right-hand side of equation 
(2.4.8) is downward sloping, and the line (n + p) is horizontal. In this case as 
k tends to infinity, the curve approaches the positive quantity sBa., rather than 
0 as in the `pure' neo-classical case. If sB2. >n+p, as assumed in the figure, 
then the steady-state growth rate, 4, *, is positive. 
The model yields endogenous steady-state growth but also predicts conditional 
convergence as in the neo-classical model because of the inverse relation 
between 
,f 
(k) 
and k. This is due to the first term of equation (2.4.6). k 
It is now interesting to observe what is going to happen when the donor ceases 
its aid allocation. Under this instance, the fundamental expression 
characterising the steady-state from equation (2.4.8) becomes: 
ýk 
-=SAk ýýa)- (nfx) (2.4.9) 
because f(B) 
= 
0. The steady-state capital-labour ratio settles at Z, as 
illustrated in figure 2.4.3. Hence the economy ends up achieving a higher 
growth rate (n +x compared to n earlier) despite a discontinuity of aid flows. 
But notice that the economy is no more exhibiting endogenous growth which 
generated a positive steady-state growth rate. 
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Figure 2.4.2: The Impact of Foreign Aid in the Endogenous Growth 
Model with Labour Augmenting Technology. 
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At Z1, the variables k, P. c are constant and the per capita variables K, y, c 
now grow in the steady state at the rate x. The levels of capital stock, income 
and consumption (saving) grow at the rate n+x. 
In Figure 2.4.3. we can observe that if the recipient has a low initial capital 
stock per effective worker, let say k (0), then the economy will grow faster in 
per capita terms than if it had a higher initial capital stock per effective worker. 
We can here think of an economy which is highly agrarian with a negligible 
amount of domestic capital stock per effective worker and where a donor 
decides to inject some capital goods into that economy. The growth rate in 
this case will be very high assuming that the productivity of capital is high. In 
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fact if rising average productivity is observed, then the curve s. f( k )1k will be 
upward sloping. 
Figure 2.4.3: The Impact when Foreign Aid stopti 
n. S. f( k )l k 
.t 
X 
Il+ S 
11 
f(k)1k 
- 
s. fi(x)/K 
k (K) 
The effectiveness of the foreign aid (and also foreign capital) depends on the 
magnitude of 2 which in a sense compares the amount of foreign capital in 
conjunction with domestic capital. As seen also in the neo-classical case, for 
an economy to "take off' the amount of foreign assistance should be 
significant. To illustrate this in this model let us assume that the s. f(x)/x curve 
behaves as shown in figure 2.4.4. We assume that the saving rate is constant 
but the production is characterised first by diminishing returns. so that the 
average product of capital declines with K but experience increasing returns at 
some point afterwards, and either asymptotes a positive value (as shown by the 
dashed portion in figure 2.4.4) or again experience diminishing returns. 
The displayed pattern of s. f(K)/K in figure 2.4.4 can be observed when an 
economy is highly agrarian where diminishing returns tend to prevail. With 
development the economy diversifies into the production of manufactures, 
industry and services which tend to generate increasing returns. The s. f(K)/K 
curve becomes upward sloping. Consequently, the economy can be subject to 
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either diminishing returns or converges to a positive value depending on the 
policy in existence. 
Figure 2.4.4: The Impact of Foreign Aid in the poverty trap case. 
S. t(K)/K 4 
KI K2 K; 
S. 1 (K )/K 
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In figure 2.4.4, the steady state x, is a stable one since when K<K,, 41< >0 and 
when x>x,, at least in an interval, ýk < 0. Hence x, is a stable steady state: it 
is a poverty trap as discussed earlier. The steady state K, is an unstable one 
because k<0 applies to the left, and i; k >0 applies to the right. Thus if the 
economy starts with an initial capital stock somewhere between K, and K,, 
then its tendency is to return to the development trap at K1, whereas if it 
manages somehow to grow further above K2 then it will tend to grow further to 
reach still higher levels of K. 
The dashed portion of the curve, s. f(K)/x, assumes that the growth rate 
asymptotes to a value that exceeds n and the economy is capable of 
endogenous steady-state growth. If donors give foreign aid that raises x to a 
level below K2, then the economy would still return over time to xi. The 
economy would thus enjoy temporarily higher levels of income and 
consumption, but would not make a permanent escape from poverty. The 
implication is that, as Crouch (1973) mentioned. a relatively small level of 
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international assistance would not achieve long-run economic development. A 
sufficiently large amount of foreign capital which enables the country to be 
above K2 would place the economy on a path that leads eventually to the high- 
level steady state, K3, or possibly to endogenous steady-state growth. 
In contrast to the neo-classical growth model, a temporary policy of raising the 
saving rate can make the country escape the poverty trap. If the high saving 
rate is maintained long enough so that x surpasses K2 and if the saving rate is 
then lowered back to its initial value, then the economy would not revert back 
to the poverty trap [see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), pp. 51]. Hence a policy 
inducing saving is very effective in this model and analysing the effect of aid 
on saving is also important. 
2 
.5 Knowledge snillovers and technology transfer from foreign 
aid activities 
2.51 The behaviour of the recipient during and beyond the transition phase 
Similar to the above example, the donor can also introduce new technology 
endowed in capital goods produced in the donor country to developing 
countries in the form of foreign aid. The question of course remains whether 
this technology is appropriate or not. We now try to analyse (by conjecturing) 
the behaviour of the recipient during the transition phase towards long run 
growth. Since capital goods is granted to the recipient we assume that the 
recipient will try to make the most of it by accumulating some knowledge. 
Arrow (1962) proposed that knowledge might accumulate as firms engage in 
new activities, but here we assume that the activity remains the same but the 
new foreign technology which raises labour efficiency can be thought of 
improving the quality of the firm's product, as if creating a `new' product. 
Entrepreneurs also start learning about ('manipulating') the new source of 
technology so that as they increase the physical capital, they learn 
simultaneously how to produce more efficiently. 
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We can think of a case where the recipient accumulates some stock of 
knowledge from time tj to t2 while foreign aid is flowing in (and assuming 
that this stops at time t2). The entrepreneurs can then use the experience gained 
from the cumulative amount of investment that had taken place in the 
economy between that time to generate additions to knowledge in the course 
of manufacturing output. The knowledge then contributes to the productivity 
of resources in subsequent manufacturing activities. The knowledge acquired 
can be thought to be the outcome of learning-by-doing and learning-by- 
investing. This consequently spills over the whole economy. 
The building up of this knowledge might seem that industrial innovation has 
little relevance to the growth process in the less developed economies. The less 
developed countries do not really carry out intensive R&D or make 
discoveries that are going to be original to the world economy. But these 
countries do acquire substantial technical change during their industrialisation 
process by analysing products and processes that are new to the local 
economy. We can think that entrepreneurs learn also through learning-by- 
looking. Pack and Westphal (1986) argue that "the minor role of invention in 
industrialisation simply means that much technological change consists of 
assimilating and adapting foreign technology" (pp. 105). 
The adaptation of technology depends on how fast the developing country is 
able to `catch-up' with the foreign technology. Abramovitz's (1986) view on 
catching up suggests that the productivity levels of countries tend to converge. 
The hypothesis asserts that being backward in level of productivity carries a 
potential for rapid advance. The catch-up process is hypothesised to operate by 
assuming that the level of technology is embodied in the country's capital 
stock. Also that the level of labour productivity were governed entirely by the 
level of technology embodied in capital stock. Abramovitz then assumes that 
when a leader (in our case the donor) discards old stock and replaces it, the 
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accompanying productivity increase is governed and limited by the advance of 
knowledge between the time when the old capital was installed and when it is 
replaced. In the meantime, lagging countries (the developing ones) have the 
potential to make a larger leap. Foreign capital injected into a recipient country 
can embody the frontier of knowledge, but the capital it replaces was 
technologically inferior. Hence, the larger the technological and, therefore the 
productivity gap between the donor and the recipient, the stronger the 
recipient's potential for growth in productivity. Ceteris paribus, this would 
lead to faster growth and the recipient will tend to catch-up faster if it is 
initially more backward. 
The question that arises, however, is if the above hypothesis is true then why 
are developing counties still lagging behind? The reason for this is that the 
process of catching up has some limits. Abramovitz suggests that 
technological backwardness is not a mere accident. Many developing countries 
have `tenacious societal characteristics' which accounts for a substantial 
portion of a country's past failure to achieve as high a level of productivity as 
economically more advanced countries. In order to be successful, he suggests 
that these countries should have the `social capability'. This could he regarded 
as such factors as years of schooling, political stability, commercial, industrial 
and financial institutions for instance. Hence, "a country's potential for rapid 
growth is strong not when it is backward without qualification, but rather 
when it is technologically backward but socially advanced" (Abramovitz, 
1986, pp. 388). 
Further to the development of a country's social capability, the pace at which 
it is expected to catch-up depends on factors limiting the diffusion of 
knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation of capital and the 
expansion of demand. Dowrick and Gemmell (1991) further investigated the 
catch-up hypothesis and also argued that technological spillover gives less 
developed countries the opportunity to catch-up but found empirically, using a 
52 
Chapter 2 Foreign Aid in Growth Models 
sample of 114 countries, that developing countries would benefit only if they 
are above certain `structural poverty threshold'. They suggest that once they 
are above this threshold, these countries are then able to modernise and catch- 
up through industrialisation. If they are below this threshold, it would be 
extremely difficult to sustain growth in per capita income to generate savings 
and investment to further economic development. 
Let us take a case where a recipient country has the 'social capability' and is 
above some 'structural poverty threshold' and see the impact on growth when 
foreign aid in terms of capital flows in the country. As Pack and Westphal 
(1986) argued, the process of assimilating a new technology in less developed 
countries will depend how much entrepreneurs can absorb. Let us assume that 
the entrepreneurs of developing countries manage to assimilate efficiently 
foreign technology and are in a position to build up on the accumulated stock 
of knowledge as from time t2. Following Arrow (1962), we assume that 
knowledge and productivity gains come from investment and production. And 
because knowledge is a public good (that is, nonrival), the knowledge spills 
over instantly across the whole economy. We also discuss further where the 
recipient starts ' learning' or imitating via trade. If we assume that the foreign 
aid ceases at time tz, then the production function for a firm i (with labour- 
augmenting technology still in place due to the accumulated knowledge) 
becomes: 
Y, 
= 
F(K;, M, L; ) (2.5.1) 
where L; and K. are the conventional inputs, and M; is the index of the 
accumulated knowledge from time tj to t2 when the foreign aid was flowing in. 
If we assume that each firm is now able to build on the acquired stock of 
knowledge and by assuming knowledge to be a public good implies that the 
change in the firm's technology term, M; 
, 
corresponds to the economy's 
overall learning and is therefore proportional to the change in the aggregate 
capital stock, k,. [We follow here Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)]. 
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Following the assumptions made, we can replace M; by K in equation (2.5.1) 
and write the production function for firm i as: 
Y; 
= 
F(K,, K. L j) (2.5.2) 
If K and Li are constant, then each firm faces diminishing returns to K, as in 
the neo-classical model. But when each firm expands K,, then K also increases 
and provides a spillover benefit that raises the productivity of all firms. 
Because equation (2.5.2) is homogeneous of degree one in K, and K for given 
L,, that is, there are constant returns to capital at the social level- when K, 
and K expand together for fixed L. This constancy of the social returns to 
capital will yield endogenous growth. 4 
If a recipient country behaves as we have conjectured, then the country will be 
able to achieve endogenous growth and be self-sustaining, at least in the short 
run. Further to this Grossman and Helpman (1991) mention that if the 
economy is `very' open, that is, well integrated into the world economy, there 
is the possibility for innovation and growth. This is because when a country 
"interacts with the outside world [it] may gain access to the large body of 
knowledge that has already been accumulated in the international community, 
as well as to some of the new discoveries that are being made there. "(pp. 166). 
They also argue that when residents of a country meet and interact with 
foreign counterparts, they may find occasions to learn technical information 
that contributes to their country's stock of general knowledge. These 
possibilities would never arise if the country restricts trade or remains closed. 
We can plausibly assume that the local knowledge stock increases with the 
number of commercial interactions between domestic and foreign agents for 
several reasons. First, the larger the volume of international trade, the greater 
presumably will be the number of personal contacts between domestic and 
foreign individuals. These contacts may involve an exchange of information 
contributing to more knowledge. Opening up to international trade is said to 
For a formal proof see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
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spur increases in domestic efficiency. There is an implicitly challenge response 
mechanism induced by competition; domestic industries are forced to adopt 
new technologies, to reduce "X-inefficiency", and generally to reduce costs 
wherever possible. According to this argument, export expansion is good and 
so is import liberalisation. Second, through the importation of goods local 
researchers have a chance to examine and inspect them to further their 
knowledge by improving the quality of local products. Third, when exporting 
goods, foreign importers may suggest ways to improve the manufacturing 
process. Hence, we can reasonably assume that knowledge and the extent of 
spillovers between a country and the rest of the world increases further with 
the volume of trade. 
Trade, in a sense, facilitates the transmission of technical information from 
foreign sources. Consequently an integrated economy will enjoy productivity 
gains in the research lab that spur its technological progress. This can take the 
form a pure innovation which stems from local technological improvements 
(which we may assume to be less common in developing countries) and also 
through imitation, where the domestic country uses the foreign source of 
knowledge generated in more advanced nations without any cost. In this 
regard, we might suggest that more trade, that is, the more open is an 
economy, the faster will be productivity growth. The mechanism works 
through the `catch-up' effect discussed above. An important part of the `catch- 
up' process involves exploiting changing comparative advantage, which 
provides a significant driving force for structural change. In developing 
countries, economies of scale and size of market have long been considered 
important in determining growth and structural change. The existence of scale 
economies implies that widening the market through trade should lead to a 
reduction in production cost. The argument is usually made in terms of the 
benefits of an expansion in demand through increased exports. But how much 
will the country be able to capture from the world's stock of knowledge to 
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further its development? Edwards (1992) hypothesises that the rate of 
knowledge accumulation in a small open economy can be written as: 
ý_ {a 
+ b((wA A) ý} + (3ý (2.5.3) 
where A represents the stock of accumulated knowledge and its changes, A, as 
`technical progress'. a and 6 are exogenously given parameters, W is the stock 
of world's (appropriable) knowledge (or in our case as the donor's stock of 
knowledge), w is the rate of growth of the world stock of knowledge, and ß is 
a parameter (0 < (3 < 1) that measures the country's ability to absorb inventions 
generated in the rest of the world. Described as above, the rate of technological 
progress depends on some basic rate of innovation, a (assumed to be 
exogenous), 8(W 
- 
A)/A which is the `catch-up' term suggesting that 
technological improvements will be faster if the gap between the recipient's 
level of know-how and that of the world's (or donor's) accumulated stock of 
appropriable knowledge is larger, and finally on the term ßo which captures 
the world's (or donor's) technical progress that is absorbed by the recipient 
country. Edwards predicts that ß is negatively related to the level of trade 
distortions in the economy. Hence, a less distorted economy would benefit 
more in terms of productivity growth. 
2.5.2 Some reservations on technology transfer. 
So far we have hypothesised how technology transfer in terms of know-how, 
knowledge about production methods, processes, techniques, spillovers, 
diffusion, and application of this knowledge to economic activity, affects an 
economy in terms of growth and productivity. This mechanism is said to work 
better when the country is less distorted and more open to international trade. 
Despite continuous struggling efforts of many developing countries, though 
reducing their trade barriers and receiving continuing assistance from the 
international community, find themselves lagging behind in growth and 
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productivity. Evidence suggests that the industrialisation experience of many 
developing countries based on modern technology, appears to have fallen 
much short of theoretical expectations. Growth has taken in a large number of 
instances, but development remains questionable, partly but importantly, as a 
result of technological distortions. 
Some plausible reasons can be forwarded to explain the failure of 'catching- 
up' with the developed countries. First, as Abramovitz (1986) suggests, it is 
because of the `social capability' which is dampened in these developing 
countries. Without this social capability a developing country will not have the 
potential for rapid advance. It is a common feature to observe political unrest, 
low literacy rate, etc. in Latin American and African countries where most of 
the developing countries are found. Second, as Dowrick and Gemmell (1991) 
showed empirically, developing countries might 'catch-up' technologically 
provided they are above some threshold level of infrastructural development. 
In fact they found that mostly African countries are below this threshold level, 
as a result their marginal product of capital is very low. Another finding was 
that technological spillover were unavailable to the least developed countries 
to assist their productivity growth. In this context, the financing of the building 
up of infrastructure by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank in those countries will prosper future growth. 
Another reason for the failure of technology transfer is that when the 
developing countries are engaged in trade, they export mainly primary 
commodities which do not benefit much from technology transfer. Had they 
been trading in manufactured goods, they would have benefited a lot from 
technology spillovers. Along this argument imported technology has not suited 
to the developing countries' needs. The technology tends to be capital 
intensive and has failed to make impact on problems of unemployment in 
these countries. It is often argued that capital intensive bias of such technology 
is a function of the `factor configuration' facing developed countries 
_ý 
r 
57 
Chapter 2 Foreign Aid in Growt/r Models 
themselves as suppliers of technology. As a result, the technology they export 
hardly satisfies the `surplus' labour supply situation in developing countries, 
which more often than not, demands the use of labour intensive techniques. 
Hence the relevancy of the concept of appropriate or intermediate technology 
in the development objectives of many developing countries. This has raised 
doubts about the effectiveness of imported technology in terms of structural 
transformation. Also, it is sometimes held that imported technology is not 
properly absorbed and assimilated in developing countries. 
In our theoretical explanation above, we have assumed that the donor is 
altruistic. This assumption is sometimes too strong, because very often the 
donor has a tendency to tie technology inputs and use restrictive business 
practices. Often the recipient is prohibited to make use of alternative 
technology as part of the technology package. This has limited prospects for 
the use and development of indigenous technology in developing countries. 
Further, it prevents developing countries from resorting to cheaper and perhaps 
`more appropriate' technology substitutes or complements, when these are 
available in the international market. On top of that, donors sometimes impose 
royalties, licence fees or know-how agreements which increase prices of the 
goods being produced by using the imported technology. This weakens the 
bargaining position of developing countries and more to their balance of 
payments difficulties. 
Developing countries are characterised by a set of distortions which occurs in 
factor market, and imported technology is said to aggravate income 
distribution problems and therefore economic inequality in developing 
countries. For instance, the use of a capital intensive technique means that the 
share of income going to the owners of capital is greater than that going to 
labour. 
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emphasised theoretically may not work properly well in practice because of 
the above mentioned reservations which are encountered by developing 
countries. In order to obtain the benefits accrued in technology transfer, it 
would be advisable for donors to carefully judge the `appropriateness' of such 
technology and the costs to the recipients to make such technology be one of 
the main factors in accelerating their growth performance and rapidly 
industrialising these countries. 
2.6 Aid as Intermediate Inputs 
Other ways whereby developed countries have sought to help developing 
countries are through trade: granting special trade preferences and special 
prices. Many authors have emphasised that trade, in particular exports, is one 
of the major determinants of growth. It is argued that exports have both direct 
and indirect effects which affect growth. Suppose a donor can affect the 
exports of a recipient by alternative route. For example the EEC allows easy 
access to Mauritius Export Processing Zone's product through the rules of 
origin and the Multifibre Arrangement. Despite the fact that this kind of 
economic assistance is not classified as foreign aid does not mean that it is not 
important for developing countries. Again in the case of Mauritius, the country 
benefits from special prices from the EEC for sugar (Mauritius receives three 
times the world market price). We then expect that this these preferences will 
be reflected on growth through the channels in which they work. 
Export oriented policies have been advocated by many especially after the 
failure of import substitution strategies. There are many direct benefits that 
help in promoting economic growth. It is argued that exports enable a country 
to import more goods and services. The country also enjoys comparative 
advantage in the sense that exports tend to be concentrated in the most 
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efficient sectors of the economy5, hence increasing productivity. There are 
considerable gains from economies of scale due to an increase in the market 
size. Consequently, it enables production on a large scale thereby reducing unit 
costs. Export expansion acts as an injection into the economy which increases 
the level of aggregate demand through the foreign trade multiplier. Expanding 
the export sector also generates more employment opportunities. 
Added to this list of direct benefits of exports are secondary effects such as 
encouraging additional investment in ancillary industries set up to supply and 
service the operations of the main export industries. It also induces foreign 
investment and encourages an increase in the flow of technological knowledge 
and market innovations. The exports sector is said to generate positive 
externalities on nonexport sectors through more efficient management styles 
and improved production techniques. This in turn reallocates resources 
efficiently. Another effect which was pointed out earlier was that exports may 
loosen a binding foreign exchange constraint and allow increases in productive 
intermediate imports and hence result in the growth of output. 
Given the benefits that arise from exports, if foreign aid (as special prices, 
trade preferences, improving the quality of the product, etc. ) could expand 
exports, then we can expect positive effects on: output growth, production of 
non-export goods and services, reallocation of resources, externality effects 
and total factor productivity. We also expect to observe increases in the 
availability of foreign exchange and putting the country in a better position to 
deal with external shocks. 
5 This might not hold for all developing countries, for instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
exports tend to be concentrated on primary commodities. 
6 These effects have been tested in a non-foreign aid context by Michaeley (1977), (Heller and 
Porter, 1978), (Balassa (1978,1984,1985), Ram (1987), Kavoussi (1984,1985), Tyler (1981), 
Feder (1982), Sheehey (1992), Esfahani (1991), Greenaway and Sapsford (1994) and Sheehey 
(1993), among others. 
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The impact of foreign aid on these above mentioned factors will depend on 
how the donor intends to assist the recipient, that is, the form in which foreign 
assistance is to be given. We will discuss two ways in which `donors' have 
given assistance to developing countries, though the first is not strictly 
speaking considered as foreign aid. 
The first could be that of providing some guaranteed markets (by importing 
the developing countries goods) or adopting some special pricing policy, 
which is often higher than the world prices. The `donor' in this case can be 
thought also of removing trade barriers which were in force. The response of 
the developing country when the `donor' reciprocates its trading policies will 
bring the developing country to the position where it originally started. 
The second form of `assistance' not essentially classified as aid is where 
donors provide some intermediate inputs to enhance the quality of the 
developing country's products (especially in cases of tied aid, see Yeats, 1990 
and Jepma, 1994). A stylised fact characterising developing countries is that 
intermediate and capital goods are not substitutable with domestically 
produced goods. In a sense, the imported inputs embody technologies that are 
unavailable to domestic producers and can only be obtained through imports. 
Policies that limit the availability of such imports, or make them more 
expensive (tariff, non-tariff barriers, etc. ) will lead to poor productivity 
performance. In contrast, policies that increase the availability of imported 
inputs or lower their costs 
-such as an export-led development strategy 
-will reduce costs for domestic industries and lead to better productivity. In 
this view, exports are important only as a source of foreign exchange; they 
permit industries to buy inputs that cannot be produced domestically only at a 
much greater cost, if at all. High exports permit an economy to import the 
intermediate input structure of an advanced economy and perhaps facilitate 
rapid growth. Analysis of the structure of intermediate inputs indicates that an 
important gain from trade is that it allows a country to achieve through imports 
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a more advanced intermediate input technology than would be possible 
through domestic production alone. Increased intermediate imports permit the 
deepening of input-output linkages, a form of technological change 
characteristic of industrialisation. 
The exports of developing countries are often criticised for their inferior 
quality and this is one of the reasons they remain uncompetitive in the world 
market. Indeed, it is often argued that the expansion of manufactured exports 
of these countries requires some more advanced production technologies and 
high-quality intermediate inputs, both of which must be imported since - at 
least in the initial stages of export expansion- domestic producers cannot 
manufacture them. In this view, intermediate imports could embody advanced 
technology, and their use can be part of the process of technology transfer. 
Let us consider a hypothetical case where a developing country has been 
traditionally producing output using capital and labour (Y = F(K, L)) for 
domestic consumption and investment only and was constrained from 
exporting its produce on the world market due to an `inferior' quality. If it is 
now supposed that a donor supplies some high-quality intermediate inputs 
through foreign aid which improves the quality of the final product (although 
through tied aid). This will then help the final product to gain some 
competitive edge on the world market. Let us assume for the sake of simplicity 
that the price charged by the donor is equal to the world price. 
Coming to the modelling part, inclusion of intermediate inputs in a production 
function has been investigated by Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), 
Ethier (1982), Romer (1987,1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). We 
follow here a similar approach of the last of these. We assume that the 
production function of firm i, after the inflow of the intermediate inputs in the 
recipient country, is represented by the following Cobb-Douglas technology of 
the form given by: 
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(2.6.1) 
where 0<a<1,0 <ß<1, a+ß<1, A is a technical factor, Y; is output, K; is 
capital input, L; is labour input, and X; 1 is the employment of the 
. 
j"' type of the 
imported intermediate input. The production function is subject to diminishing 
marginal productivity of each input, K L. and X; i, and constant returns to 
scale in all inputs together. 
If the developing country makes full effective use of the intermediate inputs 
then the country will be in a position to produce and export more on the 
international market and thereby increase its trade volume (assuming trade 
balance). Further to this hypothesis, if the recipient is able to `adopt and adapt' 
this transfer of technology and satisfies both Abramovitz's (1986) social 
capability and Dowrick and Gemmell's (1991) threshold level of 
infrastructural development, the recipient could then be able to `catch-up' and 
experience endogenous growth. 
By exporting more on the world market, the domestic country is in a position 
to import more varieties of intermediate inputs and boost its level of exports. 
But the variety of intermediate inputs that the country can import depends on 
the intermediate inputs produced on the world market, not necessarily from the 
donor's country because the domestic country has the opportunity to trade with 
other countries as well and adapt to their technology as discussed earlier. In a 
way, the donor has `opened the door' for the domestic country to trade 
internationally and competitively. The imports of intermediate inputs then 
depend on the rate of innovation on the world market. It is common to assume 
that the growth rate of intermediate inputs produced on the world market is a 
constant ter and that the growth rate for the variety of intermediate inputs 
imported, denoted by 1, is less than or equal to ' following Romer (1990) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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Following our discussion on the `catch-up' hypothesis, we can argue similarly 
that the greater the gap between yr and c, the faster will be the domestic 
country's growth rate. Also we can suggest that the greater is the volume of 
exports, the faster will the domestic country catch-up in terms of productivity 
growth with more advanced countries. 
Will the economy converge to some steady-state or witness endogenous 
growth? From equation (2.6.1), the additively separable form of the (X11)P 
means that the marginal product of intermediate input j is independent of the 
quantity employed of intermediate good j' [following Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995)]. This assumption of independence implies that discoveries on the 
world market of new types of goods do not tend to make any existing types 
obsolete. In equation (2.6.1), the marginal product of each type of imported 
intermediate input, a Y. /ö X11, is infinite at X; i =0 and then diminishes as X;, 
rises. If N types are available at finite prices at the current time, then the firm 
will be motivated to use all N types. 
Technological progress in this context takes the form of expansions in N, the 
number of imported intermediate inputs available only through foreign aid. If 
the intermediate inputs can be measured in a common physical unit and are all 
employed in the same quantity, i. e. in equilibrium, X; 1 = X;, we can then see 
the effect of an increase in N. The quantity of output is then given from 
equation (2.6.1) by 
Y; 
= 
A. K, 
. 
Li-"-f' 
. 
N. X) (2.6.2) 
or Y. = A. K, `x 
. 
L'' (N X, )" N'-O (2.6.3) 
For given N, equation (2.6.3) implies that production exhibits constant returns 
to scale in K,, L. and NX,, the total quantity of imported intermediate inputs. 
For given quantities of K,, L, and NX;, the term N"' in equation (2.6.3) 
indicates that Y, increases with N. This effect, which captures a form of 
technological progress, reflects the benefit to use more imported intermediate 
inputs from advanced nations. The benefit arises because of the diminishing 
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returns to each X; J individually. For fixed Ki and Li, equation (2.6.3) implies 
that an expansion of intermediates, NX,, encounters diminishing returns if it 
occurs through an increase in Xi (that is, in all of the X1) for given N. 
Diminishing returns do not arise, however, if the increase in NX, takes the 
form of a rise in N for given Xi. Thus, technological change in the form of 
continuing increase in N avoids the tendency for diminishing returns. This 
property of the production function provides the basis for endogenous growth. 
Hence, if the domestic country expands its trade and keeps increasing the 
variety of imported inputs (thus improving the quality of the produce), it will 
unlock the potential for `catch-up' and experience endogenous growth, at least 
in the short run. Under this sort of assistance, the recipient can continue to 
trade and grow even though this form of foreign assistance stops after some 
time. This is because the economy is now open to the rest of the world and 
can reap the beneficial effects of trade. As Edwards (1992) reminds us Lewis' 
(1955) argument that more open countries (implicitly less distorted) have an 
advantage in absorbing new ideas generated in the rest of the world. With the 
liberalisation episodes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) of recent Uruguay Round, we would expect long term beneficial 
effects on the productivity and growth, and also in terms of product quality of 
the developing countries. 
The theortical model is quite clear that there are potential beneficial impact if 
aid takes the form of intermediate goods. However, this partial analysis have 
some shortcomings. Although it is argued that tied aid will not lead to any 
distortionary effect such as real exchange rate appreciation as the aid funds 
leak abroad in the form of purchases from the donor (as the money being spent 
in the donor country), still the recipient can be in a worse situation. Often the 
price charged, in cases where aid is tied, is very high, higher than the world 
price. In such circumstances this will lead to an increase in the cost of 
production rendering the final product in the recipient country to he less 
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competitive. Also tied aid might lead to an increase in the price on 
nontradables thereby causing a real exchange appreciation-the Dutch-disease 
phenomenon. Very often also the wrong type of technolgy is being transferred 
which they result either in a waste of resources or becomes costlier as in the 
case of Kenya for example (Duncan, 1986). Hence the merits should be 
weighed against any distortionary effect. 
Z7 Summary and Conclusion 
The neo-classical growth model is seen to provide no escape from the steady 
state in the long run where the growth in the capital-labour ratio and per capita 
growth rates are zero. In contrast, the endogenous growth model enables an 
economy to achieve positive per capita steady state growth rates (assuming sA 
> n) in the long run (which also equals the short run growth rate). Changes in 
the parameters, for example, the propensity to save, do not affect the long run 
steady state in the former model, whereas in the latter, an increase in the 
propensity to save raises the steady state per capita growth rates. The outcome 
of these two models differ mainly because of the assumption of diminishing 
returns to capital in the neo-classical model and the absence of these returns in 
the AK model. In fact the working of diminishing returns determines the 
convergence speed to the steady state in the neo-classical model. For instance, 
if diminishing returns set in slowly, then the convergence period is long. 
Under these circumstances, an increase in the saving rate affects the growth 
rate for a long time. This then approximates the AK model in the short run. 
The AK model is found to be inconsistent with empirical evidence as 
suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, but when the features of the AK model 
is combined with the neo-classical model [as done by Jones and Manuelli 
(1992)] the result is more consistent with empirical evidence. This formulation 
has enabled the idea to incorporate foreign aid in this form and possibly a 
model to be tested later. 
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The implications of all these models for foreign aid are obvious. First, foreign 
aid has transitory effects in the neo-classical model unless the basic 
assumptions are ruled out. Second the magnitude of foreign aid is crucial. If 
aid is to have certain impact on the recipient country it has to be above a 
certain critical minimum level. In fact the magnitude of foreign aid is better 
seen when we deal with a combined model featuring endogenous growth 
where the value of X explicitly compares the amount of foreign aid with 
domestic capital. In both models the impact of aid is transitory unless foreign 
aid is supplied with a new alien technology which enables labour-augmenting 
technology to become `active' even when aid ceases. This enables the recipient 
country to increase its per capita growth rates and allows the economy to 
`stand on its feet'. Aid via trade is also another way where a donor can 
promote growth of recipients. The donor can actually supply some 
intermediate inputs to improve the recipients' quality of the product so that the 
recipients can trade more competitively on the world market. If the recipients 
are able to adapt to new technologies available, they can then have some 
potentials to `catch-up' and experience endogenous growth. 
The models of growth so far elaborated provide many useful insights about 
how economic variables can affect growth and how foreign aid impacts on 
growth. Each of the models certainly have their own limitations especially 
when they come to empirical testing. Given that we live in the short run, many 
donors would like to know the impact of the aid flows on the recipient's 
growth. Many studies have been carried out investigating the aid-growth 
relationship and the conclusions are overwhelmingly inconclusive. The results 
differ not only in the sense of the type of models used but also in terms of the 
methodology as well as the testing techniques used. It would be interesting to 
test aid's impact using an endogenous growth framework (featuring human 
capital) which has been hardly used in the literature. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
The Neo-classical Model 
The model is adapted from Jones (1975). Fist of all, it is assumed that an 
economy produces only one composite commodity, which it can either 
consume or accumulate as a stock of capital. A simple proportional savings 
function is assumed as in the Harrod-Domar model: 
S=sY 0<s<1 (2.3.1) 
The supply of labour, L, grows at an exogenous constant proportional natural 
rate n 
, 
i. e. 
L 
-=n L 
(2.3.2) 
where a dot over a variable denotes a change in the variable. 
Ignoring technical progress, the production function takes the form 
Y= F(K, L) (2.3.3) 
and is assumed to satisfy the following conditions: 
(i) For all K>0 and L>0, F(. ) exhibits positive and diminishing marginal 
products with respect to each input: FK >0 and FKK <0 and Fl. >0 and F1.1. < 0. 
(ii) F(. ) exhibits constant returns to scale, making output homogeneous of 
degree one in capital and labour. 
Since (2.3.3) is homogeneous of degree one, it can be written in the `intensive' 
or `per capita' form 
Y=f (K, 1) (2.3.4) 
where y= Y/L, per capita income (or average product of labour); K= K/L, the 
capital-labour ratio. Note that in this section K differs from the Kin the Harrod- 
Domar section where it was defined as the incremental capital-output ratio. 
The intensive form is assumed to be `well-behaved' or obey the Inada 
Conditions', following Inada (1963): 
(a) f(K) =0 when K=0 
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(b) f' (K) > 0, i. e. marginal product of capital is positive for all levels 
of capital-labour ratio. 
(c) /"' (K) < 0, i. e. marginal product of capital diminishes as capital per 
labourer increases. 
(d) At very high levels of the capital-labour ratio, the marginal product 
of capital becomes very small, i. e. 
Iim f' (K) 0 
a K-3 
(e) As the capital-labour ratio tends towards zero, the marginal product 
of capital tends towards infinity: 
lim f, 0 0 
K >0 
For simplicity, investment is assumed to be non-depreciating and is equal to 
the change of the capital stock and all saving is invested: 
K=S= sY (2.3.5) 
where k= dk = 1, dividing (5) by L on both sides yield: 
K- sY 
LL 
or 
K 
= s. f(x) (2.3.6) L 
Rewrite equation (2.3.6) in terms of per capita variables only. To do so 
consider K= K/L. If K and L are growing at the same rate then the growth rate 
of x will be zero (i. e. K /K = 0). If the proportionate rate of growth of K, 
K, is 
greater than the proportionate rate of growth of the labour force, 
1-- 
, 
then the 
L 
capital-labour ratio will obviously be growing, i. e. x /K > 0. Similarly if 
K 
<L then K /K < 0. Consequently, it can easily be shown that the rate of L 
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growth of the capital-labour ratio must equal the rate of growth of the capital 
stock minus the rate of growth of the labour force: 
KK L 
KKL 
(2.3.7) 
We know that 
L=n 
and is constant, hence 
KK 
n 
KK 
multiply both sides by K= K/L 
K 
K=- 
-nK L 
or 
=K+ nK (2.3.8) L 
Substitute equation (8) in equation (6) and rearrange to get 
x=s. f(K) 
- 
nx (2.3.9) 
This is the fundamental equation of the neo-classical growth model. 
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Chapter Three 
THE DUAL GAP THEORY 
3.1 Introduction 
The growth models developed in the previous chapter implicitly assumed a 
saving gap. It has been found that even though in some countries sufficient 
domestic savings were available, growth of income was very low especially in 
the years where the developing countries were pursuing inward-oriented 
strategies in the 1950s and 1960s. These poor performances indicated that 
capital was not the only factor constraining growth. Empirical studies such as 
those of Chenery and Bruno (1962) for Israel, Manne (1963) for Mexico, 
Adelman and Chenery (1966) for Greece, Chenery and Strout (1966) for 
Pakistan, and a theoretical exposure by McKinnon (1964), have all identified 
further possible constraints on growth. They pointed out the importance of 
international trade, which helps in promoting growth. Most developing 
countries, excluding the oil-producing and oil-exporting countries, had a 
dominant foreign exchange gap, this was clearly seen by the chronic balance of 
payments deficit on current accounts, while domestic resources remained idle. 
The extension in this chapter takes into account the role of foreign trade, the 
changing structure of demand and the allocation of resources. Section 3.2 
discusses the lack of foreign exchange as a possible constraint on growth. In 
section 3.3 and 3.4 we expose McKinnon's (1964) and Chenery and Strout's 
(1966) classical papers respectively elaborating the two gap theory. Section 3.5 
then deals with an assessment of the productivity of foreign aid in the two gap 
model. Section 3.6 reviews some empirical findings of country-case studies 
which have used the dual gap model. Section 3.7 addresses some criticisms of 
the two gap model. In Section 3.8 we provide a discussion concerning which of 
the two gaps is more relevant and of much importance for policy analysis and 
decision making. Section 3.9 concludes the chapter. 
71 
Chanter Three The Dual Gap Theory 
3.2 The Foreign Exchange Gap 
In concluding the analysis on aid allocation estimates, Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) 
pointed out that one of the `criteria of eligibility for soft loans are low income 
per head and a "foreign exchange gap" which is greater than the "resource gap". 
This indicated that foreign trade also plays a very important part in determining 
growth and aid requirements. In this context the simple Harrod-Domar model 
does not take into account the open economy. A simple extension of the 
Harrod-Domar model was developed by Bruton (1955) introducing foreign 
trade so that : 
_s+u ýk 
where u=MyX, M is imports and X is exports. 
(3.1) 
Equation (3.1) implies that if u is positive, that is M/Y > X/Y, then the 
allowable rate of growth of income is greater than it could be in the absence of 
trade. Such an excess of imports is only possible if a country is a recipient of 
aid, credit or foreign investment. Hence, the model indicates that international 
trade can generate growth and vitalise the role for aid to less developed 
countries. It is also evident from the above that if u is negative, that is, X/Y > 
M/Y, the percentage rate of growth required to utilise all the increasing 
domestic capacity is less than it would be in the absence of trade, implying that 
the binding constraint is the savings-gap. But the major drawback of this model 
dealing with international trade does not enable us to deduce the importance of 
this sector particularly when exports is equal to imports and higher volumes of 
trade will have no beneficial effects upon economic growth. 
The foreign exchange gap, as Nixson and Colman (1994) put it, clearly implies 
that "the import-purchasing power conferred by the value of exports plus capital 
transfers, may be inadequate to support the level of growth permitted via 
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investment financed by the level of domestic savings plus those capital 
transfers, because it still leaves a shortage of key imported inputs". In such a 
case, productive capacity is under-utilised. In a similar line of reasoning, a 
savings gap is said to arise when the growth rate permitted by domestic savings 
is less than that made possible by the availability of foreign exchange. This 
implies that available capacity is being fully utilised. With this as background 
we now turn to analyse the details in the dual gap theory. 
3.3 McKinnon's Dual Gan Model Representation. 
The dual gap theory synthesises the classical and modern views of foreign 
assistance. On the one hand the traditional view of foreign capital inflows are 
regarded as a supplement to domestic savings and on the other hand, the 
modern view stresses that, especially for developing countries, many goods 
necessary for efficient industrial growth cannot be produced domestically and 
must therefore be imported with the help of foreign capital inflows. Hence a 
transfer of external resources enables the recipient country to increase the level 
of investment and to increase the supply of commodities that are not 
domestically produced, preventing possible bottlenecks in production. For an 
understanding of the impact of foreign assistance using the two gap approach, it 
is perhaps better seen by reviewing Mckinnon's (1964) methodology where 
foreign goods enter as inputs into the production function. The basic Harrod- 
Domar type production function is used assuming fixed proportion technology 
given by: 
Y= min. (aKd 
, 
ßKr) a >0, ß >0 (3.2) 
where Y is the potential output capacity and also represents total income 
generated from domestic use of the factors of production. Kd and K, represent 
domestically produced and imported capital goods respectively. The maximum 
savings in the economy is given as: 
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Max. S= sY 0<s <1 (3.3) 
At any time t, investment, I, equals savings S, plus foreign capital flows F, (i. e. 
It 
= 
St + F, ). Investment needs to be allocated between domestic and foreign 
capital goods as a(OKd )= ß(AKf ) so that there is an efficient allocation of 
resources. Without foreign capital transfer, and assuming that sufficient foreign 
exchange is generated by the exports of domestic capital goods for the 
acquisition of foreign capital goods, the maximum attainable growth rate will 
depend on the level of domestic savings only, i. e. S, = Max S, which depends 
on the income generated. The increase in income depends on the level of net 
investment, and from (3.2) 
dY 
= a(OKd )= R(oKt )= ä RR I= 
ä 
RR 
sY, (3.4) di + 
Thus 
d Y= 
6sY, and Y, = yoeast di 
(3.5) 
where a= aß which corresponds to the output-capital ratio in the Harrod- 
a+ß 
Domar model and as is the growth rate of income. 
The foreign sector is introduced into the analysis to show that export 
capabilities of developing countries are dependent on the growth of output 
capacity. Assuming that the maximum export is given by 
Max. X, =sY, 0<E<l (3.6) 
Ifs is very small, so that the export earnings are insufficient to import foreign- 
capital goods, then the growth rate 6s will not be achievable and a trade gap is 
then said to exist 
. 
However, if If (= AKf) is the level of investment in foreign 
capital goods required to sustain a growth rate is less than the maximum export 
earnings, then a bottleneck does not exist. Then from (3.4) it can be derived 
that 
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OKf= 
ß dY 
dt 
substituting If for AK f we get If =1 
dY (3.7) 
dr 
and from (3.5) 
Iý 
=ß 6sYt (3.8) 
Hence to avoid a bottleneck Ifý < Max. X1 and S, = Max St implying that' Pc > 
6S. 
With ßs < 6s a bottleneck will exist and growth will be constrained by the 
lower growth rate of ßc. This would imply that a proportion of domestic capital 
goods will remain idle. To relieve this bottleneck, foreign assistance can be 
used for the purchase of foreign capital goods. In the case where a savings 
constraint appears to be dominating, foreign inflows of capital can be utilised to 
increase total investment in both domestic and foreign capital goods. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the constraints showing the effects of foreign capital 
transfer on the growth rate. On the horizontal axis 
Y is the foreign transfer as a 
fraction of national income and on the vertical axis g is the growth rate. The 
growth rate under each constraint is given by: 
(i) g= RE + Y) if (3(c + 
F) 
< a(s + F) = trade constraint 
(ii) g= 6(s + 
F) if ß(£ + F) > a(s +F savings constraint 
Given Xi = cYl which will finance the importation of the capital goods of 11, = cYt 
, 
from 
(3.7) it can be substituted to yield the growth rate that can be attained with given exports as 
dY 3EY, and subsequently, Yt = YoeR£t. dl 
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Figure 3.1: The Savings and Foreign Exchange Constraints 
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Under a trade gap, foreign transfers have a proportionately greater impact on the 
growth rate than if the savings constraint is binding. If an amount of F flows in 
as foreign aid, under a savings constraint, income will be increased by a(3 F, 
a+(3 
whereas under a trade gap income will increase by ßF, which is greater than the 
former. This can also be depicted graphically from figure 3.1 as the slope of the 
trade constraint ((3) is greater than the slope of the savings constraint (a), hence 
foreign capital is more productive under a binding foreign exchange regime. For 
a further graphical representation of the trade and savings gaps using isoquants 
see Findlay (1973) and White (1992). 
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3.4 Chenery and Strout's Dual Gap Model Representation 
In addition to the savings and trade gaps, Chenery and Strout (1966) identified 
another factor constraining growth in the early stage of the development 
process: skills and organisational abilities. This constraint is seen to be binding 
because to make efficient use of investment in new plant and equipment a well- 
trained labour force must be in place otherwise in the first instance investment 
resources should be diverted towards human capital. The skill constraint is an 
important issue as discussed in the growth models, especially, in endogenous 
growth models. The model developed by Chenery and Strout is often cited and 
would be useful to detail it here. Note that they do not explicitly perform the 
analysis using a production function. 
Chenery and Strout argue that without external assistance a country must supply 
all requirements of accelerated growth from its own resources or from resources 
available from abroad made possible by the foreign exchange earned by 
exports. For output to increase requires a "simultaneous increase in skills, 
domestic savings, and export earnings as well as an allocation of these increased 
resources in such a way as to satisfy the changing demands resulting from rising 
levels of income" (pp. 680). Failure of one of these will limit growth so that 
other factors will be under-utilised. This can be remedied by recourse to foreign 
assistance in relieving the potential bottlenecks of skills, savings, or foreign 
exchange. In such a case growth will be higher than that permitted by the most 
constraining factor by making efficient use of the other resources which were 
idle in the absence of foreign assistance. 
Hence the model developed attempts to incorporate the role of aid in relieving 
the relevant constraint. They identify four `phases' in which an economy can be 
located: the first two is where growth and investment are constrained by the 
absorptive capacity and either sufficient foreign assistance is available but a gap 
exists between investment ability and savings ability (Phase IA), or the trade 
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gap is binding (Phase IB), and the second set is when investment and growth 
are constrained by the target growth rate in which a situation where the savings 
gap is dominant (Phase II) and Phase III where instead the binding constraint 
is the trade gap. 
The model is outlined as follows: 
The notations are as used earlier. The capacity limit takes the Harrod-Domar 
assumptions that a certain amount of investment is required to increase output, 
so that: 
Yt=I 
roE it (3.9) K 
At low levels of development, growth will be constrained by the ability to 
invest. It implies that the absorptive capacity of additional investment is limited 
by some complementary inputs such as skill. The investment function will thus 
be given by: 
Ski It =(1 +c)Iý_ý (3.10) 
where is the maximum rate of growth of investment and the superscript Ski 
indicates that investment is constrained by the skill factor. In such a case 1 is 
referred as the "skill limit " indicating that skill formation is required in order to 
increase productive investment. The magnitude of D describes the rapidity of 
the learning process. This constraint will be binding until investment2 reaches 
xr (where r is the targeted rate of growth) and as from then growth will be 
constrained by the target growth rate with investment defined as: 
jýTar= xr Y, (ý. 1 1) 
the superscript Tar indicates that investment is set by the target rate of growth. 
The savings function is linearly defined as in the case of Rosenstein-Rodan as: 
S, = S + b(Yt 
- 
Yo) (3.12) 
2 The abandonment of the ability to invest constraint as the dominant one implies that the 
country is sufficiently mature technically so that it is now able to absorb all domestic and 
foreign savings likely to be made available and to channel them into efficient investment 
outlets. 
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The actual level of investment will be given by whichever of (3.10) or (3.11 ) is 
minimum so that the level of foreign capital inflows which will be required to 
fill the savings gap will be: 
either (i) F, Ski = itSki 
_ 
St if ItSki < 1Tar (3.13A 
Tar 
or (ii) F, Tar = 1, 
- 
St if ItTar < ItSki (). 13B) 
If it is assumed that export earnings are sufficient to cover a certain minimum 
level of imports which complements domestic production, for example foreign 
capital goods and intermediate goods which are not available domestically, then 
under this condition if growth is constrained by the ability to invest, i. e. 
equation (3.10) is relevant, the situation is described as Phase IA. If, however 
equation (3.11) is prevalent, then growth will be constrained by the growth 
target and the economy is said to be in Phase 11. 
In case exports earnings are not sufficient to meet the minimum import 
requirements to achieve a certain growth rate, a trade gap is said to exist. To 
analyse the trade gap the minimum level of imports is set as: 
Mr=Mo+ µ(Yr-Yo) (3.14) 
where µ is the minimum marginal import ratio so that the level of imports is the 
minimum required to sustain a given level of income at time t to achieve the 
desired level of growth. Exports are assumed to grow at an exogenously given 
rate c, so that: 
X, 
=(l+c)Xt_i (3.15) 
The level of capital inflows required to fill the gap between import requirement 
and export earnings at time t is given by: 
Ft=Mt 
- 
Xt (3.16) 
Hence the actual amount of foreign capital will depend in which `Phase' the 
economy is in. When growth is constrained by the ability to invest, i. e. 
investment is given by equation (3.10) and the trade gap is larger than the 
savings gap, foreign inflows will be determined by equation (3.16) with 
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equation (3.12) made redundant (situation described as Phase IB which 
according to Chenery and Strout does not seem of great significance 
empirically). Phase Ill is described as a situation where investment is set by 
equation (3.11) and it is the trade gap which is the dominant constraint so that 
foreign transfers are determined by equation (3.16) with equation (3.12) made 
redundant, so that less savings are required than specified. 
As shown the analysis incorporates the possibility that the two gaps need not 
necessarily be equal ex ante but ex post foreign transfers will be given by : 
Fj =I, 
-St=Mr-Xr (3.17) 
This is because ex ante the filling of the larger gap also fills the smaller gap so 
that ex post they are equal. 
With these four phases described, if the structural parameters are allowed to 
change at random over time, then any phase can follow each other in any order. 
With fixed parameters, however, the most likely sequence as argued by Chenery 
and Strout is from Phase IA, where growth is initially constrained by the ability 
to invest, during which period the savings gap is more likely to he the larger of 
the two gaps and hence determine the level of foreign capital. This situation 
characterises countries in the early stages of the development process. As soon 
as growth is no more constrained by the ability to invest Phase II sets in 
, 
in 
which growth is set by the target rate r and foreign capital is required to fill the 
savings gap. With the rising level of income, the savings rate increases to fill 
the domestic gap but it is more likely that import growth will exceed that of 
exports, typically in developing countries, so that the trade gap is larger than the 
savings gap and the economy will be in Phase III. This transition from Phase II 
to Phase III occurs when the deficiency in the flexibility of the economy's 
production structure becomes more of a bottleneck than the deficiency in its 
saving capacity. 
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The amount of capital flowing in will depend on which phase is predominant. 
The following sets the amount which will be required in each phase: 
PHASE IA: Growth is constrained by the ability to invest given by l, sk', and 
equations (3.10) and (3.12) are substituted into (3.13A) to describe that the 
savings gap is dominant. Foreign capital inflow is then given by : 
Fr 
= 
(1 + )`I0 
-[ So + b(Y, - YO)] ( 3.18) 
In this phase Y, = 
I, 
because (D is the target growth rate. Hence, (1) x 
F, =( 1 +ý)`h-So-b (P 
L 
+b (D 
A) (3.19) 
KK 
Aggregate capital inflow in this phase will be given as: 
IF =Io{ ](1- K)-(T+1)(S0- box (3.20) n q) (D 0 
PHASE IB: Growth is constrained by the ability to invest (equation (3.10)) and 
equations (3.14) and (3.15) are substituted into equation (3.16) to give the trade 
gap. The foreign capital inflow in year t is given by : 
Ft= Mo+ µ(Y, 
- 
Yo) 
- 
(1 +c )t XO (3.21) 
substituting for Yt = lK 
F1=M0+ N, 
if 
µ 
lo 
_( 1+ e)` X,, (3.22) (1) K (1) K 
Aggregate capital inflow during this phase will be 
1 F= ( T+ ]) (M o 0 
lo ý+µ lo ý(1+ cp'+i -1ý 
(1) x (1) x (1) 
(1 +E)'+' 
-1 Xo rý (3.23) 
£ 
PHASE II: Growth is constrained by the target rate of growth and equations 
(3.11) and (3.12) are substituted into equation (3.13B) to give the savings gap. 
Given Y, 
= 
(1+ r) Y, 
_,, 
it can be rewritten as Yt = Y() (l+ r)` 
and from (3.1 1), I, = KrY1 becomes I, = Yo xr (I+ r)t. Hence, the foreign capital 
inflow in year t is then: 
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Ft=Y0xr(1+r)`-So 
- 
bY, 
- 
bYo 
Ft=YDxr(1+ r)`-Sa-bY0 (1+ r)`-bYo 
Aggregate capital inflow during this phase will be: 
The Dual Gap Theory 
(3.24) 
IFý = Yof(1+ r)T+t - 1](K- b -)-(T+ 1)( So - bYo) (3.25) 0 r 
PHASE III: Growth is constrained by the target rate of growth and equations 
(3.14) and (3.15) are substituted into equation (3.16) to give the trade gap. The 
foreign capital inflow in year t is given by : 
F, 
=M0+µ(Y, 
-Yo)-(1+E)`X(, 
and aggregate capital inflow with the target growth rate will be: 
Yoµ [(1+r)ý+i 
- 
I1_X°[ (l+ r)T+1 
r 
]_ 
r 
(T+1)ýM0+y. µ] (3.26) 
Having found the amount of foreign aid under each constraint we now assess 
the productivity of aid in the next section when either savings or foreign 
exchange gap is the relevant gap. 
3.5 The Productivity of Aid. 
It was seen from Mckinnon's analysis that the productivity of foreign transfers 
on growth is higher under a balance of payments constraint than when growth is 
savings limited. To see the result in the Chenery and Strout model the 
productivity of an increase in foreign capital can be measured by the 
corresponding increase in total income. With the target growth rate r, the 
productivity of foreign capital inflow can be derived by differentiating 
equations (3.25) and (3.26). Under a savings constraint, the productivity is 
given by: 
1 
- K-bT 
F, ) ý1(y 0 
(3.27) 
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and for the trade gap: 
,. -- 
d(y F) µT 
(3.28) 
0 
where T= { [T-( ]-(I+ r)-'/r] / r(T+1)}. 
Comparing (3.27) with (3.28), it can be deduced that foreign assistance will be 
more productive in Phase III than if the economy is in Phase II. The results are 
akin to those in Mckinnon as elaborated earlier. The simple reason to observe 
this higher effect in Phase II is that the available productive capacity is not 
being fully utilised as there are redundant domestic resources. With more 
foreign exchange made available through external assistance, complementary 
foreign capital goods or raw materials are supplied to enable the redundant 
resources to be brought into use. The impact of foreign capital on growth rates 
will be much greater under the trade constraint if foreign capital-goods 
requirements are small, i. e. a small p. 
3.6 Empirical Findings using the Gap Model 
Numerous country-case studies have been carried out. We review some of them 
here. As mentioned earlier the pioneering exercise of aid requirements for 
underdeveloped countries was carried out by Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) where 
`international aid' would fill the savings gap to achieve self-sustaining growth. 
His sample covered all the underdeveloped countries in Africa, Latin America, 
Asia, Europe and Middle East. Assuming a capital-output ratio of 3: 1 
throughout, countries in Africa appeared to be far from reaching a sustained 
growth path while some countries in Latin America had already reached such a 
stage in the 1960s. In the case study of Israel by Chenery and Bruno (1962), the 
role of foreign capital inflows was to add to both investment and foreign 
exchange resources. Based on a policy model encompassing typical country 
objectives, instruments and structural limitations, they analysed the main 
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development alternatives in Israel and showed the interrelations among the 
main instruments of development policy. With some estimates of the 
parameters in the model for the planning period 1959/60 to 1964/5, they 
elaborated on the range of feasible combinations of instrument variables that 
can be considered by a policy maker. For controlled variables (exchange rate, 
foreign capital inflow, growth in labour productivity, unemployment level and 
government current expenditure) they assumed three levels of values: a 
minimum, representing a pessimistic assessment of the future possibilities; an 
intermediate value based on past trends; and a maximum or most optimistic 
value. 
They concluded that the key difficulties were to increase exports and to adjust 
to the changed composition of domestic demand to achieve the maximum 
increase in GNP with an intermediate value of capital inflow. They suggested 
that with higher capital inflow and with less serious changes in the composition 
of output, a higher productivity limit could be reached. From the estimates 
calculated with plausible values of the parameters (capital-output ratio, 
marginal propensity to save, effective exchange rate, etc. ) the productivity of 
aid ranged from 0.2 to 0.6 when domestic savings was the limit to growth and 
from 0.4 to over 1.0 when trade was the binding constraint. They argued that 
countries with high capital-output ratios, low savings and high import 
propensities are bound to experience low productivity of aid. 
A similar exercise was carried out by Adelman and Chenery (1966) in the case 
of Greece. Greece's dependence on external assistance was high in the years 
1945-60, but during the period 1950-61 its dependence was reduced by more 
than 50% while a real growth rate of 6% was maintained. For the requirements 
of the six per cent growth, the analysis suggested that up to 1957 the main 
function of external assistance was to relieve a savings constraint, while, since 
then, the import-export gap has become increasingly dominant. They used a 
general equilibrium system where the most important elements were the 
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structural determinants of imports and investment, the tax and savings 
functions, and factors affecting exports. Comparing predicted values of the 
endogenous variables with the values actually observed indicated the 
descriptive validity of the econometric model. The estimates reproduced values 
which were similar to historical values. The model was then used to investigate 
the effect of the external capital inflow and to project the future evolution of 
the Greek economy under varying conditions. 
The tendency for the savings gap to decline while the balance of payments gap 
rises indicated that new investment had not been sufficiently directed into 
sectors that earn or save foreign exchange. It was projected that in 1970 the 
level of domestic saving would be enough to generate a growth rate of 6% with 
a capital-output ratio of 3. However, import requirements would have to be 
reduced or export growth increased and additional savings needed to be 
transformed into productive investment. They concluded that the problem in 
the case of Greece has been of allocating investment rather than of domestic 
finance for investment. 
Chenery and Strout's (1966) gap projections in the case of Pakistan was based 
on two assumptions: one pessimistic and one optimistic, where in the latter the 
growth rate, the savings rate and the growth of exports were higher than in the 
former. Projections under the two assumptions gave the following sequence of 
phases: 
under the pessimistic 
assumption 
under the optimistic 
assumption 
Phase IA 1963 1963-67 
Phase II 1964-67 1968-73 
Phase III 1968- 1974- 
End of Transition After 1985 After 1979 
Source: Table 4 in Chenery and Strout (1966). 
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It has been observed that investment from 1956 to 1964 has grown very rapidly 
and doubled its share in GNP. The growth rate of output has increased from 
two per cent prior to 1958 to over four per cent since 1960. Under the 
optimistic assumption, it took ten years of steadily rising investment from the 7 
per cent level of 1956 to reach 18 per cent of GNP required by a growth rate of 
6 per cent. Capital inflow would reach a maximum of 6 per cent of GNP in 
1967. Assuming a savings constraint, the capital inflow could then be reduced 
to zero in 1980 if the marginal savings rate was maintained at 0.24. But even 
with a7 per cent growth of exports per year and a marginal import requirement 
of 0.10 would switch the economy into Phase III in 1974. A similar pattern was 
observed in the projections for the majority of the 50 developing countries 
which they further analysed. 
In measuring the productivity of aid for the case of Pakistan under the savings 
and the balance of payments constraints, assuming a target growth rate of 5 per 
cent for a period of 14 years, gave a value of 0.44 under the savings constraint 
and 1.14 when the latter was binding. These supported the theoretical 
derivation that foreign assistance is more productive under a trade constraint 
than under a savings constraint. 
With historical data it is indeed very difficult to assess which constraint was in 
fact binding for a particular country because ex post both gaps are equal. Given 
such difficulty Weisskopf (1972) developed and applied an econometric 
method that could help for such a classification. The dependent variable in his 
regressions was investment and the independent variables were a combination 
of gross domestic product (Y), net foreign capital inflow (F), exports (X) or 
imports (M) depending on which constraint is tested. For instance, for a case 
of a pure savings constraint, investment is regressed on Y, F and X. The results 
would then depend on the numerical values of the estimated coefficients which 
are checked for consistency with some range deemed appropriate on a priori 
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grounds. For the savings constraint, the Y and X coefficients must be non- 
negative and the F coefficient less than or equal to one. 
The test was applied to a sample of 44 underdeveloped countries over the post- 
war period. The results showed that 23 countries appeared to have been subject 
primarily to a savings constraint on growth and 8 were apparently dominated 
by a trade constraint. Six countries were classified as being inconsistent with 
both a pure savings and a pure trade constraint implying that they were 
characterised by a hybrid of savings-and-trade constraint. Seven countries were 
classified as `unclassifiable' due to unavailability of data. He concluded that 
the importance attributed to the trade constraint was questionable as being a 
limit on growth and that "a binding trade constraint on growth has been a 
relatively infrequent phenomenon in the post-war experience of the 
underdeveloped countries" (pp. 77). Weisskopf s results should be interpreted 
with much care, especially where most LDCs are witnessing a widening 
balance of payments deficit. This is because the estimated coefficients might be 
subject to biasedness and inconsistency due to the limited amount of 
observations (for e. g. 11 countries had only 7 observations and in most cases 
around 14 observations were available). Hence the tests suffered from a lack of 
degrees of freedom. 
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3.7 Some Criticisms of Two Gap Models 
The Dual Gan Theory 
The two gap model is very useful for policy makers in forecasting the volume 
of foreign capital inflows necessary to achieve a target rate of growth depending 
which of the two constraints is relevant. But the model has been subject to 
major criticisms over past decades mainly because of the assumptions on which 
it is based on, and empirically, its predictability has been limited. 
All of the theories so far reviewed have optimistically assumed that the 
recipient countries would adjust their economic structures so that foreign 
assistance is efficiently and productively used towards the achievement of self- 
sustaining growth. However, these assumptions were seriously questioned in 
the 1970s and 1980s for many developing countries despite massive capital 
inflows, development and growth were not occurring as expected. The 
structural changes which Chenery and collaborators predicted to take place with 
external assistance did not automatically occur. The domestic production 
structure hardly changed despite changes in the resource allocation and the poor 
developing countries still continue to rely on traditional commodities. This as a 
result led to an unstable export growth (contrary to the exogenous export 
growth assumption in the models described). External market demands were 
unfavourable for these primary commodities for many obvious reasons in the 
developed economies. These could be explained by the shift of industrial 
production in advanced countries from low-technology, material-intensive 
goods to high-technology, skill-intensive products; increased efficiency in 
industrial uses of material inputs; substitution of synthetics for natural raw 
materials; low income elasticity of demand for many agricultural commodities 
and simple manufactures in which low-income countries have a comparative 
advantage; the rising productivity of agriculture in developing countries; and 
the protection of agriculture and labour- intensive industries in advanced 
countries. Hence it was not surprising that these were reflected in a large and 
growing balance of payments deficit. 
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The failure of the gap model appears to lie on the assumptions upon which it is 
based. For example, about the zero substitution assumption between inputs, 
Chenery and Bruno (1962) recognised that substitution between labour and 
capital take place over a period of time and depends to a large extent on the 
installation of new equipment, but assumed that these inputs are required in 
fixed proportions at any moment. Chenery and Strout (1966) in turn justified 
the assumption of a fixed capital-output function `as a matter of convenience' 
since production function estimates are `inconclusive because of the limited 
data available'. 
Luxton (1979) criticised Chenery and Strout model especially when they 
employed the parameters to estimate the saving gap and the foreign exchange 
gap. He argued that the results relied on the size of the parameters, such as the 
propensity to save and import and the incremental capital-output ratio which are 
estimated from past historical data and which are then assumed to be constant 
for prediction purposes. What this constancy pre-supposes is a lack of 
substitutability between consumption and savings and between domestic and 
imported resources. However, Luxton gave some examples where government 
policy may be able to affect the propensity to save by developing financial 
institutions capable of encouraging savings and through a policy of attractive 
interest rates. For instance, in Mexico where the government--owned 
development bank, issued bonds which increased savings; in Philippines in 
1966, a great and unexpected success resulted from the establishment of a 
market for Treasury Bills and other short term assets. These examples show that 
the assumed constancy of the propensity to save in the Chenery and Strout 
model can be misleading. 
Luxton also added that import requirements are not likely be the same in all 
industries. If there is concentration on sectors where the import requirement is 
the lowest, the aggregate import coefficient for the whole economy may be 
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reduced. In such a case a saving constraint is more likely to be the relevant 
constraint. Whereas if concentration is in sectors with high import requirement, 
a foreign exchange is more likely to be constraining growth while in practice it 
is not. The only way that is suggested to resolve this problem is to regard the 
parameters of the system not as constraints, but as upper or lower limits, basing 
predictions upon various values for the parameters. 
Fei and Ranis (1968) argued that the two gap model as being `far from 
satisfactory to date'. They argued that in the Chenery and Strout model the 
causal order of the phases hardly exist in the real world and that donors do not 
use the criteria of filling the larger of the two gaps to allocate aid, otherwise 
recipients would be pleased with higher levels of imports, lower exports, and 
lower savings. Because donors are always willing to donate less than the 
maximum gap, recipients are forced "to make the unpleasant kind of adjustment 
in the opposite direction. " (pp. 905). On the empirical front, it is argued that the 
three-phased thesis is not amenable to historical verification even if a particular 
country has completed all the alleged life cycle. This is because of the fact that 
the model depicts only a partial picture restricted to the demand for foreign aid. 
It is seen that there is complete absence of the supply of foreign aid from the 
model. 
Some of the critics also came from Bruton (1969) on the two gap model of 
Chenery and Strout (1966). His argument tends to point out that foreign aid is 
11 gap producing, not gap covering, and accepting it as the latter can in fact 
impede, rather than facilitate, development" (pp. 440). To illustrate this he 
made the assumption that all capital goods are imported and all exports are 
consumer goods, and that there are no changes inventories of consumer goods 
or foreign exchange reserves, hence to try to save is to reduce consumption and 
actually to save is to do that and to export. He showed, by using demand and 
supply analysis that a two gap situation depends on the assumption of the 
elasticity of the foreign demand curve. If the elasticity of foreign demand is 
90 
Chapter Three The Du at Gap Theory 
elastic and prices fall as domestic demand falls, the rate of capital formation 
will rise with an increase in the savings rate, but become increasingly costly. A 
stage will be reached where domestic demand becomes inelastic and further 
increase in savings will not increase investment. If the target rate of growth 
requires a higher growth rate of capital than is actually permitted, a trade gap is 
then said to exist. The problem arises when the supply side is in a heavily 
protected domestic market where domestic producers are unwilling to export at 
all and survive only because they are protected from foreign competition. 
Bruton further argued that if the domestic capital goods sectors were large 
enough, savings could be transformed into physical capital necessary to 
produce the targeted rate of growth of output. If the capital goods sectors 
expand when aid is flowing in, then in subsequent periods the two gap problem 
will not emerge. The question is why the capital goods sector does not expand 
in these developing countries? One of the reasons is that policy makers select 
sectors in which they have the least comparative disadvantages and apparently 
consumer durables mostly fall in these categories. Hence these countries use 
foreign aid to import capital goods to produce a new line of products which the 
country cannot export and which cannot be used to produce capital goods. A 
situation like this cannot be treated as a foreign exchange constraint, "but rather 
that the country was too poor to support its own development" (pp. 445). Hence 
this is considered as a saving problem not a trade gap problem. 
Other criticisms have emerged in trying to refine the two gap model in terms of 
theory and on empirical grounds. The critiques by Fei and Ranis (1968), Bruton 
(1969) and others have all related their arguments, in one way of the other, to a 
specific variable: income growth. Ahmad (1990) mentioned that the studies on 
the two gap theory concentrates on how foreign capital inflows remove the 
binding constraints and how it impinges on the output growth of the developing 
countries. The impact of foreign assistance affects a range of other strategic 
variables which affect economic growth and development which is not captured 
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by the two gap analysis. Changes in strategic variables such as exports, imports, 
domestic savings and so on are affected when there is an inflow of foreign 
capital, these in turn affect output growth. 
It is argued in the two gap model that the role of foreign capital inflows is to 
supplement domestic saving, but there are many cases in the developing world 
where instead foreign assistance takes the form of substituting domestic saving 
(see Griffin (1970)) or when foreign aid is used to finance imports of consumer 
goods due to starvation, emergency relief, etc. Hence whether foreign capital 
inflow is used only to finance investment as modelled in the dual gap theory 
becomes questionable. 
Another criticism is that all dual gap models lay too much emphasis on capital 
accumulation. In fact, they rely heavily on the Harrod-Domar framework, 
incorporating some modifications. The Harrod-Domar growth model it should 
be remembered was concerned to deal with problems of labour shortages in the 
advanced countries. The prime intention was to explore the conditions for 
stable economic growth in developed countries. Apparently, this might be one 
of the reasons why these models fail to suit the developing countries and to 
explain the deteriorating situation of these countries. There are other factors 
besides capital which also affect growth in these countries for example, the 
types of goods produced, entrepreneurial qualities, land, and other factor inputs 
together with the different structure of policies pursued in the particular 
country. Recent growth models (the so-called endogenous growth models as 
discussed earlier) have emphasised the role played by human capital in 
fostering growth. An understanding of these models would most probably better 
explain the growth performance of developing countries. This would hence 
enable a new dimension to formulate and reorganise the way foreign capital is 
expected to meet certain growth target. 
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Concerning the estimation techniques, most studies have used econometric 
methods relying mainly on single equation method using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). From what is seen above the interdependence between the 
growth process, production structure, the effect of foreign capital on exports, 
imports, savings which also have impact on growth will yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates if OLS is applied. In this context, Over (1975) and 
Ahmad (1990) have used the simultaneous equation method to account for the 
interdependence among the variables. the advantage of this technique (using 
2SLS and 3SLS) is that both direct and indirect effects of a variable is taken 
into consideration. 
3 
.8 Which is the relevant gan savings or foreign exchange 
We have seen that when in an economy the rate of investment is determined by 
its willingness and ability to mobilise savings, there is said to exist a savings 
constraint. However, in most of the developing countries the willingness to 
save, though it exists, is frustrated by the inability to acquire through trade the 
imports which are required to produce investment goods; the foreign exchange 
constraint. Joshi's (1970) criticism of these two gap models is that they throw 
doubt on the use of the constraints, especially that of the foreign exchange 
constraint. He pointed out that the foreign exchange gap does no enable an 
increase in export growth and/or a reduction in imports although savings 
potentials have not been exhausted. If, however, these changes were 
permissible, the excess of the foreign exchange gap over the savings gap could 
be reduced and possibly eliminated. The foreign exchange constraint therefore 
occurs because export growth and import requirements are exogenously 
determined and cannot be influenced by the policy makers. Thus for the LDCs 
most of the time the foreign exchange constraint appears to he the most relevant 
constraint on economic growth rather than the saving constraint. 
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Similarly assuming that import requirements are inflexible is not true at all 
levels. Joshi suggested that "whatever the truth may be about the flexibility of 
techniques in producing a given pattern of output, there can be no doubt that 
import requirements can be changed by changing the pattern of output. This 
point is often lost sight of if the imports consist almost entirely of `essential' 
capital goods and raw materials. But it does not follow that the industries into 
which they flow are themselves `essential' for growth". (1970, pp. 124). This 
could be a case where the imports are flowing into consumption goods 
industries. In such a case investment can be increased by reducing consumption 
and diverting the resources towards investment. In case this cannot happen, then 
a saving constraint describes the situation rather than the trade constraint. He 
also explained in his analysis that if both consumption and investment enter into 
the planner's utility function and if it is assumed that the marginal utility of 
consumption to the planner is always positive, then a foreign exchange 
constraint would never exist. 
Hence from the above it can be deduced that the gap models presented so far do 
not enable changes in domestic policies and government intervention to 
influence the productive structure. Foreign exchange constraint in developing 
countries can be thought instead to be the result of unstructured 
industrialisation, haphazard production ventures without any cost advantage 
judgements and poor sales and marketing strategies unabling them to penetrate 
new market outlets. 
Luxton (1979) has shown that despite the shortage of foreign exchange, if 
savings could be increased, the amount of investment goods produced in the 
economy could be raised even though domestic capacity is still under-utilised. 
He argued that if his approach is found valid in describing the situation facing 
many less developing countries, then internal measures to raise savings levels 
may be of great importance. The point made by Luxton is quite instructive to 
policy makers in LDCs that efforts should be made to increase domestic 
94 
Chqpter Three The Dual GOD Theory 
savings. In fact Findlay's (1973) analysis of two gap model also suggests that 
increases in savings always enable an increase in growth. This is further 
detailed below. 
Findlay (1973) also presented an interesting methodology using trade theory in 
approaching the gap problem. He demonstrated that both the terms of trade and 
the rate of growth are determined by the marginal propensity to save. Under 
these circumstances, no trade gap can emerge and increases in savings always 
enable an increase in the growth rate. This is shown with the use of a simple 
model in which a country produces a single commodity, which can he used for 
consumption, investment or export. The model also allows consumption of the 
imported good. The only factor of production for the domestic output is capital. 
In figure 3.2, OU represents the maximum level of domestic production and 
UU1 the budget constraint for the economy as a whole. The slope of UUi 
determines the terms of trade, for example OU of domestic output can be 
exported to obtain OU1 of imported goods at this rate. With given marginal 
propensity to save, the line RR1 indicates the resources available for investment. 
The point x, where the family of L-shaped isoquant is tangential to the line RR1, 
determines the imported and domestic inputs into investment, and also serves as 
the origin for a family of consumption indifference curves. The point V 
represents the consumption equilibrium point for the economy as a whole in the 
absence of any constraint on trade. 
Now assume that there is a restriction on trade so that OUYY1, instead of 
ODU,, becomes the feasible set. As illustrated here, it would be possible to 
maintain the level of investment if consumption now occurs at Y instead of V, 
where consumption bears the burden of the reduced opportunities available. But 
Y could also fall below the horizontal isoquant so that reducing consumption is 
not sufficient to allow the desired consumption to be maintained. Hence it 
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would appear that a trade gap may still persist even when final consumption of 
imports is permitted. 
Figure 3.2: Findlay's gap model representation 
Imports 
0 U Domestic goods 
However, this conclusion requires some clarifications. First of all on the trade 
restriction. If the limitation is caused by distortions in the domestic trade 
policies then these should be removed, for instance as in the case of India 
(Joshi, 1970) where government subsidised industries with negative value 
added thereby reducing the availability of foreign exchange. To present a 
genuine case for aid. the restriction must be one that is beyond the control of the 
domestic authorities. Assuming that the terms of trade is fixed up to the point Y 
but beyond that exports has unitary elasticity, then in such a case, UYY1 
becomes the foreign offer curve as in figure 3.3. The equilibrium terms of trade 
and export-import volumes can be determined by constructing a domestic offer 
curve to match against the foreign offer curve UYY1. The terms of trade can be 
varied by rotating UUi on U. Given the propensity to save, we can obtain the 
resources available for investment at each value of the terms of trade by rotating 
RRi about R, parallel to the rotation of UUi about U. At each value ofthe terms 
of trade the tangency of the investment isoquants with RRi will give the 
imported and domestic inputs required for investment as well as the origin for 
placing consumption-indifference map to determine the overall pattern demand 
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for imported and domestic goods by tangency with the parallel 1111, 
. 
"f he locus 
of all these points form the domestic offer curve UVV, in figure 3.3 
(Findlay, 1973, pp. 194). 
Figure 3.3: The Foreign Offer Curve 
U Uomcstic (ioods 
The equilibrium terms of trade will be measured by the slope of UZ where Z is 
the point of intersection of the foreign and domestic offer curves. Moving along 
the offer curve from U to V, implies higher growth rates since savings are the 
same but more favourable terms of trade allows a higher value of capital 
imports. Hence growth would have been higher at V (without trade restriction) 
than it is at Z. But point V is `irrelevant' to the country because it would have 
been the equilibrium point had it been assumed that any desired volume of 
trade can take place at terns of trade equal to the slope UUi. "The foreign 
exchange gap analysis starts by calculating foreign exchange required at too 
favourable terms and thus arrives at a gap by deducting foreign exchange 
actually available" (Ibid., pp. 194). At Z, the demand and supply of foreign 
exchange are equal and there is no trade gap. 
Now, can higher growth rates be achieved without opening a trade gap? Indeed, 
this can happen by increases in the propensity to save which lead to changes in 
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the terms of trade preventing the gap to open. This is illustrated in a free trade 
case in figure 3.4. 
UT and ZT are the volumes of exports and imports respectively and the slope 
UZ measures the terms of trade in free trade equilibrium. RRi is the investment 
budget constraint, based on this equilibrium terms of trade, with investment 
equilibrium at A. Taking Z as the origin for the consumption problems means 
that consumption equilibrium is also at A. 
Figure 3.4: The Impact of an Increase in the Marginal Propensity to Save 
ORSTU 
Suppose that there is an increase in the propensity to save such that the 
investment budget constraint is shifted from RR, to SS1. The investment 
equilibrium point shifts to B and consumption equilibrium point to C, which 
results in an excess demand for imports of CD and an excess supply of 
domestic goods of BD. To restore equilibrium the terms of trade move against 
the country, so that SS, swing to the left with point S remaining fixed. 
investment will fall below the level attained at B. The adverse shift in the terms 
of trade will lead to a fall in the demand of imported consumption goods and 
the new equilibrium position must be somewhere on OAB above the point C. 
But since C is already above A, this implies an increase in the level of capital 
imports. Hence increased savings have allowed higher capital imports and 
higher growth, and this mainly because the marginal propensity to save 
determines both the terms of trade and the rate of growth. 
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The analysis shows that no foreign exchange gap appeared since the relative 
prices of domestic and foreign goods adjust to clear any disequilibrium in the 
foreign exchange market. Thus the assertion that relative price adjustment 
cannot alleviate a foreign exchange gap and that the only solution is the 
provision of the requisite amount of foreign aid has been questioned. The point 
made by Findlay, Joshi and Luxton is that a foreign exchange constraint arises 
mainly because of unduly restrictive assumptions about the structural 
characteristics of the recipient economy. 
3.9 Summary and Conclusion. 
This chapter has shown that there are other factors which also constrain growth. 
Among the main factors, foreign exchange was seen to be constraining growth 
in many developing countries. Relieving a foreign exchange gap has more 
growth potential than relieving a savings gap. The two gap model has receiving 
many criticisms due to the assumptions on which it is based and its predictive 
value. Some authors have rejected the claim that a `pure' foreign exchange gap 
can exists. If it exists, it is due to structural rigidities, unstructured 
industrialisation, haphazard production ventures without any cost advantage 
judgements and poor sales and marketing strategies. They have pointed out that 
policies aimed at increasing savings will enable increases in growth. 
In this context we use growth models which include savings a determinant of 
economic growth. Before running any econometric analysis, we first analyse the 
regional capital flows to see which regions have been favoured by which types 
of capital transfer, and second, we perform some preliminary statistical data 
analysis to see any association between aid, growth, savings and investment. 
99 
Chapter Four 
Some Preliminary 
Data Analysis 
Chanter Four 
SOME PRELIMINARY DATA ANAL Y IS 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 aggregate net resource flows were analysed and we noticed that 
low income countries have relied heavily on foreign aid flows while middle 
income countries have access to private capital markets. In this chapter we first 
analyse in section 4.2 the distribution of capital flows by region. This will 
enable us to detect the types of capital that have been flowing to the regions 
and will also indicate to us which region has been more favoured in particular 
capital flows. Before proceeding to our own econometric analysis, it is 
worthwhile investigating some summary statistics that will he used, for 
example, growth rates, investment rates, savings rates and the different types of 
foreign capital inflows, for time period under study. This will help in detecting 
any trend or pattern among the variables. In this context, section 4.3 provides 
some preliminary statistics on these macro variables for each region. These will 
enable us to see how countries in particular region have fared. Section 4.4 
concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Regional Distribution of Capital Flows. 
This chapter supplements the exercise performed in Chapter 1 where we 
analysed the trends and sources of net resource flows to developing countries. 
We now break down the analysis of net resource transfers to concentrate on the 
geographical distribution of these flows and see whether some regions have 
been more favoured than others. The geographical distribution entails many 
essential characteristics which are not present when analysing these flows when 
classified under different income groups, for instance, historical links, cultures, 
tradition, colonisation history, climate, location and so on which might affect 
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the distribution of foreign assistance. The World Bank (World Debt Tables 
1994-95) divides developing countries into six regions: East Asia and the 
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle 
East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The same 
procedure is followed here. 
We divide the time period into the three main international events that took 
place between the period 1970 to 1993, namely the oil price shocks (1974-81), 
the debt crisis (1982-87) and the trade liberalisation period (1988-93). Figures 
4.1,4.2 and 4.3 depict the three time periods respectively and give an 
indication of how on average net resource flows have been distributed to 
developing countries by region. It can be seen that during the oil price shock 
(figure 4.1), the Latin American and Caribbean countries were the main 
recipients of net resource flows accounting for around 40%, followed by the 
Fast Asian and the Pacific countries accounting around 16%, of total net flows. 
Figure 4.1: Average Net Resource Flows 1974-1981 
Average Net Resource Flows 1974-1981 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
13% 
South Asia 
6% 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
15% 
Source: World I ablr, ( 1994). 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
15% 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
9% 
Latin America 
and The 
Caribbean 
42% 
With the onset of the debt crisis which started in the Latin American countries, 
aggregate net resource flows fell dramatically as can be observed in Figure 4.2. 
Capital flight was also a prominent feature in those countries. Capital flows, 
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especially private flows, were directed to other countries and the recipients 
were the countries in the East Asia and the Pacific. 
Figure 4.2: Average Net Resource Flows 1982-1987. 
Average Net Resource Flows 1982-1987 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
16% 
South Asia 
11% 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
15% 
Source: World Tables (1994). 
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Pacific 
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Central Asia 
9°/, 
Latin America 
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28% 
During the 1990s, however. East Asian and Pacific countries attracted more net 
resource flows than Latin American and Caribbean countries. Claims coming 
from other countries were increasing, for instance from Europe and Central 
Asia which comprises New Independent States (NIS) from lornier USSR. It 
should be noted that Sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries, where 
most of the low income countries are located, have together accounted for 
about 18% of total net resource flows in the period 1990-1993 (see figure 4.3) 
which is quite low compared to other regions when the population of these 
countries are taken into consideration. From table 4.1 it can he seen that on 
average, per capita net resource flows for all the regions have increased over 
the years. However, some regions have been more favoured than others, for 
instance, in the period 1990-93, for Latin America and the Caribbean per capita 
net resource flows have more than doubled while for Middle Fast and North 
African countries these have fallen by 45%. For South Asian and Sub-Saharan 
African countries these flows in per capita terms have stabilised at around US 
$8 and US $27 respectively. 
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Figure 4.3: Average Net Resource Flows 1988-1993 
Average Net Resource Flows 1988-1993 
Latin America 
and The 
Caribbean 
23% 
Source: World "Tables ( 1994). 
Table 4.1: Average Per Capita Net Resource Flows (US $) 1970-93 
Region 1970-1973 1974-1981 
(Phase 1) 
1982-1987 
(Phase II) 
1988-1993 
(Phase II) 
East Asia and the Pacific 2.1 6.7 9.3 22.5 
Europe and Central Asia 2.6 12.6 13.1 40.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 20.9 72.2 46.5 60.1 
Middle East and North Africa 11.9 56.1 47.8 29.7 
South Asia 2.0 4.4 7.2 8.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.4 21.4 23.7 28.4 
Source: computed from World Tables and World Debt Tables. 
Although we have seen the aggregate net resource flows for the regions, we 
would like to know which type of capital has been flowing into these regions. 
That is we are now interested in the trend and composition of capital flows. It 
is also interesting to note the main recipient countries in each region and see 
how on aggregate countries in the region have been affected by the above 
mentioned international episodes. In this context figures 4.4 to 4.9 depict the 
net resource flows of these regions for the period 1970-1993. The three major 
international episodes which have influenced the world economic environment 
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are as described in figure 1.3 and are the two oil price shocks, the international 
debt crisis, and trade liberalisation. They are labelled as Phase I, II and III 
respectively. 
4.2.1 East Asia and the Pacific 
From figure 4.4 it can be observed that for East Asia and the Pacific in the 
beginning of the period official development finance (the main component 
being foreign aid) was more important than private flows, in fact it averaged 
around 65%. Thereafter, private net flows became a major source of external 
finance for the countries in this region. Notice that in phase I, it looked like the 
oil price shocks did not affect the net resources flows. In fact resources were 
flowing in at a constant rate while countries in other regions required external 
financing of a larger magnitude. One of the reasons might be the number of 
middle income countries that are in this region, in fact there are II out of 17 
and also because of new oil exporters in the region, for example, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. The debt crisis, phase II, started to hit most countries in this region 
by 1984 rather than 1982, as in other regions. Capital flows were falling due to 
an apparent weakening of private sector confidence, related in particular to 
wide swings in exchange rates and uncertainty about their future evolution. 
Capital flight became significant in 1987 where a net outflow of private loans 
was noticed. Although other official flows were stable (declining slightly 
during 1985-87), it was private flows which fell drastically, especially in the 
form of private loans when real interest rates were very high. Thereafter with 
trade liberalisation, there has been a massive inflow of net resources mainly in 
the form of foreign direct investment. In this region there are 4 countries out of 
17 which are the main recipients, they are China, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, 
and Malaysia. Together they have accounted of total net resource flows of 
around 65% in 1980, over 85% in 1992 and 1993. Private flows to these 
countries have become very important, especially in terms of foreign direct 
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investment (FDI). The main recipient of foreign direct investment is China. In 
fact China's share has been increasing dramatically in the 1990s accounting for 
about 72% of all FDI flows in that region (World Bank, 1992). Not only that, it 
has become the largest recipient of FDI flows in the world. This is because 
China's political ascendancy in the early part of 1992 of reformers favouring 
market-based reforms to accelerate economic expansion. Economic reforms 
included the large-scale removal of price controls, the opening of more cities to 
foreign investment and the granting of more autonomy to provincial 
government. This favourable political climate helped the surge in foreign 
investment. Other countries receiving FDI flows are Malaysia, 12%, Thailand, 
7%, and Indonesia, 5% of total FDI flows in that region. The countries in this 
region have recently experienced greater market access to private capital flows. 
The share of official development finance has been only 14% of aggregate net 
resource flows to the region in 1993. 
4.2.2 Europe and Central Asia 
In the case of Europe and Central Asia (see figure 4.5) official flows were not 
the major source of net resource flows in relative or absolute terms until the 
I 990s where there has been an increase in absolute terms. This increase was in 
both official loans and official grants which were directed mainly to the New 
Independent States (NIS) which were part of former Russia and Yugoslavia. 
The second price shock has necessitated a large amount of private capital loans 
but soon with the debt crisis, these started to dry up as real interest rates were 
on the rise. During the 1970s and 1980s the main recipients of net resource 
flows were Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. For the latter. there was a net 
inflow of resource up to 1982 and since then there has been a continuous 
outflow mainly because of the political conflict in that country. But in 1993 
resources have been flowing in again. The post 1989 dramatic economic and 
political reforms had surfaced in a number of Eastern European countries and 
in the USSR were driven in part by the failure of the then existing system, 
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reducing the confidence of private investors and creditors, outflows of capital 
were observed. With the recovery from the international debt crisis, 4 countries 
out of 29 became the major recipients of net resource flows, they were Turkey, 
Portugal, the Russian Federation and Hungary. In 1993 they accounted for 
about 70% of total net resource flows distributed in that region. Portugal has 
recently been a new destination for private flows and official bilateral flows, 
the amount flowing in became important after 1989 and onwards. As figure 4.5 
shows, there has been a big jump of net resource flows from 1988 to 1994. In 
fact some of the main recipients received substantial amounts, for instance in 
1988 the Russian Federation received US $ 3.17 billion of net resource flows, 
this amount tripled to US $9.6 billion in 1990. These flows were mainly in the 
form of official loans and grants to restructure the economy. In the case of 
Hungary, with the fall of communism and the rise of a free market philosophy, 
significant resources have been flowing in, for instance in 1992 net resource 
flows were US $1.4 billion while in 1993 they almost quadrupled to US $5.4 
billion. Of these foreign direct investment was more important than other 
flows. In fact, Hungary along with Poland and Portugal are the main recipients 
of FDI flows in that region. 
4.2.3 Latin America and the Caribbean 
The trend of net resource flows for the Latin American and the Caribbean 
countries (figure 4.6) resembles the trend described earlier for middle income 
countries (see figure 1.5). This is because 86% of the countries in this region 
have been classified under this category (25 out of 29 countries). The countries 
in this region have easy market access to private capital and have relied 
especially on loans from commercial banks. Official loans and grants 
accounted for less than 17% of the total in the 1970s and early 1980s but was 
around 74% in 1986 mainly because private loans dried up and there was even 
an outflow of private capital recorded in 1989. 
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During the oil crisis, this region received the highest amount of foreign capital. 
This peaked at US $47 billion in 1981. The debt crisis (together with inflation 
problems) brought macroeconomic instability. Rising real interest rates 
increased the external debt service burden, so too did rising fiscal deficits. The 
capital flight which was observed in 1989 was because the returns from 
intrinsically profitable investment were likely to be taxed to service foreign 
debt, consequently a certain disincentive to undertake investment prevailed. 
In the third phase, among the major Latin American debtor countries, a pattern 
of increasing differentiation in economic policies and performance emerged. 
One group of countries (Mexico, Chile, Columbia) has made considerable 
progress in establishing the conditions for basic macroeconomic stability and 
embarked on wide-ranging programmes of structural reforms. Another group of 
countries (Brazil, Argentina, Peru) is faced with a rapidly deteriorating 
macroeconomic situation, bordering on hyperinflation in some cases, and has 
made little progress in eliminating structural rigidities. 'T'hese countries 
continue to experience debt service problems, whereas countries with strong 
macroeconomic control and structural reform programmes in place have been 
able to reduce their debt burden and have attracted higher foreign investment 
and, in the case of Mexico, a significant repatriation of flight capital. The 
recent fall in net resource flows has been attributed mainly to the Mexican 
pesos crisis in 1994. Argentina was mostly affected which was known as the 
"Tequila effect", where the currency board system implied that the resulting 
drop in official reserves was automatically reflected in the monetary base, 
leading to a liquidity squeeze. Interest rates rose sharply, causing some firms to 
default and some banks to fail. This created a crisis of confidence in the 
banking sector. Other countries, for instance, in Brazil there were capital 
outflows recorded. 
In this region, only a handful of countries have been receiving most of the net 
resource flows, they are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. In the 
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I 970s, Brazil and Mexico both accounted for around 65% of total net resource 
flows to the region of which for Brazil only it was 45% of total. In the 1980s, 
Argentina, Brazil, Columbia and Mexico were among the main recipients. 
Argentina became one of the major recipients in the 1980s as it suffered its 
longest period of stagnation this century. Savings and investment rates fell 
precipitously and there was an unstable macroeconomic environment 
prevailing. Resources were necessary to finance the public deficit which was 
20% of GDP. 
On the other hand Brazil's economic performance since 1981 has been poor in 
comparison to its potential. The inability of Brazil to cope with the oil price 
shocks, increases in real interest rates, the debt crisis and with poor 
management of public finances and heavy state intervention resulted in large 
fiscal deficits. Demand for external financing was on the rise. For Mexico, a 
structural reform programme was undertaken because of huge balance of 
payments and fiscal deficits. In the mid 1980s, Mexico adopted an outward- 
oriented and private-sector-led reform strategy which included public 
enterprise privatisation, public debt reduction and opening the economy to 
international competition. Private inflows were responding positively to the 
demand while official loans and grants were used to restructure the economy 
and partly as debt relief. 
In the early 1990s, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were still the major recipients 
of net resource flows but other countries also started to receive foreign 
assistance such as Chile and Peru. For this time period Mexico's net resource 
flows were the most significant, they increased from US $ 9.4 billion in 1992 
to US $ 22.3 billion in 1993 (which was 35% of total net resource flows). This 
has been the outcome of the reform which re-established investor confidence in 
the Mexican economy: there were sizable private capital inflows and real 
domestic interest rates fell sharply. In 1993 portfolio equity investment was US 
$ 14 billion in Mexico (56% of total) while it was US $ 5.5 billion in Brazil 
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and US $ 3.6 billion in Argentina. In terms of foreign direct investment, 
Argentina has been the most favoured country attracting 40% of the total FDI 
flows to the region followed by Mexico which accounted for 30%. 
As mentioned above, official flows were mainly directed to Mexico to 
restructure its debt. In the early 1990s with the recovery of the international 
debt crisis there has been a preference towards private resource flows and less 
reliance on official flows. In fact official concessional loans and grants in the 
region accounted for only around 8% of total net resource flows after 1991 and 
most of which has been directed to Argentina. With recent macroeconomic 
stability in most of the countries in the region, the opening of trading 
opportunities and the level of income of most of the countries, it is expected 
that private flows will continue to be the major source of finance. 
4.2.4 Middle East and North Africa 
As with Middle East and North African countries, net resources have been 
flowing in a very erratic way over the time period 1970-1993 (see figure 4.7). 
Throughout the period foreign aid (mainly bilateral flows from the Arab 
countries) was more important than private flows except in 1988 when foreign 
aid and other official flows together fell by 46%. In the early 1970s, Egypt and 
Algeria were the main recipients of net resource flows. Algeria was receiving 
these mainly from France. With the oil price shocks many countries in that 
region relied on foreign aid-among these were Egypt, Morocco and Syria 
while Jordan and Syria received substantial grants. Most of the resources 
flowing in were from the Arab countries recycling their oil surplus revenues to 
the region. When oil prices increased by 130% between 1988 and 1979, net 
resources to these countries peaked to US $ 12 billion. Thereafter with new oil 
supplies coming on-stream in Alaska, the North Sea and Mexico, oil prices 
started to fall and together with the beginning of the recession in the OECD 
countries, led to a fall of resources to these countries in phase 11. Most of these 
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countries received substantial amounts of net resource flows for political 
reasons (Cassen et al., 1994). During the Gulf War, Egypt has received 
important sum in terms of official grants mainly from the USA. After the Gulf 
War, net resource flows to that region have been on the decline but have been 
expected to increase in 1994. 
4.2.5 South Asia 
The other regions where most of the low income countries are located, South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan African, have trends similar to that depicted in figure 1.4 
(see figures 4.8 and 4.9). The countries in both regions have relied heavily on 
foreign aid flows. In the case of South Asia, where all of the countries are in 
the low income category-except Maldives, the main recipients in the 1970s 
have been India, which accounted for 45% of total net resource flows, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh each receiving 25% of total net flows. The South Asian 
countries have on average received US $2 per capita of net resource flows 
during the period 1970-1973, the lowest among all the regions (see table 4.1). 
This region still receives the lowest per capita net flows, for instance for the 
period 1990-1993 it received US $9 while for Latin American and Caribbean 
countries it was US $60. The three above mentioned countries are still the 
major recipients of net resource flows, in 1993 India received 60%, Pakistan 
20% and Bangladesh 10% of total net flows. Foreign aid flows have mostly 
been directed to India and Bangladesh towards poverty relief and emergency 
funding for natural disasters. Of the foreign aid flows, multilateral loans were 
more important than bilateral ones. It is just recently that portfolio equity 
investment has started to flow in while official flows remain vital for this part 
of the world. 
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In Sub-Saharan Africa, 34 out of 45 countries are in the low income group. 
During 1970-1973, the countries received on average US $7 per capita of net 
resource flows and foreign aid flows accounted for around 60% of total net 
flows (see figure 4.9). In the 1980s, Cote d'lvoire, Nigeria. Sudan, Tanzania 
and Zaire were among the main recipients of in this region. Average per capita 
net resource flows have increased to US $27 and net flows to other countries 
have increased, for instance to Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Somalia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 1993, Nigeria and Ethiopia each received 
7% of total net flows, Mozambique and Tanzania 6% each, and Angola and 
Zambia 5% each. The rest of the countries received less than 4%, mostly 
around 2% of the total. Private flows have been very limited to the region, of 
which Nigeria was the main recipient of FDI flows. Only in Liberia and 
Mauritius has portfolio equity investment been undertaken. Most of the 
countries in this part of the world continue to rely mainly on official flows 
especially in terms of grants. Many authors have stressed the amount of foreign 
aid flows which has been flowing to Sub-Saharan Africa and have expected 
that the countries in this region to perform well, for instance, Cassen et 
al. (1994), Mosley (1984,1987) among others. The fact that this region receives 
around one third of foreign aid flows does not necessarily imply that all 
countries are getting huge amounts of these flows. This is because there are 45 
countries in this region, the highest number out of any other regions. In terms 
of per capita allocations, as seen earlier, they receive no more than a third of 
what Latin American and Caribbean countries get. Another reason is the fact 
that the countries in this region are among the poorest in the world so that 
resources are often diverted towards survival needs. Other reasons include 
internal problems caused by civil war and natural calamities. On top of that 
these countries are very vulnerable to external factors due to heavy reliance on 
agricultural products which command low prices and are exposed to high 
fluctuations. 
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4.3 Statistics on Growth, Investment and Savings 
The net resource flows to the developing countries are expected to have certain 
macroeconomic effects such as on growth of income, domestic investment and 
domestic savings. In earlier chapters, we described how foreign aid (and other 
capital imports), can increase income through different channels (for instance, 
increasing productivity, improving human capital, spillover effects and so on). 
All the theoretical models discussed earlier, the orthodox dual gap model, the 
Harrod-Domar growth model, the Neo-classical growth model along with some 
extensions and the endogenous growth model, have capital stock (or 
investment) or savings as one of the variables influencing growth of output. 
Foreign assistance is supposed to supplement domestic investment and savings 
so as to increase growth. In this respect, we first use some descriptive statistics 
to analyse the growth performance (trend), investment and savings and then we 
try to deduce statistically any relationship between foreign aid and growth. 
The following is an account of the growth performance, investment ratio and 
the savings rate for the six regions. Table 4.2 provides a summary of the 
average growth rates of the six regions for the period 1970-1993 along with 
some statistics such as the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation 
which enable us to assess the relative dispersion of average growth rates of the 
countries in a particular region. 
Table 4.2: Average Real GDP Growth Rates (%) 1970-1993 
Region Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
(`%. ) 
East Asia and the Pacific 7.6 2.3 30.1 
Europe and Central Asia 2.9 6.1 208.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.6 2.8 77.5 
Middle East and North Africa 1.9 5.7 295.6 
South Asia 4.3 2.9 66.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 2.2 82.2 
Source: computed from World Bank Table, 1995. 
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It can be seen that, on average, the growth performance has been positive for 
all the countries between 1970-1993. The ultimate question to ask is whether 
the same average growth has been achieved throughout the period. Certainly 
not. The problem associated with this statistic (though useful) is that it hides 
many essential characteristics, for instance, when looking at the coefficient of 
variation a high degree of volatility (the relative dispersion) of the growth rates 
is evident for countries in regions achieving less than 3%. This would imply 
that there has been some significant fluctuations during the period. 
The obvious solution then is to break down the period as was done when 
analysing the aggregate net resource flows. The three major international 
episodes which have influenced the world economic environment as described 
in figure 1.3 as the two oil price shocks, the international debt crisis, and trade 
liberalisation. They are labelled as Phase I, II and III respectively. From the 
literature review on foreign aid, this is the very time that such decomposition 
and analysis are being carried out. Previous authors had explicitly isolated the 
developing countries by not taking into account the international episodes so 
far described. In the next sections we explain why this is important. Only a few 
have implicitly incorporated some variables which are affected by these events, 
for instance, exports or the degree of openness, but not specifically explaining 
how these events affected growth in the presence of foreign capital flows. They 
have been preoccupied more by concentrating on deriving a snapshot 
relationship between aid and growth only. 
Table 4.3 presents the break down of the average growth rates of the regions 
according to the main international events. In the `pre-shocks' phase, 1970- 
1973, the average growth rates of each region are higher than the `shocks' 
phases-except for South Asia which had lower growth in the beginning. Some 
plausible reasons could be due to the fact that many countries had adopted 
inward-oriented trade strategies which were not a success and also due to the 
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low level of savings which was not supplemented by external assistance. The 
high value of the coefficient of variation of 111% (see table 4.4) also suggests 
that during this period growth rates of the countries have been volatile to a 
large extent. Over the whole period, it can be seen from tables 4.3 and 4.4 that 
in most cases when the coefficient of variation is falling, the mean value of the 
growth rate increases. This implies, first, that the average growth rates for all 
the countries in the region are rising, and second that most of the countries are 
having growth rates closer to the mean value, that is, the volatility has been 
reduced. We now examine the macroeconomic performance in each region. 
Ta 4 Av 1 D 0 tphases. 
Region 1970- 
1973 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
East Asia and The Pacific 9 6.5 7.6 8.2 
Europe and Central Asia 9.9 4.5 3.1 
-4 
Latin America and The Caribbean 7 4.4 1.9 2 
Middle East and North Africa N/A 2.6 0.9 2.3 
South Asia 2.3 4.3 5.1 5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.9 3.6 1.1 1.7 
Source: same as Table 4.2. 
Table 4A Coefficient of variation in real GDP Growth Rates in different 
phases. 
Region 1970- 
1973 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
East Asia and The Pacific 38.1 31.7 16.6 16.4 
Europe and Central Asia 60.0 24.9 28.3 141.7 
Latin America and The Caribbean 9.8 47.9 142.6 74.5 
Middle East and North Africa N/A 298.4 515.8 60.3 
South Asia 111.3 83.2 19.9 49.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 42.9 51.6 108.2 85.5 
Source: Computed. 
The East Asian and Pacific region, on average between 1970-1993, has 
experienced the highest average rate of real GDP growth, 7.6 %. This is not 
surprising due to the presence of some Dynamic Asian Economies (DAEs)- 
China, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. The remarkable performance could 
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possibly be accounted by the high rates of investment and savings (the highest 
in all the regions, see Tables 4.5 and 4.6), flexible and efficient production 
structures and a strong outward orientation reflected in very rapid growth of 
both exports and imports. Throughout the period, investment and savings rates 
were both increasing, they averaged around 34% in 1990-1993. Although in the 
beginning, an increase in these rates was observed in phase I, the average GDP 
growth rate fell due to the oil shock which affected demand for their exports in 
the OECD countries (their main importers), figure 4.10 in Appendix 4.1' 
depicts this clearly. The OECD countries had experienced the sharpest decline 
in output and the highest unemployment since World War Il. In the early 
1980s, when recession hit most industrialised countries, the investment and 
savings rates of the East Asian and Pacific countries stabilised at around 25% 
and with some increases in private net flows (see figure 4.4), GDP growth was 
around 5%. In phase II, the average growth improved further due to 
continuously increasing domestic investment and savings rates. The coefficient 
of variation in this phase was half that of the previous phase, indicating that 
growth of the countries in this region became less volatile than before. This 
suggested that the debt crisis had not exacerbated growth of these countries- 
most of the investment resources came from domestic savings which rose 
sharply in this phase (see figures 4.11 and 4.12). 
With trade liberalisation and the ending of the debt crisis (phase III), real 
exports revenues increased sharply in 1988 as a result of strong demand in 
OECD countries and rising relative prices of commodities. The growth rate was 
around 10% in that year. Thereafter the growth rate was around 7% in 1989 and 
has since been rising at an increasing rate taking advantage of liberalisation in 
the world economy. This reflects the openness and competitiveness of the 
countries in this region. Despite high rates of domestic investment and savings, 
the growth impetus seems to come from increasing foreign direct investment 
which remains important in this part of the world (OECD Economic Outlook). 
In Appendix 4.1 figures 4.10 to 4.. 27 are depicted. 
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In Europe and Central Asia, the region was experiencing the highest growth 
rate in the period 1970-1973, around 10%, but excluding 1970 which was an 
exceptional year, it averaged around 6%. Since then it has followed a smooth 
downward trend (as confirmed by the coefficient of variation) during phase I 
and 11, see figure 4.13. Domestic investment and savings rates were around 
30% in phase II (see tables 4.5 and 4.6). Foreign direct investment in this area 
has been very disappointing, but with fall of communism and opening of 
markets in the EEC, this form of investment has started to rise since 1992. 
Table 4.5: Average Domes S A 
. Dº ºn 0 ifferen t--Dhases 
Region 1970-973 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
East Asia and the Pacific 23.9 26.2 29.1 33.5 
Europe and Central Asia N/A N/A 29.9 28.4 
Latin America and the Caribbean 22 24.6 19.3 20.3 
Middle East and North Africa N/A 26.6 25.2 23.9 
South Asia 16.5 20.2 21.8 23.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 21.8 24.6 18.1 17.2 
Source: same as Table 4.2. 
Table 4.6: Average Domestic Savings Rates (%) in different phases 
Region 1970-973 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
East Asia and the Pacific 23.5 25.5 28.8 34.1 
Europe and Central Asia N/A N/A 30.2 26.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 20.6 22.9 22.3 21.3 
Middle East and North Africa N/A 37.8 22.3 21.8 
South Asia 14.8 17.2 17.6 20.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.1 23.3 17.6 17.3 
Source: same as Table 4.2. 
With the emergence of the New Independent States, the average growth rates in 
the region deteriorated further during phase III, as output in these countries 
were falling due to civil war disturbances. Both domestic savings and 
investment rates fell, the domestic savings rate fell drastically to about 20% of 
GDP while the investment rate was around 27% in 1992. During this phase 
growth rates have been much more volatile than before. Low productivity and 
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poor allocation of investment from 1989 have resulted in adequate and badly 
adapted supply, contributing to mismatches between supply and demand at the 
microeconomic level, and to persistent excess demand overall. Excess demand, 
in turn, has led to sometimes sharp increases in both open and repressed 
inflation. Macroeconomic imbalances have in some cases, notably Poland, been 
compounded by loss of confidence in dramatic currency, giving rise to severe 
stabilisation problems and hyperinflation. With stabilisation and structural 
adjustment in place in these NIS countries, some recovery in activities are 
expected in the mid-1990s (OECD Economic Outlook). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, after a period of high growth rates in 
1970-1973, the countries in this region suffered the adverse impact of the oil 
price shock as most other developing countries. Growth rates fell from 7% in 
1970-1973 to 4.4% on average during the period 1974-1981 (see table 4.3). 
Resource transfers to this region are seen to have supplemented domestic 
investment especially during phase I. In fact, investment rates were around 
25% while domestic savings averaged 23%. The gap between investment and 
savings being closed especially by private flows. Private loans, which were 
cheap and which could be accessed easily, were being used to finance oil 
imports. The adverse effect of the oil price hike might have been responsible 
for the fall in GDP growth which fell from a peak of 8% in 1973 (see Figure 
4.16). In 1979-80, an improvement was observed, possiblly due to the second 
oil price shock which generated some windfall gains to Mexico's oil export. 
The debt crisis had a significant impact on this part of the world. In the early 
1980s, the growth rates of many countries in this region were deteriorating due 
to rising inflation rates, the incipient debt crisis, recession in the OECD 
countries, huge fiscal deficits and fall in the investment rates (from 25% in 
1980 to around 17% in 1983, see figure 4.17) although sufficient domestic 
savings were available (figure 4.18). This is partly due to poor real rates of 
return obtainable in that period. Many countries contracted the IMF 
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Stabilisation and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes through 
which recovery was observed in many cases in the mid-1980s. In the late 
1980s, although domestic investment rates were rising, they were still less than 
the savings capacity and together with capital flight, as explained earlier, 
growth performances were rather poor, less than 1%. A foreign exchange or 
fiscal gap could possibly best characterise this situation. There were also some 
disruptions in Brazil's export supply. Countries which were heavily-indebted in 
this region had their growth retarded by the possible role of "debt overhang". 
During the early 1990s many countries embarked on economic reform 
programmes and the third phase shows the payoffs of countries which made 
considerable progress in establishing the conditions for basic macroeconomic 
stability. Despite some falls in the domestic investment and savings rates, GDP 
growth was rising due to heavy investment by private investors. The amount of 
foreign direct investment, portfolio equity investment and significant 
repatriation of flight capital might have been responsible for growth to resume 
in phase III. With the beginning of the trade liberalisation episode, many 
countries adopted a more open trade regime, for instance, Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, as well as the Andean Pact member countries-Bolivia, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela-have enacted new, more liberal and transparent 
foreign direct investment codes. Mexico has also pursued a policy of opening 
the domestic market to foreign competition, with a reduction of import tariffs 
and elimination of most import licences. 
The resurgence of free trade areas in Latin America is also providing a 
stimulus. In addition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Mexico has agreed to establish a free trade agreement with Columbia and 
Argentina over a 10-year period. Other integration agreements include the 
Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), consisting of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay; the Andean Group; the Central American 
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Common Market and CARICOM, which have been implemented by the larger 
Caribbean countries. These are all helping to promote growth in the region. 
Despite observing some fall in the savings rates in the 1990s, GDP growth has 
been increasing. This characterises the role of foreign assistance, especially 
private net flows, supplementing domestic savings. Private capital flows have 
been attracted by high real rates of return compared to those obtainable in the 
U. S. in particular, and by renewed investor confidence in the medium-term 
growth outlook. This confirmed the trend which began in the early 1990s, and 
caused most currencies to appreciate in real terms. With these conditions 
further growth achievements are expected to continue in the future. 
Among all the regions, Middle East and North Africa have experienced the 
lowest average rate of GDP growth during the period 1970-1993,1.9%. Figure 
4.19 illustrates the average growth rates of the countries in the region. As can 
be seen, just like the net resource flows, the growth rates over the period show 
considerate volatility. In fact the coefficient of variation is as high as 296%, the 
highest among the regions in the period 1970-1993. During the oil shock, the 
countries in this region were badly hit, growth rates fell from 15% in 1976 to 
around 
-10% in 1981. It is worth noting that during the oil crisis, despite 
having high domestic savings rates and high inflows of net resources (of which 
foreign aid was significant), investment rates were well below the savings 
capacity. This is a case where resources were mostly diverted towards 
consumption and non-productive investment. Growth followed a downward 
trend. During phase II the same scenario was observed and it was only after 
1988 when both investment and savings rates started to rise that the growth 
rates of the countries in the region began to increase, see figures 4.20 and 4.21. 
In the early 1990s, phase III, with economic reforms in some countries, growth 
performance was better than previous phases. it was only in this phase that the 
average savings rate was lower than the average investment rate, see tables 4.5 
and 4.6. Despite this net resource flows were less than those recorded in the 
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late 1970s and early 1980s, it implies that these resources were mainly 
supplementing domestic savings and investment. Growth rates averaged 3% in 
this period. 
South Asia, where the world's poorest countries are located, has on overall 
achieved on average a good growth performance during the period 1970-1993. 
It averaged around 4.3% (see table 4.2 and figure 4.22). Full credit should be 
given to these poor countries because during the oil crisis while other regions 
were facing continuous decline in their real GDP growth rates, most of the 
South Asian countries managed to achieve an average growth rate of 4%. This 
would imply that most countries pursued a sound macroeconomic management 
and were using the proceeds from agricultural booming prices in 1973 towards 
productive investment. Also during this phase despite having, on average, a 
savings rate of 17%, domestic investment as a percentage of GDP was around 
20% (see figures 4.23 and 4.24 and Tables 4.5 and 4.6). We find here also a 
case where foreign assistance has helped in closing the investment-saving gap. 
In fact, not only in phase 1, but throughout the period 1970-1993 was domestic 
investment greater than domestic savings. 
As pointed out earlier, the three main recipients-India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan-have relied mostly on foreign aid. Economic development in these 
countries has improved over the last two decades. India, for instance, pursued a 
planned approach that combined prudent macroeconomic management; an 
active state role in key sectors such as banking, basic industries, utilities, and 
infrastructure; and extensive regulation of the economy. However, although 
highly regulated, the private sector was important and was present in most 
sectors of the economy. Throughout the 1980s important policy changes 
liberalised trade, industry, and the financial sector, while subsidies, tax 
concessions, and the depreciation of the currency improved export incentives. 
These measures helped GDP growth to accelerate over 5% a year during the 
1980s and reduced poverty more rapidly. But India's most Fundamental 
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structural problems were addressed only partially. Tariffs continued to be 
extremely high and quantitative restrictions remained pervasive. In the late 
1980s these problems were compounded by political uncertainty. There were 
two general elections and four changes of government between end- 1988 and 
July 1991. Growth rates in between that time deteriorated. The August 1990 
developments in the Persian Gulf put additional pressures on the balance of 
payments and eroded the confidence of foreign lenders. Capital outflows 
accelerated and commercial banks reduced their exposure in India. Multilateral 
and bilateral aid, particularly from Japan, provided significant assistance in the 
first half of 1991. 
In June 1991 a new government launched a comprehensive economic 
stabilisation programme and a major transformation of India's development 
strategy. A new industrial policy announced in late July, together with the 
revised budget, liberalised one of the most controlled investment regimes in the 
world. The rupee was devalued by 22% in dollar terms. In April 1992, virtually 
all licensing restrictions on imports of capital goods and intermediates were 
eliminated. Growth prospects seem propitious in the 1990s following these 
measures. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, although experienced some windfall gains in the 
1970s from increases in cotton prices, has experienced considerable political 
turmoil for several years which had effects on its growth. The level of 
investment and savings in the economy remains too low to sustain growth. As a 
consequence, Pakistan compares unfavourably with fast-growing economies in 
Asia in terms of physical infrastructures-basis transport, power, and 
telecommunication-and even more so in human resources development. The 
country relies to a large extent on foreign aid. The country also continues to 
grapple with difficult political, social/cultural, and governance issues that affect 
the pace and effectiveness of its economic development effort. In the late 
1980s, ethnic and tribal conflicts have also contributed to periodic law and 
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order problems, which have been exacerbated by drugs and corruption. These 
difficulties have slowed implementation of development projects and affected 
the location and size of new investments with the international community 
embarking on trade liberalisation scheme, Pakistan adopted trade policy 
reforms in two phases. Still though the country is exposed to substantial risks 
posed by vulnerability to external and internal shocks and policy slippage. On 
the external front, the main sources of risks are fluctuations in cotton and oil 
prices, slow growth in OECD countries, changes in interest rates (given the 
amount of external borrowing on variable terms), and sudden outflows of 
capital. On the internal side, the cotton virus is having a major impact on cotton 
production, which is likely to continue to be affected for several years. But it is 
expected that with trade liberalisation and investment opportunities, growth 
will prosper. 
Bangladesh, has been vulnerable to devastating cyclones and floods. Structural 
adjustment programme were in place since the beginning of the 1990s and 
brought macroeconomic stability and improvements in public resources 
management. Bangladesh remains heavily dependent on foreign aid, with over 
50% of its Annual Development Program financed by concessional project aid. 
Trade liberalisation has advanced significantly in an effort to remove anti- 
export and anti-private sector biases. To encourage the private sector, the 
government is reforming fiscal and financial incentives and the regulatory and 
legal environment. A phased programme of import liberalisation covering both 
quantitative restrictions and tariff rationalisation is in progress. Measures have 
been taken to improve export incentives and investors are particularly attracted 
by cheap labour. In the 1990s, the savings rates have been more than double 
those of the 1980s. 
The efforts of the countries in this region can be characterised as being 
remarkable despite many factors inhibiting their growth. While many `radical' 
authors have emphasised the negative aspect of foreign aid on growth, these 
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countries have shown that efficient use of foreign aid and other flows can be 
made. It can be found from figures 4.23 and 4.24 that investment and savings 
have increased over time despite low incomes per capita. These require in real 
terms a high opportunity cost. In fact the lower savings rates than investment 
implies that additional foreign resources have helped in supplementing 
domestic savings. Gang and Khan (1991) have also shown that official loans 
were used more productively than grants in the case of India. With trade 
liberalisation, these countries need to be vigilant and cautious, especially when 
they are exposed to fierce competition from the East Asian and Pacific 
countries. 
Sub-Saharan Africa includes the poorest countries in the world. Growth 
performance has not been remarkable over the period 1970-1993, it has instead 
followed a downward trend (see figure 4.25). The level of poverty in this 
region hinders growth at large (or it could be the other way round! ). In the 
beginning of phase I, despite the first oil price shock, many countries achieved 
some remarkable growth rates, due to booming agricultural prices in 1973. 
Boom conditions in industrial countries, which fuelled these prices, also 
contributed to strong volume demand for these exports; but in the following 
year this was more than offset by the rising volume of these countries' imports. 
Over the whole period, just like South Asian countries, foreign aid has been 
more important than private flows. But contrary to South Asia, the growth 
performance has been disappointing. This is not surprising given the 
investment and savings rates, the lowest since the 1980s. They have been 
falling on average over the period 1970-1993 as figure 4.26 and 4.27 depict. 
The continued increase in foreign assistance, mainly in terms of foreign aid, 
seems to be directed mostly to consumption rather than productive investment, 
given that many countries have their population below the poverty line. 
This region faces an enormous problem if efforts are not made to invest foreign 
capital productively, especially when both the investment and savings rates are 
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falling (see tables 4.5 and 4.6). Phase III characterises clearly this outcome. 
Without an increase in these rates, it would be difficult to sustain growth of 
income. There have been some signs that structural reform policies, when 
strongly supported by external finance and not undermined by weather and 
political problems have shown results. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the terms of trade outlook has been less favourable, prices of a number of 
commodities crucial to individual countries have fallen, and the collapse of the 
coffee pact is symptomatic of the difficulties commodity exporters face in 
seeking to hold up their terms of trade through commodity cartels. Sub-Saharan 
Africa's share of world markets has almost halved since 1970 and this loss is 
expected to continue. With trade liberalisation, the type of commodities 
(mostly primary agricultural goods) which are mainly produced by the 
countries in this region put them at a disadvantage as they command low prices 
and are affected by climatic conditions. Diversification, with the help of 
foreign assistance, has proved to be beneficial in some countries (for instance, 
Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius) and this can be taken as an example for other 
countries. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks. 
It was observed in Chapter 1 that the distribution of net resource Ilows between 
middle income countries and low income countries differs. While the former 
has more access and reliance on private capital flows, the latter continues to 
rely on official flows, mainly in the form of foreign aid. Breaking down the 
countries into the six regions gave an indication where most of the middle 
income and low income countries are clustered. Most of the middle income 
countries are located in Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe and 
Central Asia regions while South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa account for 
most of the low income countries. Private net flows are seen to he more 
important to the Latin American and Caribbean countries while foreign aid 
flows are of utmost importance to the countries in South Asia and sub-Saharan 
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Africa (see figure 4.28 in Appendix 4.2). It is observed that since 1990 the New 
Independent States have been allocated some important amounts of foreign aid 
in helping them to build their economic base. 
The growth rates of income of the developing countries have been affected 
mainly by the external economic developments, their domestic investment and 
savings rates, and foreign transfers. In most cases investment rates have been 
rising in the 1990s even though domestic savings were falling in some cases, 
for instance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Whether only foreign aid has 
affected growth or not, or has been used for consumption rather than for 
investment purposes needs to be found- the so-called fungibility. But it is 
without doubt that private investment in the Latin America and the Caribbean 
and in East Asia and the Pacific regions has improved the growth performance, 
especially in the third phase. Other region such as Sub-Saharan Africa, foreign 
aid was directed mainly to poverty alleviation, rebuilding certain basic 
infrastructure and towards `unproductive' activities. For both Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, the 1990s remains a challenge for future growth as 
many other developing countries in other regions have already established a 
programme of trade liberalisation and reforms. There is a high need for them to 
catch up. This also implies that they need to be ready for greater competition. 
Overall the two unfavourable shocks, that is phase I and phase II, have caused 
many countries to experience high volatility in their growth rates (as indicated 
by the high coefficient of variation values, see Table 4.4). In the third phase, 
however, this volatility has been reduced. We have observed that instabilities in 
the external economic environment have considerable impact on growth in 
developing countries. These instabilities in turn can affect the effectiveness of 
foreign aid. So far in the aid literature these instabilities have been overlooked. 
In the next chapter we present a simple taxonomy to explain how aid's 
effectiveness can be affected. 
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Figure 4.13: REAL GDP GROWTH IN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 
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Figure 4.14: DOMESTIC INVESTMENT AS A'%, OF GDP IN EUROPE 
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Figure 4.16: REAL GDP GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 
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Figure 4.18: DOMESTIC SAVINGS AS A `%, OF GDP IN 
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Figure 4.20 : DOMESTIC INVESTMENT AS A%, OF GDP IN MIDDLE 
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
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Figure 4.22: REAL GDP GROWTH IN SOUTH ASIA 
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Figure 4.24: DOMESTIC SAVINGS AS A OF (: 1)P IN SOUTH ASIA 
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Figure 4.25: REAL GDP GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
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Figure 4.26: DOMESTIC INVESTMENT AS A'%o OF ('DP IN SUB- 
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Aid and Growth: A Statistical Link 
5.1 Introduction 
From the donors' point of view, the main objective of official transfers to 
developing countries is to promote economic development and to enhance 
welfare. Policy makers are quite certain that economic development requires a 
substantial increase in national investment, that is an accelerated rate of capital 
formation. Another contention is that rapid economic development generally 
calls for a substantial volume of imports of materials, capital goods, and 
technical services. If either domestic savings are insufficient to finance 
domestic investment, or exports are inadequate to meet such imports, or both, 
rapid development cannot be attained. In such circumstances, the only way out 
is the substitution of foreign resources for the deficiency in domestic savings 
and/or exports. Chart I below describes this schematic link. 
Chart 1: A Schematic Link 
Imports 
I Investment IN 
Economic 
Development 
(or economic 
growth) 
Donors expect that their resources are efficiently used, especially when it 
comes to foreign aid. What do they want in the end'? In section 5.2 we start 
with a simple taxonomy about the link between aid and growth. This will 
enable us to understand better how aid is supposed to affect growth. It will 
also enable us to see whether others factors are important in explaining growth. 
In section 5.3 we then use a sample of developing countries to analyse 
statistically the link between aid and growth. This will tell us whether there is 
any association between these two variables. We also consider the investment 
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and savings rates to see if there are any further link. Section 5.4 concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2 A Taxonomy for Aid and Growth 
To start with, let us assume that a developing economy is in a steady (or in a 
shock-free) state and basing our argument on the fact that foreign aid causes 
growth (as described by the classical economists), then the economy in its early 
stage of development receiving low foreign aid as a proportion of its GDP will 
experience low growth of GDP. When high foreign aid/GDP is injected, then 
the donors would expect the recipient to move from the low growth state to 
some higher GDP growth. Figure 5.1 below depicts this simple argument 
showing that the recipient is in the beginning in the first quadrant with low 
foreign aid/GDP and low growth and which consequently moves to the third 
quadrant when the inflow increases. The argument can also be interpreted the 
other way round that if foreign aid falls then low growth will be observed, 
unless the economy has reached its self-sustaining growth level. this would 
imply moving from the third quadrant to the first one. 
Figure 5.1: Aid and Growth: A Direct Relationship 
GDP growth 
(%) 
I Iigh Growth 
Low Growth 
0 
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Now if we take some of the propositions and findings of the recipient needs 
literature, the argument often runs that countries with low growth are bound to 
receive high foreign aid and those experiencing high growth will tend to 
receive low foreign aid/GDP. Here it is growth which causes foreign aid 
inflow. In such a case the recipient will find itself in the second or fourth 
quadrant as illustrated below in figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Aid and Growth: An Inverse Relationship 
GDP growth 
I ligh Growth 
Low Growth 
0 
Lina Aid/(i[)P High Aid/GI)P 
r Aid/CiDP 
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Putting both arguments together, a recipient can be anywhere in the four 
quadrants. Donors would normally expect their funds are efficiently used. so 
that at the end of the day the recipient will he able to maintain a high growth 
rate with some low inflow of resources. As Mosley and I Judson (1995) explain 
there is an "expected sequence" where the recipient moves in a counter 
clockwise direction starting with low aid/GDP and low growth as shown in 
figure 5.3 below. 
Assuming that the economy under consideration is in steady state, it is 
expected that the recipient starts in the first quadrant initially with some low 
Aid/GDP (financing mainly basic infrastructure facilities) and then with time 
experiences some higher proportion of inflows, i. e., moving on to the second 
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quadrant. With high inflows the economy then starts to achieve a high rate of 
growth (quadrant three) and finally moves to the fourth quadrant where growth 
becomes sustainable with low Aid/GDP. This sequence then describes the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. One thing to point out though, as Mosley and 
Hudson put it, is that "good economic performance..... is not the same as high 
aid effectiveness" (pp. 18). Good economic performance could well be 
associated with a host ol'other factors. 
Figure 5.3" Mosley-Hudson Expected Sequence 
GDP growth 
(`%o) 
High Growth 
Low Growth 
0 
A 
Aid/GDP 
Low Aid/GDP I ligh Aid/GDP (%) 
What is unknown in the process is the amount of time that the recipient spends 
in any particular quadrant. The transition will depend on the policies pursued 
by the recipient (for instance, trade policies, fiscal policies, and any other 
macroeconomic policies) and the effectiveness of foreign resources. (riven this 
sequential pattern, we would be tempted to ask why developing countries have 
not so far experienced such a pattern after so many decades of loreign 
assistance? The most obvious answer would be because 01' the simplistic 
assumptions made concerning the state of the economy. The economy has been 
assumed to be isolated from international events, either from positive or 
negative shocks and internal problems which developing countries usually 
experience have been omitted. 
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Following this, we then argue that an economy, being in any of the quadrants, 
will be influenced by push and pull factors so that the economy moves to 
another quadrant. By push factors we mean those factors which push the 
economy into a favourable state (for example a positive external shock) and 
pull factors as those which force the economy to be located into an 
unfavourable state (for example the oil crisis which caused growth of' many 
countries to fall sharply). We can hence combine figures 5.1,5.2 and 5.3 to 
depict the consequence of push and pull factors. Figure 5.4 below depicts this 
with a positive sign (+) indicating a favourable event and a minus (-) indicating 
an unfavourable event. An economy can hence find itself in any one quadrant 
at some point but later can find itself located into another quadrant depending 
on the type of the shock. 
Figure 5.4: Aid and Growth: Effect of Shocks 
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Table 5.1 below provides some possible explanation of how an economy can 
move from one quadrant to another. 
Table 5.1: Movement from one state to another. 
From To Possible Reasons 
1 1 
-Receiving low aid, no possibility to take-off. 
1 2 
-A sudden high inflow of foreign aid 
1 3 
-A sudden high inflows of foreign aid 
-A positive shock. 
4 
-A favourable shock (characterises especially countries 
with already established infrastructure) 
2 1 
-Fall in foreign aid 
2 2 
-Fungibility of foreign aid 
2 3 
-Favourable shock 
-Payoffs of high aid, investment in productive sectors 
leading to high growth. 
2 4 
-Favourable shock 
-Sound macroeconomic policies, repayment of debts 
3 1 
-Unfavourable shock 
-Fall in foreign aid leading to low growth 
-Internal domestic problems 
3 2 
-Unfavourable shock 
-Crowding out of private sectors 
-Fungibility of foreign aid 
-Internal domestic problems 
3 4 
-Sound macroeconomic policies 
-High effectiveness of foreign aid 
-Sustainable growth with low inflows of foreign aid 
4 1 
-Unfavourable shock 
-Fall in the productivity or effectiveness of foreign aid 
-Internal domestic problems 
4 2 
-Unfavourable shock 
-Growth not sustainable with low aid 
-Internal domestic problems 
4 3 
-Unfavourable shock 
-High aid is needed to sustain growth 
4 4- Sustainable growth with low aid 
Growth sustainability is, of course, the main target of every country. In figure 
5.3 what is probably missing is an explanation of how growth can be 
sustainable with low inflows of foreign aid. Many studies have, while testing 
the contribution of foreign aid, found private inflows to he more important (in 
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terms of higher coefficient and significance in regressions) for example, 
Papanek (1972), Mosley (1980), Gupta and Islam (1983), among others. Hence 
adding private inflows along with foreign aid gives a better picture of growth 
performance. This would help to understand cases where high foreign aid had 
led to poor growth performance because of a lack of private inflows (for 
instance foreign direct investment). This can also help depict a relationship 
between foreign aid and private flows, it could be the case that they might be 
complementary for growth to take place at an early stage of development yet to 
be substitutes in some later stage of development. This is because while foreign 
aid is mostly directed towards infrastructure (for example, roads construction, 
telecommunication, etc. ), education and so on, where high rates of returns are 
obtained in the long run, on the other hand private inflows are mostly directed 
towards more immediately productive investment where returns are faster. But 
for private investment to take place some minimum level of infrastructure 
should be available to ensure this investment. Other hypotheses could be drawn 
when we add private inflows, for instance, private investors would like to 
invest in countries where aid flows are high just to be sure that basic 
infrastructures are in place (a complement case). In cases where the level of 
infrastructure is satisfactory private flows can substitute foreign aid for growth, 
for instance in the case of East Asian countries. 
To incorporate private flows we will need to modify the two dimension figure 
into a three dimension one. When private flows are brought in it becomes 
difficult to suggest a sequential pattern as was suggested by Mosley and 
Hudson. In fact there is nothing as an "expected sequence" as they might 
suggest but a `preferred' sequence which any donor or donor agencies would 
like recipients to follow while foreign aid is flowing in. A theory based on an 
expected sequence would be difficult as there are a host of factors affecting 
growth (see Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
In figure 5.5 below, 0 is the origin and the growth rate of GDP is represented 
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on the vertical axis while foreign aid and private flows as a proportion of GDP 
are labelled on the horizontal axes as shown. The axes have been partitioned 
into two so that we can, as before, identify between 'low' and 'high' values of 
the respective variables. The figure thus has eight zones. Each zone depicts a 
country's inflow of foreign aid, private inflows and growth. Ili a country is 
located in 
, 
for instance, Zone 1, then the country is characterised of having low 
growth, low aid and low private inflows. 
Figure 5.5: Aids Private Flows and Growth. 
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The descriptions of the zones are given in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2: Description of Zones 
Zone 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Description 
low growth, low aid, low private flows 
low growth, high aid, low private flows 
low growth, high aid, high private flows 
low growth, low aid, high private flows 
high growth, low aid, low private flows 
Fungibility? Crowding out? 
What are other factors? 
high growth, high aid, low private flows 
high growth, high aid, high private 
flows 
high growth, low aid, high private flows 
From figure 5.5, if a country is located in zone I or 7, it would not be 
surprising given the ratio of aid and private flows, zone 7 however would he a 
preferred one to the recipient. If we observe that a country is `stuck' for years 
in either zone 2 or 4 this could possibly imply that growth is restrained by the 
lower inflow. This could suggest that both inflows are complements and in 
such a case deficiency in either inflow can restrain growth. Following the same 
line of reasoning if a country is either in zone 6 or 8 this could imply that for 
the high growth performance one of the inflows is substituting the other. 
Some controversial cases arise for instance, if a country is in zone 3 or 5. In 
zone 3 for instance, it implies that high aid together with high private inflows 
are not able to promote growth or that growth is constrained by other factors 
not described here. Fungibility also could well be an argument. Similarly for 
zone 5, given low inflows of aid and private flows, a high growth rate is 
observed. In this case we expect that factors like export, imports, quality of 
labour, etc. might well play an important part in explaining growth. These 
descriptions allow us to deduce that even the three dimension figure cannot 
satisfactorily explain growth, other factors as well are important. But one 
advantage of this diagram is that it allows us to cluster a group of countries 
together and to analyse each group and find out factors affecting growth in each 
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cluster. It is also helpful especially if one is conducting country case studies, 
one could take a country in a particular zone and compare it with another 
country in other zones. We might then be able to conclude about the 
effectiveness of foreign resources. 
The above taxonomy has first shown that a relationship between aid and 
growth exists and second, that there are also a host of factors that can affect 
growth. In particular, it has been argued that external and internal economic 
conditions are potential factors that are responsible to affect growth and 
influence the aid-growth relationship. In the next section, we use a sample of 
developing countries to locate in which quadrant or zone most of these 
countries have been located. 
5.3 A Preliminary Statistical Exercise 
In the previous chapter, the net resource transfers in different regions along 
with some macroeconomic indicators have been analysed and these have, at 
least, given some indication of a possible link between resource flows and 
growth performance. Now the intention is to trace out this link empirically on a 
group of developing countries. Out the 137 developing countries on the World 
Bank list, only 68 have been selected for the analysis. The countries are listed 
in the Appendix 5.1 at the end of the chapter. These include countries with 
population greater than one million in 1993 and those which have a data set on 
foreign resource transfers from 1970 to 1993. Some countries were excluded 
although they satisfied these criteria due to internal problems, for example civil 
war in cases like Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua and Somalia. These 
countries have received very high amount of foreign resources, in some cases 
even as high as 55% of their GDP. If these countries are included in the sample 
it gives certain biases to the mean values. 
151 
('hunter Five Aid any/ 'ra vt/i A 'lutisti ! Link 
As a preliminary exercise we have computed some statistics for the following 
variables for the period 1970-1993 in Appendix 5.2: 
(i) OECD Aid to GNP (OECD/GNP) 
(ii) Private flows to GNP (Priv/GNP) 
(iii) Domestic investment to GDP (Inv/GDP) 
(iv) Domestic savings to GDP (Sav/GDP) 
(v) Gross Domestic Product growth (growth) 
All the data are in percentage terms. The mean, standard deviation and median 
are also computed. 
5.3.1 Aid 
To begin with figure 5.6 depicts a scatter plot of the countries in the sample 
associated with their OECD aid inflows as a percentage of GNP and their GDP 
growth rates over the period 1970-1993. From the figure there is no doubt 
about the East Asian countries, for instance, China, Indonesia, Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, are among the high growth countries due to 
their recent surge in export performance. But their receipt of OECD/GNP flows 
are quite low. Would it be fair in these cases to suggest that low foreign aid 
causes high growth or that high growth is more likely to attract low foreign aid 
resources? Many would in this particular case agree with the latter statement. 
We can also observe that many Sub-Saharan African countries have received 
high foreign aid inflows but performed poorly in terms of growth, for instance, 
Chad, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Senegal among others. Again in 
these cases we cannot just associate poor growth performance due to high 
foreign aid inflows only (other important factors have been outlined earlier). To 
clarify this argument we try to identify how many countries have achieved high 
growth with high aid, high growth with low aid, and so on. 
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The problem which we are confronted is to define `high' and `low' values. 
Some authors (Mosley (1987) and in World Bank studies) usually use the mean 
value to draw the distinction between high and low values. The mean often 
does not give a representative value due to extreme values at the end of the 
distribution. In this case a very common practice is to use the median instead of 
the mean. Defining thus all the values above the median as 'high' and those 
below or equal to the median as `low', we can know the number of countries in 
OL'C D/GNP, each quadrant in terms of figure 5.3. Tile median values of' 
Priv/GNP and GDP growth are 3.6,1.82 and 3.94 respectively. Figure 5.7 
depicts the number of countries in each quadrant. 
Figure 5.7: Number of Actual and Expected Countries in Each Quadrant 
GDP growth 
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Performing a chi-squared test to check if any relationship exists between 
growth and foreign aid indicates to us that there is some dependency between 
the two. The chi-squared test is given as: 
` 
(O-E)2 
where 0 is the observed frequency and Fi is the expected 
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frequency (given in parentheses in figure 5.7), with (r-1)(c- l) degrees of 
freedom, where r and c are the number of rows and columns respectively. The 
calculated is x2 = 5.88 and the critical x2 value at 5%> level is 3.84 with I 
degree of freedom. Hence a relationship does exist between growth and foreign 
aid. It would not be surprising by looking at figure 5.7 to deduce a negative 
relationship per se. But we cannot treat this result as causal, i. e., that low 
foreign aid causes low growth or that high aid causes low growth. It would be 
difficult to believe that low foreign aid inflows have caused high growth rates 
in 22 countries. If that is the case then it would be preferable to discourage 
foreign aid. Surely this hypothesis is not credible. One way to tackle this issue 
is to perhaps analyse these 22 countries by searching for factors responsible for 
growth, this can in turn allow one to decide when to start reducing the amount 
of foreign resources to a particular country. 
5.3.2 Aid, Private Flows and Growth 
As mentioned earlier to support our argument that a simple diagram like figure 
5.7 cannot on its own deduce any causality we add another important variable 
in terms of private capital flows which are sought to be directed towards more 
productive activities and thereby increasing growth. Figure 5.8 below 
illustrates the three-dimensional diagram with the three variables as previously 
described. 
Figure 5.8 tells a better story than figure 5.7, for instance, of the 22 countries 
which were observed to have high growth with low foreign aid, 14 (20.6% of 
the total sample) have experienced high private flows and only 8 low private 
flows as a ratio of GNP (of which China and Korea have received substantial 
absolute amounts in terms of Foreign Direct Investment). Of the other 22 
countries which were classified as high aid and low growth in figure 5.7,17 
(25% of the total sample) have received low private flows on average during 
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the period 1970-1993. Clearly one can hypothesise that private flows are an 
important source of capital for achieving growth. 
Figure 5.8: Number of Countries in Each Zone 
Private Flows/GNP (%) 
ý 3.94 
GDP 
growth (%) 
(%) 
3.94 
OECD/GNP (%, ) 
The number of countries as classified in figure 5.8 are listed in "fable 5.3 
below. We can find good cases to suggest that private inflows are important for 
growth and they can be more effective in countries where the level of 
infrastructure is well developed. For instance take zone 8 which includes 
countries like Brazil, Gabon, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand and 
zone 2 which mostly includes Sub-Saharan African countries täcing a below 
threshold level of infrastructure to encourage private inflows as one of' the 
factors. 
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In the above analysis we have seen that foreign capital flows can explain 
growth performance but there are instances where these flows cannot fully 
account for growth for e. g. in zone 5. In this context we need also to analyse 
domestic sources of capital, mainly, domestic savings. 
Table 5.3: List of Countries in Each Zone 
Zone C haracteristics No. of Countries F 
countries 
j Low Growth, Low Aid 5 Guatemala, Nigeria, Philippines, 
and Low Private Flows Venezuela, Zaire 
2 Low Growth, High Aid 17 Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
and Low Private Flows Central African Republic, EI Salvador, 
Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Tanzania. 
3 Low Growth, High Aid 5 Bolivia, Chad, Papua New Guinea, 
and High Private Flows Togo, Zambia. 
4 Low Growth, Low Aid 7 Argentina, Cote d'lvoire, Panama, 
and High Private Flows Peru, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay. 
5 High Growth, Low Aid $ China, India, Korea, Mauritius, 
and Low Private Flows Pakistan, Paraguay, Turkey. 
Zimbabwe. 
6 High Growth, High Aid 4 Burundi, Malawi, Sri Lanka, Syrian 
and Low Private Flows Arab Republic. 
7 High Growth, High Aid 8 Botswana, Cameroon. Congo, Egypt, 
and High Private Flows Gambia, Honduras, Kenya, 'Tunisia. 
8 High Growth, Low Aid 14 Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa 
and High Private Flows Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Gabon, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Oman, Thailand. 
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5.3.3 Aid, Private Flows, Savings, Investment and Growth 
Three-dimensional framework described earlier implicitly suggests that a 
regression model where growth is regressed only on foreign aid is misleading. 
Even incorporating other resource flows such as private flows wi II not suffice, 
for instance in zone 5 where some countries still achieve high growth with low 
aid and low private flows. Other factors also come into play for instance 
domestic savings, domestic investment, the extent of fiscal and macro 
imbalances, and so on. Because it would be practically impossible to 
simultaneously represent these in one diagram we try to analyse other sources 
of capital: domestic savings. We consider the other factors when we perform 
regression analysis. 
To understand better the link between the variables, we take different growth 
intervals and see the associated rates of foreign aid, private flows, domestic 
savings and investment. In the first instance we analyse average rates of OECD 
aid flows, private flows, domestic investment and domestic savings for 
countries having growth rates below the median at different growth intervals. 
This will enable us to compare some essential characteristics among the `low' 
growth achievers. Table 5.4 below shows these. 
Table 5A Countries below the median growth value of 3.94 with growth 
intervals (averages) 
Interval Growth 
Rate 
OECD/ 
GNP 
Priv/GNP Inv/GDP Sav/GDP n 
0<_ Y<1 0.48 8.22 1.19 13.00 7.57 3 
1< Y<2 1.68 7.74 2.40 18.86 14.41 9 
2< Y<3 2.46 8.47 1.42 18.57 12.74 10 
Y >_ 3 3.56 7.45 2.09 19.97 12.20 12 
Mean 2.47 7.90 1.89 18.65 12.53 
Y is the percentage growth rate of GDP. 158 
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The second column in the table gives the average economic growth rates for 
countries between the interval values in column one, for instance in row one, 3 
countries have on average growth rates around 0.5% and have received aid 
around 8% of GNP. On average the countries below the median growth value 
have domestic investment and domestic savings rates of around 19% and 13% 
respectively. The figures in the table show that countries with low domestic 
savings and investment ratios are associated with low growth. As these rates 
increase, the growth performance also increases. 
We can also analyse the link between these variables by taking different 
foreign aid flows intervals and see the associated rates of private flows, 
domestic savings, investment and growth. This is performed in Table 5.5 
below. 
T dine "tries oeiow rue meala 0 Qwltn i1 A1Q 
intervals (averages) 
Interval OECD/ 
GNP 
Priv/GNP Inv/GDP Sav/GDP Growth n 
X2< 1 0.22 2.65 22.52 23.22 2.6 6 
1 <_X<3 1.51 2.45 21.13 19.26 3.19 4 
35X<6 4.43 1.61 16.51 14.00 1.77 5 
65X<9 7.92 0.93 14.01 7.74 2.52 6 
9: 5X < 12 10.57 2.15 18.30 9.66 2.41 3 
12 5X< 15 13.57 2.50 17.84 7.96 2.29 6 
X2! 15 19.60 0.91 21.34 4.16 2.65 4 
The above table has some important features, for instance, countries with high 
private inflows, high domestic investment, high domestic savings and high 
growth rates have received on average foreign aid less than 3%. Notice also 
that countries which achieved relatively higher growth, for instance around 
2.65% (the last row in Table 5.5) despite having low domestic savings rates 
2X is the percentage of OECD/GNP. 159 
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(4.16%) have a high domestic investment rate (21.34%). This depicts a case 
where foreign aid and/or private flows supplement domestic savings. 
Repeating the same sort of analysis for countries above the median growth 
value (i. e. for high growth achievers), Table 5.6 gives a much clearer picture 
than Tables 5.4 and 5.5. It can be found that higher growth rates are associated 
with higher domestic savings, higher domestic investment and higher private 
inflows. Aid dependency falls in this category as growth rates become higher. 
Countries with growth rates greater than 6.5% are China, Botswana, Malaysia, 
Oman and Thailand. They almost all have investment and saving rates as high 
as 30%. 
Tabl Juniries aua ne meaian groý 4 Min ffrowtn 
intervals (averages) 
Interval Growth 
Rate 
OECD/ 
GNP 
Priv/ 
GNP 
Inv/ 
GDP 
Sav/ 
GDP 
n 
3.5 
_< 
Y< 4.5 4.14 6.47 2.20 22.09 17.41 12 
4.5 Y<5.5 5.03 2.83 2.40 24.26 22.12 9 
5.5 SY<6.5 5.83 5.36 2.97 23.47 17.83 7 
Y >_ 6.5 8.62 3.06 3.25 30.48 31.53 6 
Mean 5.51 4.68 2.60 24.43 21.23 
Note that the mean values for domestic investment, domestic savings and 
private flows for all the countries above the median growth rate are higher than 
those below the median growth. 
If we perform the same kind of analysis for this group of countries as in Table 
5.5, we can find that countries with lower savings rates have received a higher 
aid inflow, see Table 5.7 below. Concerning the growth achievements, even 
though there are cases where foreign aid is less than I%, growth rates are high 
due to high private inflows, high domestic investment and high savings rates. 
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And in cases where the growth rate is high, for instance the last row, despite a 
low savings rate, foreign aid investment and domestic investment is seen to he 
mostly responsible for such high growth. 
Table 5.7: dDOVe n ne meuian growt of 3.94 with Ai 
intervals (averages) 
Interval OECD/ 
GNP 
Priv/ 
GNP 
Inv/GDP Sav/GDP Growth n 
0<_ X<1 0.47 3.14 25.81 25.30 5.56 9 
15 X<3 1.91 2.90 25.89 27.17 5.89 9 
3<_ X<6 3.53 1.58 22.73 18.18 4.81 6 
6<_ X<9 7.15 3.29 23.68 17.77 4.84 4 
X >_ 9 14.63 1.88 22.38 11.59 6.00 6 
From the above analysis one clear implication is that high growth is observed 
either when domestic savings is high and foreign aid is low or when domestic 
savings is low and foreign aid is high. But without any doubt growth 
performance is better when domestic investment rates are high. It can be seen 
that investment rates of around 20% generates growth rates around 3.5% while 
rates between 22% to 25% can achieve growth in the region of 5% or more. 
Because the sample was divided using growth rates (above and below the 
median value) in each category there would be inclusion of countries with high 
and low GNP per capita. Normally one would expect a lower income country 
to save less than a higher income counterpart. In this context we approach 
another way by dividing the sample into low-income and middle-income 
countries. This will also check the robustness of the above hypotheses. The 
countries classified as low-income are those in which 1993 GNP per capita was 
no more than $695 and middle-income are those in which GNP per capita was 
more than $695 but less than $8,626 (World Bank, 1994). The list of countries 
in each group are given in Appendix 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
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Table 5.8 produces statistics for low-income countries in a similar fashion as in 
the previous tables. Here again poor growth performance is associated with low 
domestic investment and domestic savings rates, low inflows of private flows 
and foreign aid (observe the first row in Table 5.8). We can still notice that 
higher growth rates are associated with higher investment and savings rates. 
Table 5.8: Low-income countries with growth intervals (averages) 
Interval Growth 
Rate 
OECD/ 
GNP 
Priv/ 
GNP 
Inv/ 
GDP 
Sav/ 
GDP 
n 
0<_Y<1 0.48 8.22 1.19 13.00 7.57 3 
1S Y< 2 1.94 12.59 2.20 16.82 8.90 5 
2<_ Y< 3 2.61 12.36 1.39 17.87 8.35 5 
3: 5 Y<4 3.49 9.97 0.66 17.60 7.79 7 
4_<Y<5 4.22 10.36 1.07 19.64 12.71 7 
Y >_ 5 6.35 5.12 1.88 24.27 18.52 4 
Mean 3.29 10.07 1.33 18.39 10.53 
There is no clear cut indication about private flows, as the growth rate interval 
gets higher, private flows are quite low. This suggests that private investors 
select particular countries in deciding where to invest, not particularly growth 
rates. This is not surprising as investors would prefer to invest where returns 
are high, the country is politically stable, where there are less fiscal and macro 
imbalances and so on. The level of income also plays an important role as this 
could ensure a higher demand for goods and services produced in the local 
economy. One of the obvious factors is that countries which have growth rates 
less than 3% have higher foreign aid inflows. This could he due to the low 
level of income, high level of poverty and low propensity to save in these 
countries. Countries which perform well in this group, for example with growth 
greater than 5%, have the highest investment and savings rates and the lowest 
foreign aid inflows of 5.12%. 
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Looking from the foreign aid angle as depicted in Table 5.9 below, it seems 
clear here also that countries with low savings have received higher foreign aid 
inflows. Whether low foreign aid is associated with high growth, or high aid is 
connected with low growth is not obvious. 
Table 5.9: Low-income ountriP with aid intervals 
Interval OECD/ 
GNP 
Priv/ 
GNP 
Inv/ 
GDP 
Sav/ 
GDP 
Growth n 
0 
_< 
X<3 0.59 1.24 24.25 24.36 5.67 3 
3<_ X<6 3.82 1.36 16.25 14.21 2.98 5 
6SX<9 7.70 1.08 16.49 9.95 3.32 8 
95X<12 9.98 2.94 21.34 11.53 3.48 3 
12<_X<15 13.34 1.27 16.55 6.45 2.00 5 
X >_ 15 19.02 0.97 19.64 5.13 3.30 7 
For middle-income countries, private flows are higher than low income 
countries (Table 5.10). This also supports the evidence that private investors 
select countries with higher levels of GNP. Again we can find the same 
outcome that at higher growth intervals domestic investment and savings are 
higher together with private flows. Notice that foreign aid inflows for middle 
income countries are lower than the low income countries which was observed 
in Chapter 1 when we analysed trends and sources of net resource flows. 
As in Table 5.9, a similar analysis in Table 5.11 for middle income countries 
suggests that countries with low savings receive higher foreign aid. Even 
within this group we can justify the point made earlier that when high growth 
and high investment rates are observed, either a high savings rate as high as the 
investment rate or a low savings rate and a high aid/GNP ratio tend to be 
associated. This suggests that foreign aid is fulfilling its job in terms of 
supplementing domestic savings to match the domestic investment rate 
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Table 5.10: Middle- income countries with growth intervals (averagesl 
Interval 
l5Y<2 
2SY<3 
3SY<4 
4<_Y<5 
55Y<6 
Y>_6 
Mean 
Growth 
Rate 
1.75 
2.31 
3.75 
4.34 
5.39 
7.90 
4.58 
OECD/ 
GNP 
1.69 
4.58 
2.97 
1.84 
2.88 
4.40 
3.12 
Priv/ 
GNP 
2.63 
1.45 
4.08 
2.75 
3.41 
3.06 
3.01 
n Inv/ Sav/ 
GDP 
21.41 
19.27 
24.69 
22.33 
25.98 
28.28 
(: UP 
21.29 
Tab 
20.91 
Interval 
0_<X<] 
]<_X <2 
2<_X<4 
4<_X<7 
X>_7 
22.20 
Growth 
4.9 3 
5.38 
2.50 
5.93 
4 
S 
7 
6 
8 
7 
n 
9 
6 
4 
5 
In the middle income group and above the median growth category some 
evidence is present to support the hypothesis that foreign aid supplements 
domestic savings. For the low-income group and below median growth 
category, countries which have achieved high growth rates are those which 
have managed to have high savings and investment rates. For the low income 
countries there are cases where it seems that foreign aid is fungible, leaking 
towards consumption without supplementing the low domestic savings rates 
due to low levels of GNP. However, whether aid is fungible is not clear as we 
have not encountered cases where high aid inflows associated with low savings 
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OECD/ 
GNP 
0.3 8 
1.56 
3.06 
5.22 
11.44 
r- 
rrrvi 
GNP 
3.16 
2.44 
3.26 
1.62 
4.49 
Inv/ 
GDP 
24.34 
23.1 1 
27.08 
16.66 20.23 
25.35 
GDP 
24.16 4.08 13 
21.16 
28.03 
17.13 
20.19 
23.50 
27.90 
24.18 
Sav/ 
16.43 
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are associated with low investment rates. 
5 
.4 Conclusion 
The simple taxonomy depicting the relationship between aid and growth has 
shown that the expected sequence can be disturbed by external economic 
events. This relationship is also further affected by domestic economic 
conditions. In this context aid effectiveness can be affected depending on the 
conditions in place. The three dimensional diagram has indicated that the 
simple aid-growth relationship hides other factors which can explain growth 
performance. Analysing only the different sources of capital statistically, it is 
found that low savings rates are associated with high foreign aid inflows. For 
the sample we did not find cases where aid can be thought of as being fungible. 
Fungibility would have been observed if high foreign aid inflows in the 
presence of low savings were associated with low investment and growth rates. 
This, however, was not found. These preliminary statistical exercises have been 
informative. They suggest that there is a host of factors that explain growth and 
studies which have not controlled for such factors might have led to misleading 
conclusions on aid's effectiveness. Before we bring out the factors that explain 
growth, we review some of the empirical studies in the aid-growth literature in 
the next chapter. This will help us in specifying a model capable of explaining 
growth and overcome the shortcomings in previous studies. 
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Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Korea, The Republic 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
f 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
ea u 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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e samn1 
166 
Chapter Five Aid and Growth "A Statistical Link 
APPENDIX 5.2: Average Values for the period 1970-1993. 
Countries oecd/ gnp priv/gnp inv/gdp sav/gdp growth 
Algeria 0.8 0 3.4 8 36.4 5 34.5 2 3.95 
Argentina 0.0 7 2.2 6 21.8 0 23.4 6 2.00 
Bangladesh 7.97 0.0 6 11.51 2.6 6 3.42 
Benin 9.18 1.5 9 15.02 2.23 2.92 
Bolivia 6.81 2.00 18.09 15.89 2.29 
Botswana 13.09 3.76 36.78 27.70 11.66 
Brazil 0.08 2.92 21.50 22.00 4.80 
Burkina Faso 13.81 0.27 20.68 0.72 3.60 
Burundi 15.16 0.13 13.31 2.53 4.47 
Cameroon 4.15 2.08 22.94 21.84 4.01 
Central African Republic 13.88 1.19 12.82 0.27 1.19 
Chad 16.66 1.96 11.54 5.73 1.99 
Chile 0.32 4.65 19.90 19.95 3.99 
China 0.23 1.44 32.39 32.81 8.85 
Colombia 0.43 1.83 19.16 20.24 4.50 
Congo 7.67 8.08 28.78 22.06 5.67 
Costa Rica 2.99 3.91 25.14 19.92 4.40 
Cote d1voire 3.58 3.99 18.51 22.06 2.82 
Dominican Republic 1.72 2.32 22.38 16.81 5.26 
Ecuador 1.21 4.04 22.05 21.69 5.61 
Egypt 9.19 3.59 23.63 11.67 5.81 
El Salvador 5.01 0.68 15.76 10.03 2.17 
Gabon 2.95 6.01 37.67 48.20 5.13 
Gambia, The 23.63 1.83 16.81 4.88 4.03 
Ghana 5.07 0.49 10.08 7.21 2.21 
Guatemala 1.43 1.55 15.24 11.88 3.50 
Honduras 6.93 2.14 20.59 15.58 4.13 
India 1.05 0.59 21.85 20.21 4.31 
Indonesia 1.91 2.61 25.63 28.11 6.48 
Jamaica 4.90 1.70 24.14 18.89 1.52 
Kenya 7.48 1.98 23.32 20.02 5.02 
Korea, The Republic 1.28 1.69 30.06 27.91 8.87 
Madagascar 8.45 0.81 10.50 3.60 0.77 
Malawi 15.93 1.21 22.02 11.89 4.01 
Malaysia 0.64 6.50 29.05 31.84 7.07 
Mali 18.10 0.36 18.34 1.25 2.98 
Mauritania 25.84 0.51 27.39 8.98 2.12 
Mauritius 3.21 1.19 24.69 20.86 5.52 
Mexico 0.06 3.18 21.84 21.82 4.08 
Morocco 3.33 2.57 23.42 15.30 4.22 
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erloa 1970-199 
Nepal 8.16 0.14 16.44 9.5 0 3.55 
Niger 12.63 1.58 14.44 7.34 0.51 
Nigeria 0.42 1.67 18.49 20.07 3.84 
Oman 2.24 3.41 24.82 42.79 7.60 
Pakistan 3.59 0.52 17.74 9.58 5.70 
Panama 1.50 4.53 23.45 23.02 3.94 
Papua New Guinea 14.69 8.60 24.89 15.53 3.73 
Paraguay 1.87 1.55 23.36 18.91 5.39 
Peru 1.36 1.90 21.46 20.20 1.91 
Philippines 1.76 1.80 24.38 21.93 3.42 
Portugal 0.30 3.95 28.55 19.53 3.71 
Rwanda 13.73 0.76 13.43 3.67 3.38 
Senegal 10.97 1.23 14.50 6.05 2.60 
Sierra Leone 8.19 1.66 12.98 7.61 1.99 
Sri Lanka 6.51 0.97 22.02 13.44 4.54 
Sudan 7.91 0.90 14.56 7.20 3.14 
Syrian Arab Republic 10.76 0.77 21.79 10.84 6.00 
Tanzania 17.78 0.79 28.08 12.14 3.50 
Thailand 0.87 2.67 29.81 26.12 7.64 
Togo 11.56 3.64 25.37 20.69 1.70 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.25 4.32 23.32 28.89 1.69 
Tunisia 3.62 2.49 26.75 21.10 5.38 
Turkey 0.82 1.57 22.18 18.36 5.19 
Uruguay 0.25 2.61 16.73 17.16 1.86 
Venezuela 0.04 1.10 26.20 30.22 2.50 
Zaire 3.59 1.19 14.08 11.78 0.15 
Zambia 12.65 2.57 21.40 21.68 1.31 
Zimbabwe 3.29 0.59 20.85 20.41 4.03 
Mean 6.29 2.25 21.54 16.88 3.99 
Standard Deviation 6.15 1.74 6.14 10.13 2.07 
Median 3.60 1.82 21.85 18.90 3.94 
No. of countries 68 
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APPENDIX 5.3: Low-income countries (Averages for the period 1970-93L 
Countries oecd/ gnp priv/gnp inv/gdp sav/gdp growth 
Bangladesh 7.97 0.06 11.51 2.66 3.42 
Benin 9.18 1.59 15.02 2.23 2.92 
Burkina Faso 13.81 0.27 20.68 0.72 3.60 
Burundi 15.16 0.13 13.31 2.53 4.47 
Central African Republic 13.88 1.19 12.82 0.27 1.19 
Chad 16.66 1.96 11.54 5.73 1.99 
China 0.23 1.44 32.39 32.81 8.85 
Cote d'Ivoire 3.58 3.99 18.51 22.06 2.82 
Egypt 9.19 3.59 23.63 11.67 5.81 
Gambia, The 23.63 1.83 16.81 4.88 4.03 
Ghana 5.07 0.49 10.08 7.21 2.21 
Honduras 6.93 2.14 20.59 15.58 4.13 
India 1.05 0.59 21.85 20.21 4.31 
Kenya 7.48 1.98 23.32 20.02 5.02 
Madagascar 8.45 0.81 10.50 3.60 0.77 
Malawi 15.93 1.21 22.02 11.89 4.01 
Mali 18.10 0.36 18.34 1.25 2.98 
Mauritania 25.84 0.51 27.39 8.98 2.12 
Nepal 8.16 0.14 16.44 9.50 3.55 
Niger 12.63 1.58 14.44 7.34 0.51 
Nigeria 0.42 1.67 18.49 20.07 3.84 
Pakistan 3.59 0.52 17.74 9.58 5.70 
Rwanda 13,73 0.76 13.43 3.67 3.38 
Sierra Leone 8.19 1.66 12.98 7.61 1.99 
Sri Lanka 6.51 0.97 22.02 13.44 4.54 
Sudan 7.91 0.90 14.56 7.20 3.14 
Tanzania 17.78 0.79 28.08 12.14 3.50 
Togo 11.56 3.64 25.37 20.69 1.70 
Zaire 3.59 1.19 14.08 11.78 0.15 
Zambia 12.65 2.57 21.40 21.68 1.31 
Zimbabwe 3.29 0.59 20.85 20.41 4.03 
Mean 10.07 1.33 18.39 10.53 3.29 
Standard Deviation 6.31 1.02 5.50 8.46 1.74 
No. of countries 31 
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APPENDIX 5.4: Middle-income countries (Averages for the period 1970- 
m 
Countries oecd/ gnp priv/gnp inv/gdp sav/gdp growth 
Algeria 0.80 3.4 8 36.4 5 34.5 2 3.95 
Argentina 0.07 2.2 6 21.8 0 23.4 6 2.00 
Bolivia 6.81 2.00 18.09 15.89 2.29 
Botswana 13.09 3.76 36.78 27.70 11.66 
Brazil 0.08 2.92 21.50 22.00 4.80 
Cameroon 4.15 2.08 22.94 21.84 4.01 
Chile 0.32 4.65 19.90 19.95 3.99 
Colombia 0.43 1.83 19.16 20.24 4.50 
Congo 7.67 8.08 28.78 22.06 5.67 
Costa Rica 2.99 3.91 25.14 19.92 4.40 
Dominican Republic 1.72 2.32 22.38 16.81 5.26 
Ecuador 1.21 4.04 22.05 21.69 5.61 
El Salvador 5.01 0.68 15.76 10.03 2.17 
Gabon 2.95 6.01 37.67 48.20 5.13 
Guatemala 1.43 1.55 15.24 11.88 3.50 
Indonesia 1.91 2.61 25.63 28.11 6.48 
Jamaica 4.90 1.70 24.14 18.89 1.52 
Korea, The Republic 1.28 1.69 30.06 27.91 8.87 
Malaysia 0.64 6.50 29.05 31.84 7.07 
Mauritius 3.21 1.19 24.69 20.86 5.52 
Mexico 0.06 3.18 21.84 21.82 4.08 
Morocco 3.33 2.57 23.42 15.30 4.22 
Oman 2.24 3.41 24.82 42.79 7.60 
Panama 1.50 4.53 23.45 23.02 3.95 
Papua New Guinea 14.69 8.60 24.89 15.53 3.73 
Paraguay 1.87 1.55 23.36 18.91 5.39 
Peru 1.36 1.90 21.46 20.20 1.91 
Philippines 1.76 1.80 24.38 21.93 3.42 
Portugal 0.30 3.95 28.55 19.5 3 3.71 
Senegal 10.97 1.23 14.50 6.05 2.60 
Syrian Arab Republic 10.76 0.77 21.79 10.84 6.00 
Thailand 0.87 2.67 29.81 26.12 7.64 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.25 4.32 23.32 28.89 1.69 
Tunisia 3.62 2.49 26.75 21.10 5.38 
Turkey 0.82 1.57 22,18 18.36 5.19 
Uruguay 0.25 2.61 16.73 17.16 1.86 
Venezuela 0.04 1.10 26.20 30.22 2.50 
Mean 3.12 3.01 24.18 22.20 4.58 
Standard Deviation 3.74 1.85 5.36 8.16 2.13 
No. of countries 37 
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Empirical Aid-Growth Literature Review 
6.1 Introduction 
After the second World War there has been a growing concern in the advanced 
industrial countries over the widening gap in living standards between rich and 
poor countries, and the assumption of an obligation on their part to help 
promote the economic development of the poor countries through the 
contribution of substantial resources to development assistance. Development 
aid became a major endeavour involving both financial and technical transfers. 
In relation to the theoretical growth models developed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
aid is assumed to lead to higher growth for the developing countries through a 
very simple mechanism. An assessment of the flow of ! reign aid was 
performed for the very first time in the late 1960s-known as the Pearson 
Report [Pearson (1969)]. Surprisingly the Report acknowledged that 
"(E)conomic growth in many of the developing countries has proceeded at 
faster rates than the industrialised countries ever enjoyed at a similar stage in 
their own history. The fears that economically underdeveloped parts of the 
world were incapable of growth, or that their political problems would be so 
great as to produce any economic advance, have proved to be unfounded. Many 
of the developing countries have shown themselves capable of a major 
development effort" (ibid. pp. 3). Yet the Report further observed that "the 
correlation between the amounts of aid received..... and the growth performance 
is very weak" (pp. 49). 
Would an absence of correlation imply that aid did or does not work'? Not 
necessarily. The reason is that foreign aid is not the only factor determining 
growth, there are a host of other factors which complement or obscure this 
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relationship. Attempts to deal with issue have been undertaken since the I 970s 
where many applied regression analysis move beyond correlation analysis. 
The statistical analyses which have so far been undertaken, as discussed below, 
do not provide any conclusive result of the impact of aid on growth. A 
summary of these studies can be found in Cassen et al (1986) and Riddell 
(1987), but here we proceed by reproducing the models used, discussing the 
results, assessing their methodologies and data set along with some criticisms 
so that we might in the end improve our approach to evaluate the effectiveness 
of aid. The empirical literature is divided into two sections, section 6.2 presents 
single equation studies while section 6.3 analyses studies which have relied on 
simultaneous equation models. In earlier studies, many authors have considered 
foreign aid and capital inflows as synonymous, which is wrong if we are to 
assess the effectiveness of foreign aid as their impact may in many dimensions. 
6.2 Single Equation studies 
Among the earlier studies, the widely cited papers by Grill-in (1970) and 
Griffin and Enos (1970) challenged the orthodox views that foreign aid will 
result in increased growth, particularly that the rate of development will 
increase if investment rises and also that investment will rise if capital imports 
increase. Their main argument is that capital imports (from which they draw 
conclusion for foreign aid) reduce domestic savings and that "capital imports, 
rather than accelerating development, have in some cases retarded it" (Griffin, 
1970, pp. 100). Using United Nations data for the period 1962-64 for 15 
African and Asian countries, Griffin and Enos found a weak association 
between the amount of aid received and the rate of growth of GNP (Y*). The 
regression result was: 
Y* 
= 
4.8 + 0.18 (A/Y) ; R2=0.33 
(? ) (0.26) 
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where Y* is the growth of GNP, A/Y is the ratio of aid received as a proportion 
of income and the standard errors given in brackets. They also performed some 
further regressions which looked dubious. In fact there are many problems in 
their regressions. First, no diagnostic tests are reported to back the relationship 
in terms of heteroseedasticity for the cross-section ones and serial correlation is 
their time series analysis. Second, the variables used are not in real terms since 
they have not been deflated. Third, concerning the variables used for the 
dependent variable, growth rate of GDP (or GDP per capita) would be more 
appropriate which reflects domestic activities in a country rather than GNP 
growth. For the aid variable, on the other hand, the current account balance was 
used to deduce conclusion about foreign aid. Note that the current account 
balance is a mongrel of capital inflows and not necessarily foreign aid. Fourth, 
those regressions with only two variables yield only correlations but do not 
necessarily imply causation. Finally, the sample size is too small to determine 
any relationship, which consequently leads to biased and inefficient estimates. 
With all these shortcomings it would be misleading to cite these studies as 
evidence against foreign aid. 
A similar technique was applied by Voivodas (1973,1974). 1Ie found no 
relationship between foreign capital inflows and growth. lie also found that 
foreign capital inflows are associated with a higher capital-output ratio but was 
not sufficient to ensure a negative relationship between capital inflows and 
growth as pointed out by Griffin and Enos (1970). Using time series data for 
Korea during the post- World War II period when foreign aid (mostly 
American aid) was predominant, he found a positive and significant 
relationship between the ratio of exports and foreign capital inflow to total 
product and its rate of growth (the coefficient of the aid variable was 0.92). It 
was further found that official foreign capital flow was contributing 
significantly more to investment in the period 1954-62 than 1962-1968. One 
plausible explanation for this observation could be that in the earlier period 
foreign aid was channelled towards the building of infrastructure which 
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crowded in private investment while in the second period Ibreign private 
investment was more significant than foreign aid. 
Papanek (1973) argued that some evidence can still be deduced on the 
relationships between savings, foreign resource inflows, and growth in less 
developed countries. He pointed out in an earlier study (1972) that in many 
previous studies capital inflows and aid were treated synonymously where in 
fact one should distinguish between different types of capital inflows. In this 
context he disaggregated inflows into their principal components: foreign aid, 
foreign investment and other inflows. His model was defined as: 
Y= a+ßS+ ? AID+6FPI+7rOFI 
where Y is the growth rate of GDP, S is gross domestic savings, AID is 
foreign aid, FPI is private long-term borrowing plus net private direct 
investment and OR other capital inflows. All the independent variables are 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
The above was tested for a sample of 34 countries for the I 950s and 51 
countries for the 1960s which were pooled into 85 observations. he obtained: 
Y=1.5 + 0.20S + 0.39AID + 0.17FPI + 0.190FI 
(2.5) (6.0) (5.8) (2.5) (2.1) 
R2=0.37; F=13.5 
t-values in brackets. It can be found that aid has a coefficient nearly twice that 
of the other independent variables. This pointed out that earlier studies which 
combined all foreign resource flows to draw conclusions lbr aid were 
misleading and wrong. 
Kraska and Taira (1974) examined the effects of capital inflow on the 
economic growth of the host-recipient countries in Latin America. They argued 
that foreign direct investment is undertaken by private firms in search for 
profits, while foreign aid is offered by governments of more developed 
countries to those of less developed ones fbr political reasons. But they 
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defended the argument that a weak relationship obtained by some earlier 
studies may indicate that much of foreign aid, in addition to being politically 
determined as to its volume and direction, goes to the formation of social 
overhead capital rather than into directly productive activities. Social overhead 
capital, they argued, is necessary for making direct production profitable and 
hence, one should not despair of the apparent low productivity of foreign aid. 
This is because when social overhead capital is being built and expanded that 
the activities directly related to the market can be profitably carried on. In these 
circumstances, the apparent lack of correlation or even an inverse correlation 
between foreign aid and economic growth does not mean that aid contributes 
nothing, or becomes an obstacle, to the economic growth of the recipient 
country. 
Stoneman (1975) criticised earlier studies because of inadequate formulation of 
models, the use of biased or incomplete samples of countries, inappropriate 
selection of statistics, and deficiencies in the statistics themselves. Using three 
main samples: a `basic' sample, an `extended' sample, and a `restricted' 
sample, he found strong positive associations between domestic savings and 
growth and between aid and growth (as Papanek (1973)). Although it was not 
possible to separate capital inflows into aid, foreign private investment and 
other foreign inflows, he used aggregated aid and other foreign inflows into 
one variable, distinguishing only direct investment. The coefficients for the aid 
variable were positive (ranging from 0.26 to 0,501) and were highly significant. 
These coefficients were slightly higher than that for savings. lie concluded that 
aid projects were more likely to be specifically related to economic growth than 
investments. 
Dowling and Hiemenz (1983) tested the aid-growth relationship in the Asian 
region using data for the 1970s. They suggested that aid flows seemed to be 
well utilised in many countries of the Asian region and supported Papanek's 
findings that a significant and positive relationship exists between aid and 
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economic growth in the seventies. However, growth performances were not the 
same for low and middle income countries. While they observed that earlier 
studies, except for Papanek, using cross-section data found that financial 
foreign aid has not led to higher rates of growth of GDP, time series analysis 
of a few Asian countries seems to suggest that aid contributed to growth (for 
example Islam (1972), Krueger (1979)). 
Bearing in mind the deficiencies of the quality of data, they argued that earlier 
studies have many shortcomings. For instance, they have omitted many 
variables. Taking into account some shortcomings in previous studies, they 
studied the effectiveness of foreign aid in the Asian region in the 1970s based 
on a pooled sample of time series and cross-country data. In addition to the 
model fitted by Papanek (1973) and Mosley (1980), where real growth rate of 
GDP was regressed on foreign financial aid, private capital inflows and gross 
domestic savings (all as a proportion of GDP), they added four policy variables 
to express different aspects of government policy in each country. They were: 
the degree of openness of the economy (exports plus imports as a proportion of 
GDP), the role of governments in domestic resource mobilisation measured by 
central government tax revenue as a percentage of (iDP. the share of public 
sector in economic activities measured by total government expenditure in 
GDP and a measure of financial repression proxied by M2 over GDP. 
For the sample 13 countries were included, the data were over 4 time periods 
averaged (to tackle the problem of gestation lag). Their results were consistent 
with similar conclusions drawn by Papanek and they supported the hypothesis 
that the rapidly growing economies of Asia were able to utilise aid effectively. 
The results showed that tax effort of governments and financial liberalisation 
have contributed much to GDP growth. Splitting the sample into low and high 
growth country groups, they found that aid was more etiective for the latter 
group than for the former. Some plausible explanations of the lack of 
effectiveness of foreign aid for the low growth group could he that foreign aid 
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may have encouraged government consumption or crowded out private 
investment. Also import substitution activities may have driven up the capital- 
output ratio thus lowering the marginal productivity of aid. Given that aid 
usually finances improvements in physical and social infrastructure in low 
growth countries, the gestation and payoff periods could be indeed very long. 
This, of course, cannot be determined on a cross-country basis for individual 
countries. For more precise conclusions in respect to individual countries time 
series analysis would be more helpful. 
Gupta and Islam (1983) specified their model by assuming a neoclassical 
production function with neutral technical change. Their attempt is to explicitly 
estimate marginal productivities of different sources of capital törmation when 
they are independent of the state of development and also when they depend on 
the behaviour of an economy at different stages of development. This can be 
carried out by using interaction terms. The model was specified as: 
G= ao +a1 (SD) + a2 (S/Y) + a3 (S/Y)(SD) + a4 (AID) + a; (AID)(SD) + 
a6(FPI) + a7 (FPI)(SD) + ax (RFI) +a9 (RFI)(SD) +aio(GL) + It 
where G is the growth rate of GDP, S/Y is the ratio of domestic savings to 
GNP, AID is the ratio of foreign aid to GNP, FPI is the ratio of torcign direct 
investment to GNP, RFI is the ratio of other capital inflows to GNP. GL is the 
growth rate of labour force and SD a proxy for the stage of development 
measured by per capita GNP, y. 
The result was not satisfactory when the above model was estimated covering 
52 developing countries over the 1950s and 1970s. Consequently a restricted 
version was adopted where G was regressed on S/Y, AID, I`PI. RFI and an 
interaction term to represent the stage of development was added. The 
interaction term was (S/Y)(SD), AID(SD), PPI(SD) and RFI(SD), each was 
added to the base regression one at a time. Interesting results emerged, first, 
when (S/Y)(SD) was added to the base regression, its coefficient was 
insignificant but the coefficient of (S/Y) retained its significance. This implied 
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that domestic savings are an important determinant of growth irrespective of 
the stage of development. Second, when the interaction term for foreign aid 
[(AID)(SD)] was added, the AID coefficient was not significant but the 
interaction term was. They concluded on the basis of this result that foreign aid 
is useful only when it is associated with a higher stage of development. A 
plausible explanation would be that at a higher stage of development, the 
economy is better organised and managed, and aid is more effectively utilised; 
while at a lower stage of development, a larger portion of aid may he used for 
consumption purposes rather than increasing investment. Finally, each time 
that an interaction term is added in turn, the domestic savings rate continued to 
be positively significant and stable in its quantitative impact. This in a sense 
highlights the robustness of this variable. 
Dividing their sample into three regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America), they 
found that foreign aid exercised a positive significant effect in Asia only and 
concluded that most foreign aid in this group was used for capital formation 
whereas in Africa and Latin America, it went largely to meet additional 
consumption expenditures. These findings suggest that capital is a crucial 
constraint in a number of Asian countries, while socio-political factors are 
more important for some countries in Africa and Latin America. Gupta and 
Islam concluded that for a proper appreciation of the role of different capital 
inflows, one must allow for the dependence of the effects on the state of 
development. And that foreign aid is the most important form of foreign capital 
inflows if these inflows are to accelerate growth in developing countries. They 
added that there are sufficient exceptions to their strong results which require 
caution and the need for individual country studies. 
Investigating time series data for the case of Sudan for the period 1960 to 1975, 
El Shibly (1984) although the coefficient of the aid variable was negative but 
insignificant. He concluded that there seemed to be no evidence that aid has 
resulted in stimulating growth in Sudan but it is worth pointing out that official 
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foreign flows had a positive and significant effect on investment (a coefficient 
of 0.66). The problem of omitted variables was also found in this study, for 
instance, domestic savings. 
Since many studies have ignored the role of the state's economic policy in the 
development of aid-receiving LDCs, Singh (1985) concentrated on state 
intervention in an economy. Using two time periods, 1960-1970 and 1970- 
1980, for a sample of 73 countries (36 African and 37 the rest of the Third 
World countries) in order to make some comparison over time, he estimated 
the following model: 
Y= J3 + (3IAID + ß2S +(33POP + (341NC + (35STIN + (3(, DL)M I +117DUM2 +u 
where Y is the average annual growth rate, AID is economic aid as a 
percentage of GDP, S is domestic savings rate (%), POP is total population in 
log, INC is per capita income in US dollar (logged), STIN is the state 
intervention score indicating the nation's economic policy. Dl JM I is a regional 
dummy taking the value of 0 for the African countries and I for the rest, 
DUM2 is the oil dummy taking the value of 0 for the non-oil-exporting 
countries and u is the disturbance term. 
He then conducted the regression analyses using two alternative specifications. 
First, by running the above model and second, by expanding the model 
including other regressors such as literacy and enrolment, and government 
expenditures with several specificational variations. The latter specification 
helped in examining the sensitivity of the coefficients on the key explanatory 
variables. The regression analyses for the two time periods without including 
the state intervention variable yielded positive and significant coefficients for 
foreign economic aid, implying that aid did play a positive role in LDCs' 
growth. It has also been found that this coefficient was statistically more 
significant in the time period 1970-80 than the 1960-70 period. His results 
would suggest that aid was more effective during 1970-80. Even though the 
effect of aid on growth seemed much smaller, and statistically weaker than 
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found by Papanek (1973) and others, the results reject the negative growth-aid 
association found by Griffin and Enos (1970). 
Government intervention, especially in Africa, is very intense and according to 
Singh's result, this reduces growth. Levy (1988) examined the aid-growth 
relationship in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and provided some interesting 
quantitative evidence. Simple correlations between the main macroeconomic 
trends yielded a false linkage in the SSA sample of 22 countries. For instance, 
from 1968 to 1982 while GDP growth rates were falling, the investment rate 
and the ratio of aid to GDP were both increasing yet the simple correlation 
coefficients between growth and investment were positively correlated. This 
could indicate that the relationships are spurious. 
In an attempt to analyse the relationships, two regressions were performed, one 
by regressing GDP growth rate on the ratio of aid to GDP and income per 
capita and another one where the change in GDP growth was regressed on the 
change of the aid ratio to GDP and income per capita. The results indicated that 
there is a statistically positive association among poor African countries 
between foreign aid (and its changes) and the level of economic growth (and its 
changes). Although the relationship cannot be interpreted as causal, it suggests 
that aid may affect growth mainly through the investment rate which was found 
to have positive effects. It was even found that each extra dollar of aid was 
associated with 1.08 additional dollars of investment for the 22 SSA countries. 
The recent growth performance of the African countries has been found to 
deteriorate. According to Metwally and Tamaschke (1994) the deteriorating 
growth performance is due to the fact that their foreign debt burden keeps 
increasing. The debt problem is mainly attributed to two main factors. First, 
adverse developments in the world economy including the sharp decline in 
export prices, slower growth in industrial countries and in world trade, the 
decline in capital flows, and the slack in foreign aid. Second, inappropriate 
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government domestic policies which have created major distortions which 
resulted in severe reductions in domestic savings, productive investment and 
the rate of growth of the national economy. 
A recent study by Hadjimichael et al. (1995) analysed the growth performance 
of Sub-Saharan African countries using a panel framework for the year 1986- 
92. They found that foreign aid stimulates growth initially but beyond a certain 
threshold level the impact on growth appears to be negative. "l'hcy make use of 
a quadratic model in foreign aid and control for sonic macroeconomic factors. 
They have not however included other sources of capital along with foreign 
aid. 
Mosley and Hudson (1995) have used time series data to study aid's 
effectiveness. Using some lag structures they found that there is not a single 
country studied for which aid effectiveness is consistently negative, or 
consistently positive. But they found that as the length of lag increases some 
positive impact were found. 
Although single equation studies are very common, there are many who 
question the efficiency of the parameter estimates if aid is endogenous. If aid is 
endogenous then OLS estimation will lead to biased estimates. In this context 
some studies have used simultaneous models which we now turn to in the next 
section. 
Gupta's (1975) model consisted of equations explaining savings rate, growth 
rate of income, per capita income, and total labour force participation. This 
model was estimated by 2SLS using cross-section data lbr the 1960s for 40 
developing countries. For the present context, we consider only the income 
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growth equation and leave the savings equation for a later purpose. The 
estimated behavioural equation for income growth was: 
G=3.1193 + 0.09582 (S/Y) + 0.26582 (F) ; Rz = 0.341 
( ?) (1.691) (3.735) 
where G is the growth rate of GDP, S/Y is the gross domestic saving rate and 
F, foreign capital inflows. When foreign capital inflows was broken into its 
components, the following was obtained: 
G=3.5708 + 0.08398 (S/Y) + 0.15553 Aid + 0.19531 FPI + 0.29788 RFI 
(? ) (1.415) (2.671) (1.362) (2.097) ; R`=0.296 
where Aid is net transfers received by government plus official long-term 
borrowing, FPI is foreign private investment including private long-term 
borrowing plus net direct investment and RFI is other foreign inflows. The 
result of the second equation contrasts Papanek's findings where the foreign 
aid variable was twice as other forms of capital inflows, but is still twice that of 
the savings rate. Analysing both equations cast some doubts especially in the 
absence of further stastistics. The low value of the coefficients of determination 
would indicate omitted variables which explain growth. 
Mosley (1980) also criticised earlier studies as having misspecified equations 
and inappropriate econometric tests. He argued that in those equations there 
have not been the use of any kind of lag structure relating to the independent 
variable (foreign inflows) and the dependent variable (growth) which is 
essential because of gestation lag and from donors disbursement. He also 
stratified the less developed countries by income levels compared to others 
who estimated the aid-growth relationship by continent. This would in a way 
enable us to deduce whether the impact of aid is greater than or less than in the 
lower income level group. 
After taking into consideration the shortcomings of earlier studies, his 
estimated 2SLS model with lag structure using data for the 1970s for 83 
LDCs, was: 
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Growth 
= 5.00 
- 
1.08 (Aid/GNP),. 
s - 
0.34 (other financial flows/GNP), 
-5 
(3.43) (1.74) (0.93) 
+ 0.10 (Savings rate) (6.1) 
(2.43) ; R2 = 0.2885 
His results rejected the overall positive effect of aid on growth which Papanek 
found for the 1960s (t-value in brackets). What Mosley obtained was a weak 
and insignificant but negative correlation between aid and growth. When he 
used the ratio of taxes to national income as an independent variable in place of 
savings rate (in respect to Papanek's criticism), for 47 countries for which tax 
ratio data were available, he obtained: 
Growth 
= 
6.41 
- 
1.08 (Aid/GNP), 
-, 
5- 0.14 (other financial flows/GNP), 
-5 
(3.35) (1.63) (0.3 0) 
+ 0.061 (taxes/GNP) 
2 (6.34) ;R=0.4276 
(6.2) 
which improves the fit further. Here also he obtained an insignificant but 
negative correlation between aid and GNP per capita. 
Splitting the sample into 30 `poorest countries' and 53 'middle-income 
countries', he obtained a positive and significant relationship between aid and 
growth for the former group of countries (0.98) and negative but insignificant 
correlation for the latter group. He further found that there are many differences 
between donors, for instance, U. S aid is positively correlated in the middle- 
income countries only whilst UK aid is largely given to the poorest countries. 
Mosley tried to explain variations in the aid-growth relationship. From a 
theoretical point of view if the recipient's marginal propensity to consume is 
one, then aid input will lead to no growth, since it is all consumed, whereas if 
the marginal propensity to save is one, then all aid goes to investment and 
consequently leads to growth. Given the relative `taste' for present and future 
consumption (assuming both are normal `goods'), part of the aid will go to 
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present consumption and the other part to investment. In practice, however, 
donors often influence aid allocation by tying a part or all of it to certain 
projects. Recipients, on the other hand, use aid funds on marginal projects, 
which the donors refuse to finance, or for consumption purposes (the well- 
known problem of the fungibility of aid). Hence, the influence of aid on growth 
will depend on the extent to which aid is tied to capital projects and the extent 
to which a recipient is able to resist such tying. From his analysis it would 
seem that aid is tied in low income group while in the middle income group the 
donors' influence in less. 
Should recipients only be blamed? As Mosley indicated, the share of new 
development lending to total bilateral aid has fallen during the 1970s, more 
lending was in the form of technical assistance, food aid, debt forgiveness, 
which do not necessarily have any developmental component at all. 
Supposedly if recipients were relying on aid funds to finance certain capital 
projects then a reduction in aid flows will entail either stopping the projects or 
continue them at a higher cost. In such a case a fall in the recipients' growth is 
rather expected. But this contention is very different to prove since data on 
types of aid flows by recipient country is not always available. 
Not putting the whole burden on the donors' shoulders, Mosley argued that the 
recipients' effort in reducing fungibility of aid into consumption expenditure is 
crucial. His assumption is that if a recipient government manages to increase its 
tax effort, then there would be very little switching of aid resources into 
consumption. In fact when the percentage change in tax effort is substituted for 
the savings rate in regression 6.1 for those countries for which data were 
available (using 2SLS) he obtained: 
Growth 
= 
-0.26 + 1.11 (aid/GNP), 
-5 + 
0.23 (other financial flows/GNP), 
-5 
(0.11) (2.80) (0.44) 
+ 0.0027 (change in tax effort 1962-68 to 1972-7 (6.3) 
(3.09) ; RZ = 0.3023 
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t-values in brackets. Hence aid and growth is strongly positively related when 
tax effort is added. Mosley's interpretation of the results is that "increases in 
tax effort, where they occurred, implied a determination to build up a 
developmental budget from local resources without harming the recurrent 
budget, and that this prevented those aid-flows which were developmental in 
intention from soaking into recurrent budget" (pp. 88). 
But Mosley's conclusion seems to be `unfair' in the sense that he is more 
inclined towards finding a negative relationship between aid and growth by 
rejecting Papanek's findings. Yet in the beginning the negative association was 
insignificant and further a positive and significant relationship was found for 
the poorest countries. Also the relationship was significant and positive for 
UK-aided countries. On top of that, regression 4.3 which yielded one of the 
best fits, with an R2 of 0.3023 suggested a strong positive and significant 
relationship between aid and growth. 
Mosley himself argued that his analysis is `seriously incomplete'. This is 
because the model assumed that the economy is closed. In tact the coefficients 
of determination hardly explained 50% of the variations when GDP was the 
dependent variable and even less than 25% when aid was treated as the 
dependent variable. No causality test was carried out to support his hypothesis. 
Also his theory of feedback was concerned with level variables, while in fact he 
used growth rates and ratios which do not necessarily imply feedback effects. 
We should also add that the regressions were not supplied with enough 
statistics (for instance, F-test, residual sum squares, etc. ). Inclusion of' income 
per capita has not been explained with some theory underlying its presence in 
the regressions. In some cases the large magnitude of the constant term again 
indicates some problem. 
Comparing regressions 6.2 and 6.3 would put the robustness of the results into 
doubt. Simply substituting the percentage change in tax effort for the ratio of 
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taxes to national income in 6.3, changed the regression results completely. The 
intercept value fell from 6.41 to 
-0.26, the aid variable which was negative and 
insignificant turned out to be positive and highly significant at the one percent 
level and the other financial flows variables changed sign from negative to 
positive though were still not significant. These indicate some thilure in the 
specification and would perhaps imply that some variables are superfluous. 
Using fiscal behaviour model as outlined by Heller (1975). Mosley el ul. 
(1987) came to similar conclusions as above. They used the OLS as compared 
to the 2SLS. 
Rebuilding on the work of Gupta (1975), Gupta and Islam (1983) presented a 
structural model (similar to Gupta (1975)) with a set of behavioural relations 
consisting of economic as well as non-economic factors. "Their model which 
has a system of nine equations consisted of nine endogenous variables: gross 
domestic saving rate (S/Y), growth rate of GNP (G), real GNP per capita (y), 
dependency rate (DR), birth rate (BR), female labour force participation rate 
(FPR), infant mortality rate (IMR), total labour force participation rate (I'LPR) 
and percentage of labour force in agriculture (ALF). 't'here were eight 
exogenous variables: aid (AID), foreign private investment (FPI), other foreign 
inflows (OFI), per capita energy consumption ([N), population density (DEN), 
literacy rate (LIT), number of persons per hospital bed (I IB) and rate of growth 
of labour force (GL). The model is reproduced for ready reference below: 
(1) S/Y=a, +b, y+c, G+d, Dr+e, AID+f, FPI+g, RFI +u, 
(2) G= a2 + b2S/Y + c2AID + d2FPI + e2RFI + f-, GL + u-, 
(3) y= a3 + b3EN + c3TLPR + d3LIT + c3DEN + ul 
(4) TLPR 
=a 4+ b4DR + u4 
(5) DR=as+b5BR+uc 
(6) BR 
= a6 + b6LIT + c6y +d,, ALF + e6IMR +ff, FPR + 
(7) FPR 
= a7 + b7ALF + c7BR + u7 
(8) IMR 
= aR+ b8LIT + cxy +d8ALF + e8HB +u8 
(9) ALF=a, ) +b9y+u, ) 
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From the model, only equations (1) and (2) appear to have an economic 
relationship, the entire model does not have any economic relationship despite 
the fact they explained why some variables enter into an equation (this was also 
criticised by White (1992)). Lacking any economic representation, the 
exogeneity of certain variables can be questioned, for instance, literacy rate. 
They did not report any exogeneity test to support their arguments. 
Coming to their estimation which used data for the 1970s for a sample of 52 
countries, it was rather strange to find that they use OIL on each equation in 
turn (which is contrary to what they mentioned in the beginning). Their 
argument was that applying OLS will yield estimates of the direct effects. But 
from elementary econometric textbooks we know that we will obtain direct 
effects only if the dependent variables are regressed on exogenous variables 
only. In their equations we find that there are endogenous variables on the RHS 
which in turn indicate that the estimated parameters were all biased and 
inconsistent. Further, the grounds on which they argued for using OLS might 
suggest some problem in the modelling itself. They argued that the "2SLS 
estiniates... were invariably bad on the basis of usual statistical criteria. 
Therefore we report only the OLS result. " Why would the estimates he `had' if 
the model is correctly specified'? Another plausible explanation could be 
because of the presence of multicollinearity or heteroscedasticity. 
Multicollinearity seemed to be more the case, for instance if we take their 
savings rate equation (Table VI. I, pp. 71), we find with an adjusted R2 of about 
55%, four variables on the RHS out of six (excluding the constant term) were 
insignificant at the 1% level and taking their per capita income equation with 
an adjusted R2 of 56%, three out of four variables were insignificant at even the 
5% level. The unavailability of the residual sum of squares (RSS) does not 
permit us to judge the validity of the model and the estimates. In some cases 
we observe a high value of R2 without any of the RHS variables being 
significant. 
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As pointed out above the model has no economic meaning, it makes it difficult 
to explain the channel through which the impact of aid can be assessed on 
development. Based on their results, they argued that the total labour force 
participation equation (Table VI. 2, pp. 72, Eq (5)) performed `extremely well' 
because of a high adjusted R2 of around 70% while only one exogenous 
variable was not even significant. Omitted variables might explain this, lbr 
instance, we know from economic theory that wages (or real wages) do affect 
the participation rate which has completely been ignored. The results are 
therefore dubious, more work should be done on the modelling part bringing in 
more economic relationships to give satisfactory results. 
Rana (1987) re-examined the relationship between foreign capital and growth 
in the Asian region using the sample of countries as used by Dowling and 
Hiemenz (1983). In this case he changed the methodology by using 2SLS. He 
specified a simple two-equation model consisting of a growth and a savings 
equation as follows: 
GR 
=a0+a, AlD+a2FP1+a1S+a4CX+a5CLF+u, 
S-a6 +a7AID+a8FPI+a9CX+a, 0GDPN+aGR +v, 
where GR is growth rate of GDP, S is gross domestic savings as a percentage 
of GDP, CX is the change in exports as a percentage of GDP, CLF is the 
change in the labour force, GDPN is GDP per capita, u and v are stochastic 
error terms, and the others are as before. From these, reduced törm growth and 
saving equations were derived and estimated. Both the OLS and the indirect 
least squares (ILS) techniques were used for the 14 Asian countries during the 
period 1965-1982 using pooled cross-section and time series data. 
The OLS method was applied to the structural equations so as to compare with 
previous studies. The ILS, on the other hand was applied to get the effect of the 
exogenous variables on the endogenous variable. The results using OLS 
confirm the findings of earlier studies that the various types of foreign capital 
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as well as domestic savings rate have a favourable effect on the economic 
growth of the Asian developing countries. The estimated coeflicients of the 
variables were, however, lower than those of the earlier studies covering the 
1950s and 1960s which suggested that the relative significance of these 
variables declined around the 1970s. When ILS was applied. foreign private 
investment and the export variable had a favourable and statistically significant 
effect on growth, while the effect of foreign aid was favourable in its effect but 
was marginally significant. Comparing the OLS and ILS results, the data 
indicated that the direct effects generally overestimated the favourable effect of 
foreign capital on the growth rate. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The empirical literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid on growth, though 
vast, has shed little light on the relationship between aid and growth. In fact at 
the macro level, the results are mixed and inconclusive, but nonetheless, in no 
case was aid found to he detrimental to growth. The results differ because of 
differences in estimation techniques, sample size, data, model specification, 
etc.. Recent studies have improved upon previous ones by disaggregating 
capital inflows into its various components and have also tried to include some 
other factors, apart from the different sources of capital, which are thought to 
affect growth. The taxonomy described in Chapter 5 highlights the need to 
account for both internal and external economic conditions in assess aid's 
effectiveness. Although internal factors have been included in some 
regressions, external factors have so far been overlooked. The developing 
countries have, in a sense, been isolated from the happenings in the world 
economy. Even on the domestic front there are many important victors that 
have not been considered so far. 
To judge the effectiveness of aid is not an easy task because in the process it is 
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affected by for example by government policies, institutional lactors, private 
sector behaviour, the internal and external environment. 'These policies, factors 
and circumstances vary among countries. In the next chapter we intend to 
improve on past mistakes concerning sample size and composition, data 
quality, model specifications, omitted variables and econometric methodology. 
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Chanter Seven 
Empirical Testing of the Aid-Growth Relationship 
7.1 Introduction 
The empirical literature on the aid-growth relationship has been criticised on 
many grounds: sample composition, sample size, methodology, econometric 
technique, and variable inclusion. With regard to the latter. most studies 
explained growth as a function of capital accumulation when only a few, for 
example Dowling and Hiemenz (1983) and Mosley (1987) introduced factors 
such as the role played by government and trade. Dowling and Iliemenz's 
study showed that Asian countries have used aid effectively and suggested that 
other countries have not spent aid well because of bottlenecks and less efficient 
allocative mechanisms. But what are these allocative mechanisms and how do 
we identify them? It is a very important area which has so tar been overlooked 
in the empirical literature. Only one study that of Hadjimichael e/ al. (1995) 
has so far included some macroeconomic factors in an aid-growth model. 
Developing countries share some macroeconomic characteristics. These are 
important issues in considering the effectiveness of foreign capital inflows 
which is influenced by the extent of macroeconomic instability and distortions. 
These are expected to vary from country to country. 
in relation to the arguments set in Chapter 5, the effectiveness of aid is not only 
affected by the external economic conditions but also by the level of distortions 
and macroeconomic instability. In section 7.2 we outline some macroeconomic 
factors which are capable of explaining growth performance tollowing the 
work of Fischer (1993) and Easterly (1993). Section 7.3 describes the variables 
that will be considered in the empirical regression models while in section 7.4 
we specify and test the models. Because there are many studies which have 
conducted cross-section analysis, we present a model n !a Fischer-Easterly in 
section 7.4.1. The model is tested using cross-section data for the period 1970- 
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93 in Section 7.4.2. Section 7.4.3 provides some conclusions and critiques on 
the analysis. Previous studies were unable to use time series data due to limited 
data availability. The time period under study enables us to build a panel 
framework with reasonable number of observations per country. In section 
7.4.4, we explain the panel data technique to be used and we specify and test 
the model in section 7.4.5. Section 7.5 summarises the effectiveness of aid 
found when cross-section and panel data were used. 
72 Macroeconomic Factors Explaining Growth 
The World Bank has emphasised the need for a `supportive macroeconomic 
framework' to the success of structural adjustment in every major area of the 
economy. According to the Bank the macroeconomic situation will be 
supportive when inflation is low and predictable, real interest rates are 
appropriate, the real exchange rate is competitive and predictable, fiscal policy 
is stable and sustainable and the balance of payments is perceived as viable 
(World Bank, 1990). The effectiveness of capital flows (and investment) will 
be greater when there is macroeconomic stability and few distortions. 
Distortionary policies, such as trade restrictions and financial repression, 
reduce the efficiency of capital investment and thus the rate of growth for a 
given level of capital investment. Removing distortionary policies does the 
reverse: increasing the efficiency of foreign capital (and domestic investment) 
and the growth rate of GDP. 
The role played by macroeconomic factors and distortionary policies has been 
emphasised by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Fischer (1991,1993) and 
Easterly (1993). Kormendi and Meguire test a set of macroeconomic 
hypotheses relating to economic growth such as income convergence, monetary 
variance, government spending, inflation and trade, Fischer (1993) goes further 
in arguing that "macroeconomic stability is necessary for sustainable growth is 
too strong, but....... that macroeconomic stability is conducive to growth" (pp. 
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486). Hence removing distortions will create a path for macroeconomic 
stability and improve growth. This view however varies according to different 
schools of thought. According to the standard neo-classical growth model, 
distortionary policies affect only the level of income and not its rate of growth. 
The `new' growth models such as Romer (1986,1989), Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1993), Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rehelo (1991) show that 
distortionary policies have significant effects on long-run growth. 
The problem that is encountered in practice is in measuring the extent of 
distortions and macroeconomic instability. Fischer (1993) uses the inflation 
rate as the best single indicator of macroeconomic policies and the budget 
surplus as the second basic indicator. The inflation rate indicates the overall 
ability of the government to manage the economy. Countries generating high 
inflation rates imply that the government has lost its control (as suggested by 
the experience of some Latin American countries). Tables 7.1 and 7.2 give a 
simple indication of the relationship over the period 1970-1993 between 
inflation and growth. Generally regions or countries having high inflation have 
experienced lower real income and per capita growth. Some exceptions, 
however in Table 7.2, have been noticed where poor growth perfhrmance is not 
associated with inflation. The extent of inflation variability over a period might 
also indicate the macroeconomic climate prevailing during that period. 
The early literature on the impact of inflation on growth suggested a positive 
relationship through the Mundell-Tobin effect which involves a shift away 
from real money balances toward real capital as a consequence of higher 
anticipated inflation. Thus, more rapid rates of anticipated inflation implies 
more rapid shifts away from real money balances toward real capital and hence 
greater economic growth. This hypothesis has been reversed by Stockman 
(1981) where in his `cash-in-advance' economy higher anticipated inflation 
reduces economic activities, hence growth. Subsequent work supports 
Stockman's hypothesis, for instance, Fischer (1983,1991,1993), de Gregorio 
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between inflation and growth has been tested by Levine andlervos (1992) and 
Fischer (1993). 
Table 7 
1970-1980 I 993 980-1 
GDP Inflation GDP GNP per Inflation 
growth Rate growth capita Rate 
(%) (%) (%) growth (%) 
('Y,, ) 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 7.53 9.7 7.68 6.4 7.1 
Europe and Central 
Europe 6.58 4.6 
-0.17 -0.3 35.3 Latin America and 
the Caribbean 5.73 46.7 1.76 
-0.1 245.0 Middle East and 
North Africa 4,58 16.9 0.63 
-2.4 10.7 
South Asia 3.38 9.7 5.15 3.0 8.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.14 13.8 1.47 
-0.8 16.1 
Source: World Bank (1995). 
Concerning the fiscal variable, Fischer (1993) argues that a fiscal deficit also 
serves as an indicator of a government that is losing its control. Fiscal reform 
has been a major policy platform of the World Bank and IMF. It is argued that 
it is vital for both restoring a sustainable macroeconomic situation and for 
increasing investment and efficiency. According to World Bank (1990), 
reductions in fiscal deficits have typically been at the core of successful 
stabilisation programmes, which have often been prerequisites Ihr successful 
structural adjustment. Hence reducing a fiscal deficit could result in improved 
growth performance, ceteris paribus. 
Financial repression is expected to be detrimental to growth. Some developing 
countries overregulate their financial sector through controls on interest rates 
on deposits, restrictions on credit to the private sector-all of which hamper the 
financial sector's ability to intermediate savings efficiently (World Bank, 
1989). Although financial liberalisation will usually foster growth, it will not 
he effective if it also creates macroeconomic instability. For example, a 
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reduction in forced lending to government could increase the availability of 
financing for private investment. But if the government needed these resources 
to finance its deficit and resorted instead to inflationary finance, the move 
could be counter productive (as in Argentina recently). Some lävour repression 
by arguing that the promotion of high priority "productive" investment, with 
longer gestation periods and externalities, justifies suppressing their financial 
costs and so lowering their cost of capital (Gelb, 1989). 
Tabl 970-93 
GDP GNP per Inflation 
growth capita Rate 
growth (%O 
(%) (%) 
High Inflation countries with 
low arowth' 
Argentina 1.36 
-0.5 374.3 
Bolivia 1.02 
-0.7 187.1 
Brazil 2.14 0.3 423.4 
Ghana 2.67 0.1 37.0 
Mexico 2.36 
-0.5 57.9 
Nigeria 
-0.14 -0.1 20.6 
Peru 0.45 
-2.7 316.1 
Sierra Leone 1.65 
-1.5 61.6 
Uruguay 1.34 
-0.1 66.7 
Zambia 1.08 
-3.1 58.9 
Low Inflation countries with 
high growth 
Chad 4.2 2.0 11.5 
China 9.6 8.2 7.0 
India 5.2 3.0 8.7 
Indonesia 5.9 4.2 8.5 
Mauritius 4.8 5.5 8.8 
Pakistan 6.3 3.1 7.4 
Low Inflation countries with 
low growth 
Cameroon 1.71 
-2.2 4.0 
Central African Republic 0.39 
-1.6 4.2 
Cote d'Ivoire 
-1.05 -4.1 1.5 
Niger 
-0.14 -4.1 1.3 
Rwanda 1.99 
-1.2 3.4 
The rank correlation between GDP growth and inflation = -0.2437 
High inflation is defined here as rates above 20 percent. 
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7.3 Description i  of Variables 
There have not been many attempts to control for macroeconomic 
stability/instability and distortions in examining the aid-growth relationship. 
This section adds to that literature. Finding variables or proxies for policy 
measures is a daunting task when running regression models. The variables 
which we intend to use in our econometric model are: 
" FAIDOECD-is Official Development Assistance (DAC) as defined by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1993) as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product. We denote the square of this 
variable by FAIDOECDSQ. 
" 
FAIDWB-is Official Development Finance as a percentage of' gross 
domestic product-as defined by the World Bank. It includes 
nonconcessional and concessional official net flows. Note that technical co- 
operation is excluded. Its square is denoted as FAIDWBSQ. 
" NONCON-is official nonconcessional net flows as a percentage of (DP. 
" OFFLOWS-is concessional bilateral and multilateral flows only as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product. Its square is denoted as 
OFFLOWSSQ. 
" PRIV-is total net private flows as a percentage of the gross domestic 
product. 
" 
OTHERIFS-is all other inflows which includes other net long-term capital 
and other net capital inflows as a percentage of the gross domestic product. 
" 
SAV-is domestic savings as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
" Openness measures-WOPEN-a weighted openness measure as defined 
below. 
There is a vast literature highlighting the beneficial aspect of trade, trade 
liberalisation and trade reform in improving productivity and growth, while 
trade distortions result in a misallocation of resources. It is argued that trade 
distortions can change the pattern of social returns to alternative capital goods 
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and attract capital and labour into activities that are less valuable at 
international prices-reducing the overall productivity of' capital and thus 
reducing growth. A more open economy with fewer distortions is expected to 
improve resource allocation and accelerate income growth. Openness to trade 
raises growth through several channels, such as access to advanced technology 
from abroad, possibility of catch-up, greater access to a variety of inputs for 
production, and access to broader markets that raise the efficiency of'domestic 
production through increased specialisation. 
Pritchett (1996) defines openness as "an economy's trade intensity" rather than 
a policy measure. According to him a measure of policy openness must adjust 
for nonpolicy determinants of trade intensity (tier example endogenous import 
penetration). Various measures of openness have been proposed and tested, it is 
still difficult to decide which is `the' best measure. Edwards (1997), for 
instance, uses a series of openness indexes for trade policy and others to proxy 
trade distortions. Others use measures of openness including the ratio of total 
trade to GDP and changes in terms of trade. 
With regard to the ratio of total trade to GDP, a positive and significant 
coefficient on this variable indicates that, ceteris paribus, an increase in trade 
improves growth. But where countries are exposed to overpricing on imports, 
for example as observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, which inflates the openness 
measure, can hardly be seen as being beneficial to growth. In fact, Yeats (1990) 
found that between 1962-1987 twenty African former French colonies paid a 
premium of 20-30% on average over other imports of iron and steel imports 
from France and similar price premia were paid by former Belgian, British, and 
Portuguese colonies in Africa for imports of these products from their former 
rulers. This distortion in trade could pick up the effect of tied aid, 
diseconomies of scale in distribution, market size, lack of information on 
competitive suppliers, and the use of overpricing to facilitate corruption. To 
illustrate, consider the openness measure, OPEN, defined as: 
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OPEN 
= 
(X +M) 
GDP (7.1) 
11 
iX + Q; (P; + Pi); 
. 
ý_ý (7.2) GDP 
where X and M are total exports and total imports respectively in (7.1). With 
price premia imposed on imports, total imports can be expressed as the second 
term in the bracket of equation (7.2), where Q... i is the import quantity of good 
j, p, j ' is the world price of good j and p'is the price premia paid by the 
importer on good j. Interpreted as above, an increase in p` will increase the 
openness measure but does not necessarily imply that growth will be enhanced 
as resources are inefficiently used. In fäct we suspect that if p', ' is very high, 
then this coefficient of openness measure might turn out to he negative through 
distortionary import penetration. Another problem with this crude measure of 
openness is that countries with significant current account deficits will have a 
higher openness value. 
In this study we use a weighted openness measure-WOPEN. The weights are 
current account balances of the developing countries in the sample. Out of the 
58 countries on which the cross-section regressions are based. 45 countries 
(representing 77% of the sample size) have a trade deficit out of which 23 have 
a deficit greater than 5%. There is only one country which has a trade surplus 
greater than 5%. The weights assigned give more weight to countries closer to 
the equilibrium trade balance and engaged in more trade. The weight is defined 
IX 
- 
Mi 
as GDP . Hence our weighted openness measure-WOPEN---is defined as: 
WOPEN 
= 
(X +M) / 
IX 
- 
Ml 
GDP GDP 
(X + M) 
IX 
- 
Mi 
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This measure is superior to the unweighted one as we also take a country's 
trade intensity into consideration and trade equilibrium condition. 
" The role of government has often been proxied by reference to action in 
mobilising domestic resources through central government tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP. Also used is the share of the public sector in economic 
activities measured by total government expenditure in (il)P (for example 
Dowling and Hiemenz, 1983). We define the variable EXP as total government 
expenditure (including all nonrepayable and non-paying payments by 
government, whether for current or capital purposes only) as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product. 
Supply-side theories hypothesise that taxes necessary to support government 
spending distort incentives and reduce efficient resource allocation. Higher 
spending is alleged to reduce the efficiency of investment. On the other hand, if 
government spending is complementary to private investment, then 
government expenditure can be positively related to growth. It can increase 
growth if it raises the productivity of private capital-through spending on 
basic education, health, and infrastructure such as roads, water supply, and 
communications. For instance, public investment in railways and highways has 
been a key factor in the growth of mountainous countries such as Columbia and 
Mexico (Reynolds, 1985) while a lack of public infrastructure in Nigeria has 
hampered growth by requiring firms to invest in their own inefficient electrical 
generators, boreholes for water, and water treatment plants (Lee and Anas, 
1989). Hence the sign on the coefficient of EXP is ambiguous. 
As pointed out above, a better indicator to capture macroeconomic stability and 
government control (and its role) is the budget surplus-ßSUR. ßSIJR is 
defined as the sum of current and capital revenue and all grants received, less 
the sum of current and capital expenditure and government lending minus 
repayments as a percentage of gross domestic product. Our preference is to use 
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a budget surplus variable which is more unambiguous in terms of' results and 
captures macroeconomic stability in which we are interested. 
" INF is the inflation rate calculated from World Bank data and INFSTD is 
the standard deviation of the inflation rate over the period 1970-1993. The 
latter indicator is preferred as it gives an indication of the extent of volatility in 
inflation over the period. As discussed above we expect that this variable will 
be negatively related to growth. 
" Financial repression has been incorporated as a dichotomous variable by 
many, for example World Bank (1989) which defined financial repression as 
an average real interest rate below 
-5 percent over a period of time, Easterly 
(1993) has also used real interest rates below 
-5 percent and -2 percent. Iie also 
used the actual average real interest rate. Others have used the money supply 
(M2) as a percentage of GDP (Dowling and Hiemenz, 1983) as suggested by 
Fry (1981) denoted as MONEY in our case. Small values are associated with 
financial repression while large values would indicate steps closer to financial 
liberalism. 
7.4 Model Spec cation and Econometric Results. 
In line with previous analysis we estimate our model in a cross section setting. 
There are however limitations associated with this methodology therefore we 
also estimate the model in a panel setting. 
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_7.4.1 
Cross Section Analysis 
m T SlnP of the AidGrowth Relations 
The model which we estimate is of the following form: 
Y; =a; +(3'Xi +X'Zj +Ui where i=1,2...... 58. 
where Y; is the average growth rate of GDP over the period 1970-93 for 
country i, X; is a column vector of different sources of capital (domestic and 
foreign), Z; is a column vector including trade, financial repression, 
macroeconomic variables and other variables which are now commonly 
incorporated in new growth models of a Barro-type fashion, and u; is the error 
term. The model is assumed to satisfy the classical linear regression model 
assumptions. 
So far in the literature all empirical investigations using regression analysis 
have tested the aid-growth relationship using a linear approach (except 
Hadjimichael et al. (1995) for panel data). We depart slightly from this and test 
with the inclusion of a quadratic form. The reason for this model is as follows. 
The two-gap model framework indicates that foreign aid is used to fill either 
the savings or the foreign exchange gap whichever is greater; this in turn leads 
to the targeted growth of output. But some caveats need to be outlined. First, 
we should be asking whether the `right' amount of Ibreign aid is being 
disbursed to the recipient. If the recipient receives an amount less than 
prescribed by the gap model to achieve the targeted growth rate, then 
insufficient finance for some large scale projects could result in resources being 
inefficiently used and diverted to unproductive projects. In essence these funds 
will be regarded as being fungible. On the other hand, over-borrowing and/or 
over-lending can also cause some serious problems, for example, Dutch 
Disease (see for instance van Wijnbergen (1984,1986) and Younger (1992)). 
Over-lending2 can hence also lead to a waste of resources. Thus in both cases, 
inadequate or excessive inflows of foreign aid can be associated with 
fungibility. Second, we should also ask whether the recipient can make 
There are other problems from over lending see Woodward (1992). 
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effective and efficient use of the foreign aid inflow. This in turn depends on 
what Chenery and Strout (1966) referred to as the "limit on the ability to 
invest". This reflects the view that absorptive capacity for additional 
investment is limited by the supply of complementary inputs which can only be 
increased as a result of the development process. These complementary inputs 
are, for instance, managerial expertise, skilled labour, civil servants (skill limit) 
and so on. Hence a country which faces these deficiencies will not be able to 
utilise foreign aid resources efficiently and consequently fungibility is the final 
outcome. 
The recent experience of the debt problems is generally regarded as a sign that 
countries either over-borrowed or that creditors over-lent in the 1970s. From 
these we can use the quadratic form to see the consequence on growth when 
there is too much foreign aid, and include the square of the foreign aid ratio. 
This tells us whether beyond a certain threshold foreign aid is fungible or not. 
The model to be estimated is hence as follows: 
Growth 
= ao + ßßi FAIDOECD + R2i FAIDOECDSQ + ß3i PRIV +4 SAV + 
05i OTHERIFS + P61WOPEN + R7i MONEY + ß8i BSUR + ß9i 
INFSTD +ß i0t DUM3 +I3j Ii DUM6 + s; 
From the 68 countries listed in Appendix 5.1,10 have been excluded due to 
non-availability of data or when the country has less than 10 observations for 
the fiscal variable over the period 1970-933. In the sample there are 19 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries and 22 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Because these share some distinctive features we use a dummy variable for 
each region, DUM3 and DUM6 respectively. The data source is the World 
Bank STARS CD-ROM, Government Finance Statistics and the International 
Financial Statistics. All the variables in the model have been averaged over the 
period 1970-93. 
' These are Algeria, Benin, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Egypt, Mali, 
Niger, Oman and Senegal. 
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It should again be emphasised that the motivation for this model is to control 
for the policies and factors discussed above. Previous studies have been more 
concerned about correlations between growth and different sources of capital 
rather than aid effectiveness when not controlling for the Z variables. It is easy 
to see that foreign aid would be more effective in countries where the 
macroeconomic framework is stable than unstable. By controlling for such 
stability/instability we get closer to the potential effectiveness of foreign aid 
and other capital sources. 
7.4.2 Cross Section Results 
Table 7.3 in Appendix 7.1 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used 
in the regressions. This helps in indicating any potential collinearity among the 
explanatory variables. The cross-section results4 for the 58 countries are given 
in Tables 7.4,7.5 and 7.6 when the dependent variable is average GDP growth 
rates for the period 1970-93. Column 1 (Table 7.4) is the usual estimated aid- 
growth model with regional dummies but without any Z variables. Although 
the coefficient of FAIDOECD is positive it is not significant. This specification 
explains only around 27% of the variation (the adjusted R2) in growth. Note 
that the residuals are not normally distributed which invalidates the usual F and 
t tests. Column 2 reports on a Fischer-Easterly type regression with the non- 
linear form and including the Z variables: the weighted openness measure 
(WOPEN), the proxy for financial repression (MONEY), the budget surplus 
(BSUR) and the deviation of the inflation rate-measuring the volatility 
(INFSTD). This improves the model fit significantly'. In fact this non linear 
model explains around 58% of the variation in growth (adjusted R2). 
d The regression outputs are not reported in the thesis but are available from the author upon 
request. 
s An F-test to assess the incremental contribution of these variables suggest an improvement in 
the model, the computed F-value being 7.89 with degrees of freedom 5 and 46. See Gujarati 
(1995) for such a test. 
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0.0335 
Table 7.4: Cross-Section Regressinns () 
Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth 1970-1993 (N = 581 
Independent 
Variables 
Constant 
FAIDOECD 
Column 
1 
3.314 
(0.000)*** 
(0.428) 
Column 
2 
2.5891 
(0.009)*** 
0.19869 
(0.074)* 
Column 
3 
3.1593 
(0.000)*** 
Column 
4 
3.1437 
(0.000)*** 
FAIDOECDSQ 
PRIV 
SAV 
OTHERIFS 
WOPEN 
MONEY 
BSUR 
EXP 
INFSTD 
DUM3 
DUM6 
le 
Adj. W 
F 
RSS 
Breusch-Pagan X 
Jarque-Bera statistic' 
-0.0811 (0.534) 
0.1125 
(0.006)*** 
(0.572) 
0.0102 
-0.004168 (0.286) 
-0.24668 (0.061)* 
0.11369 
(0.000)** * 
0.025031 
(0.093)* 
0.010497 
(0.009)*** 
0.036089 
(0.027)** 
0.30719 
(0.000)*** 
0.08772 3) 
(0.016)** 
-0.21409 (0.093)* 
0,1020 
(0.000)*** 
0.025705 
(0.085)* 
0.010568 
(0.009)*** 
0.032717 
(0.041)** 
ro will R 
0.099806 
(0.009)*** 
-0.13265 (0.203) 
0.13875 
(0.000)*** 
0.01856 
(0.309) 
0.01 1979 
(0.077)* 
0.023938 
(0.097)* 
0.29859 
(0.000)*** 
-0.07286 (0.023)** 
-1.98 (0.000)*** 
-1.55 (0.007)*** 
0.35060 
0.2742 
4.59** 
159.55 
19.645 
20.11*** 
-0.000773 (0.180) 
-1.6252 (0.005)*** 
-1.5911 (0.006)*** 
0.65981 
0.57846 
8.11*** 
83.58 
7.38 
1.64 
-0.000989 (0.070)* 
-1.7777 (0.002)*** 
-1.4942 (0.009)*** 
0.65122 
0.57702 
8.78*** 
85.69 
7.64 
0.97 
-0.001427 (0.003)*** 
-1.7168 (0.004)*** 
-1.4904 (0.001)*** 
0.51452 
0.41123 
4.98*** 
119.28 
33.51 *** 
15.17*** 
Note: p-values in parentheses. Based on the Breusch-Pagan X- test if at the 10% level of 
significance heteroskedasticity was detected, then the p-values reported are those following 
Mackinnon-White (1985) heteroskedasticity test. For the other equations the usual p-values 
apply. Variables as defined in text. 
***, ** and * imply significant at least 1%, 5%and 10% level respectively. 
`' The Jarque-Bera normality test is based on the OLS residuals, it asymptotically follows the 
chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis is that the residuals are 
normally distributed. 
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The coefficient of FAIDOECD in Column 2 becomes significantly positive 
when controlling for the Z variables and has a lower coefficient (around 0.20) 
to that reported by Papanek (1973) on the aid variable (0.39). If we look at the 
significance on total net private flows, PRIV, it is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. This can be explained by the flow itself where a sharp increase 
was observed during the oil crisis and subsequent downfall in the debt crisis 
period. A cross-section model using averages over the entire sample period 
may not pick up these effects. This would support further investigation by 
breaking down the sample period into the phases described earlier (and/or 
using panel data). 
Coming to the basic macroeconomic indicators, in Column 2, only the budget 
surplus variable is significant and consistent with Fischer's (1993) findings in 
terms of sign, magnitude and significance where the budget surplus coefficient 
was 0.277. Instead of the inflation rate used by Fischer we have used its 
standard deviation, INFSTD, as a measure of volatility. The inflation rate and 
its deviation are highly correlated, 0.95 (see table 7.3 in the Appendix) 
supporting the inclusion of one but not both as used by Hadjimichael ei al. 
(1995). Although the coefficient of INFSTD is negative it is not significant. 
But as will be discussed below when we experiment with different measures of 
openness (see Appendix tables 7.4A and 7.4B), this inflation variable becomes 
significant supporting the hypothesis that macroeconomic stability is conducive 
to growth. The quadratic term in column 2 (FAIDOECDSQ) has a negative 
(but insignificant) sign, which suggests that "too much" foreign aid does not 
hurt developing countries. For the sake of comparison with earlier studies, the 
model was run without the quadratic term (column 3). Notice that the 
coefficient of foreign aid fell to 0.0877 while its significance increased. Even 
though earlier studies used a linear specification, a positive and significant 
contribution of foreign aid on growth is rarely reported. One of the reasons 
could undoubtedly be because of omitted variables such as trade, 
macroeconomic indicators and so on in those studies. 
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The budget surplus and inflation variables are significant in column 3. These 
suggest, ceteris paribus, that fiscal deficits are associated with a deterioration 
in growth performance and that efforts to reduce inflation volatility is 
conducive to growth. In checking whether government expenditure supports 
the supply-side hypothesis we replaced budget surplus by total government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP-EXP, in column 4. The result seems to 
substantiate the supply-side view with the coefficient being negative and 
significant. This supports the view that greater government intervention 
adversely affects efficiency, productivity and growth. 
The financial repression variable proxied by M2 over GDP-MONEY- 
suggests that repressing the returns on financial assets either through 
inflationary confiscation of real money holdings or through holding interest 
rates at below-market-clearing levels have negative effects on growth. The 
coefficient of MONEY is significantly positive in all the regressions (linear and 
non linear as well in Tables 7.4,7.5 and 7.6). This in turn would advocate 
financial liberalisation beneficial effects on growth. 
With respect to the openness measure-WOPEN-this is positive and 
significantly related to growth in all the regressions in Tables 4,5 and 67. We 
found a some what expected negative coefficient due to the high import price 
premia paid by African importers and the magnitude of their current account 
deficit. By adopting our weighted openness measure-WOPEN, a positive and 
A range of other openness measures were used: collected trade taxes (TTAX) defined as the 
ratio of total revenues on international trade (exports plus imports) to total trade, the black 
market exchange rate premium (LNBMP), the average of export and import as a proportion of 
GDP (OPEN I), the openness measure as defined in the Penn World Table Mark 5.5 (OPEN2), 
the growth rate of total trade as a percentage of GDP (TGG) and changes in the terms of trade 
(ZTOTI). While the foreign aid coefficient did not change much in terms of magnitude and 
significance when using these different measures (except when we used the crude openness 
measure OPEN I), none of them were significantly different from zero. In fact these openness 
measures were not even found to be highly correlated with each other. Since in our sample 
there are 22 Sub-Saharan African countries, the result substantiates Yeats' findings that over- 
priced import or aid-tied trade hampers growth as indicated by the crude openness measures. 
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Table 7.5: Cross-Section Regressions (OLS). 
Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth 1970-1993 (N = 58). 
Independent Column Column Column Column 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Constant 3.6454 2.430 2.5565 2.5274 
(0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** 
AIDPOP 0.01555 
- - - (0.046)** 
FAIDWB 
- 
0.26413 
- - (0.026)* 
FAIDWBSQ 
- -0.006768 - - (0.111) 
NONCON 
- - 
0.33971 
- (0.496) 
NONCONSQ 
- - -0.010749 - (0.839) 
OFFLOWS 
- 
- 
0.58893 0.58138 
(0.058)* (0.021)** 
OFFLOWSSQ 
- 
- -0.040485 -0.032691 (0.195) (0.083)* 
PRIV 
-0.2128 -0.24939 -0.14179 -0.13094 (0.106) (0.055)* (0.252) (0.282) 
SAV 0.075215 0.11402 0.09592 0.09879 
(0.005)*** (0.000) *** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
OTHERIFS 0.027962 0.027092 0.025196 0.25071 
(0.068)* (0.068)* (0.097)* (0.092)* 
WOPEN 0.010969 0.01050 0.009802 0.010236 
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.017)** (0.012)** 
MONEY 0.032576 0.03695 0.036156 0.037815 
(0.046)** (0.024)** (0.032)** (0.022)** 
BSUR 0.29377 0.31936 0.32544 0.32713 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
INFSTD 
-0.000484 -0.000418 -0.000473 -0.000392 (0.345) (0.549) (0.537) (0.586) 
DUM3 
-1.9195 -1.6762 -1.7755 -1.6509 (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
DUM6 
-1.2466 -1.5349 -1.4550 -1.4392 (0.024)** (0.007)*** (0.01 1)** (0.009)*** 
R 0.63729 0.66401 0.66726 0.65980 
Adj. R 0.56011 0.58366 0.56895 0.57845 
F 8.26*** 8.26*** 6.79*** 8.11 *** 
RSS 89.11 82.55 81.75 83.58 
Breusch-Pagan x 3.27 6.52 6.22 6.10 
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.99 0.05 1.79 2.44 
Note: Details as in Table 7.4. 
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significant value is observed. This would imply, ceteris purihus, that countries 
which are engaged in higher trade and having a trade balance have more 
growth potential than a closed economy. 
In running these regression models the foreign aid variable has been defined as 
foreign aid as a ratio of GDP. Some authors have expressed concerns at using 
such a variable (for example, Lipton (1986)). They pointed out the risk of 
running into a `trap' when expressing foreign aid as a ratio of GDP that, except 
in the very long run, the ratio of aid to GDP is `automatically' boosted by a big 
aid rise, or by a period of sluggish or negative GDP growth. In this context, we 
test whether the aid-growth relationship still holds when using aid per capita 
(AIDPOP) instead of FAIDOECD in column 1 of Table 7.5. The positive aid- 
growth relationship still holds. Note that the results are robust. 
So far the foreign aid component is Official Development Assistance as 
defined by the OECD, i. e. official concessional loans which have a grant 
element of at least 25%. The World Bank on the other hand tries to see the 
impact of official flows on developing countries, defined as Official 
Development Finance (ODF). This comprises concessional and 
nonconcessional official net flows and grants (technical co-operation is 
excluded). We define ODF as a ratio of GDP as FAIDWB and its square as 
FAIDWBSQ. We then replace the foreign aid variables by FAIDWB and 
FAIDWBSQ in our non linear model to see its impact on growth. This is 
reported in column 2. It can be observed that FAIDWB has a higher positive 
and significant coefficient than FAIDOECD in Table 7.4. Because of this 
difference we separate concessional and nonconcessional official net flows as a 
proportion of GDP (OFFLOWS and NONCON respectively) and see their 
individual impact as in column 3. Ceteris paribus, nonconcessional official 
flows do not have any impact on growth, while on the other hand concessional 
official net flows seems to have a much higher impact individually. At this 
stage we can only speculate that nonconcessional official net flows do not have 
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any major effect on growth because they are primarily motivated by 
commercial and political motives. Running another regression without the 
nonconcessional flows variables in column 4, we can compare the foreign aid 
variables FAIDWB (in column 2) with OFFLOWS in cloumn 4. We find that 
with the latter the impact is higher on growth when we exclude grants and 
technical co-operation from ODA. This finding is consistent with those of 
Gang and Khan (1991) and Khan and Hoshino (1992) that official loans are 
used productively while grants are fungible, the latter being used as tax relief. 
However, the square of OFFLOWS is negatively significant. This suggests that 
beyond a certain level, concessional official net flows can have some harmful 
effects on developing countries (for instance, contracting `Dutch Disease' as 
suggested by van Wijnbergen (1984) where there is a tendency lör the real 
exchange rate to appreciate). 
In Table 7.6 we report the results of introducing dummy variables for regional 
differences. These support earlier findings and are significant in all regressions. 
To test the hypothesis of income convergence among the developing countries 
in the sample we run an augmented Barro-type model which includes initial 
income-GNP70, initial primary and secondary school enrolment rates- 
SEC70 and PRIM70 respectively, a social indicator-the fertility rate in 
1993-FERTI93, the different sources of capital together with the Fischer- 
Easterly variables. The results do not support income convergence. This may 
suggest that convergence only applies to a sub-sample. Among the human 
capital measures, the primary school enrolment rate is insignificant while the 
secondary school enrolment rate is significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level. The latter might be picking up some of the "initial" effect not captured 
by initial income. The foreign aid impact on growth is still positively 
significant in all three cases. Again it can be seen that the effectiveness of 
concessional flows (OFFLOWS) is higher than Official Development Finance 
(FAIDWB) which in turn is higher than Official Development Assistance 
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Table 7.6: Cross-Section Augmented Barro Regressions (OLS. N= 58Z 
Independent Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Variables 
Constant 5.6461 5.3082 5.5875 
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** 
FAIDOECD 0.25630 
- 
OFFLOWS 0.71376 
(0.029)** (0.004)***- 
FAIDOECDSQ 
-0.006816 
-0.043299 (0.107) (0.018)* *- 
FAIDWB 
- 
0.29834 
- (0.011)** 
FAIDWBSQ 
- -0.008543 - (0.043)** 
PRIV 
-0.23687 -0.24014 -0.11221 (0.066)* (0.060)* (0.351) 
SAV 010311 0.10401 0.08897 
(0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
OTHERIFS 0.020791 0.023576 0.021357 
(0.151) (0.099)* (0.126) 
WOPEN 0.009786 0.009938 0.0094938 
(0.013)** (0.011)** (0.013)** 
MONEY 0.04158 0.04387 0.045646 
(0.018)** (0.013)** (0.009)*** 
BSUR 0.27722 0.29112 0.30154 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
INFSTD 
-0.000368 0.000469 0.0000634 (0.524) (0.953) (0.927) 
GNP70 0.461 x 10" 0.478 x 10 0.594 x 10 
(0.725) (0.719) (0.644) 
PRIM70 
-0.00264 -0.002404 -0.001638 (0.838) (0.842) (0.888) 
SEC70 
-0.056003 -0.05693 -0.063511 (0.020)** (0.017)** (0.007)*** 
FERTI93 
-0.48213 -0.43319 -0.49225 (0.065)* (0.078)* (0.044)** 
DUM3 
-1.4359 -1.5037 -1.4304 (0.016)** (0.009)*** (0.011)** 
DUM6 
-1.6371 -1.6705 -1.6048 (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
R 0.72013 0.72600 0.73605 
Adj. R 0.62017 0.62814 0.64179 
F 7.20*** 7.42*** 7.81 *** 
RSS 68.76 67.32 64.88 
Breusch-Pagan x 9.91 7.92 8.60 
Jacque-Bera statistic 0.60 0.99 1.47 
Note: Details as in Table 7.4. 
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(FAIDOECD). Notice that their squares are also significant, except in column I 
where it is marginal significant at the 10% level. 
Overall, these results suggest that foreign assistance impacts positively on 
growth. The obvious question is why have so many previous studies failed to 
find a positive and significant impact for foreign aid? The answers may include 
sample composition and size, omitted variables, gestation lags and the fact that 
the effectiveness of foreign assistance has started to pay-off in recent years. We 
should bear in mind that developing countries were involved in the economic 
turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s which could have dissipated the potential 
positive effects of foreign assistance. The reason we believe that the gestation 
lags of foreign aid is becoming more effective in recent years is also confirmed 
by Hajimichael et al. (1995). 
As we have suggested, averaging the data over the period 1970-93 could be one 
of the reasons why the private flows variable is not positively related to 
growth. To tackle this problem we split the sample period into three phases: 
Phase I-the oil price shocks (1974-81), Phase II-the international debt crisis 
(1982-87) and Phase III-trade liberalisation (1988-93). In running the 
regressions for these phases, we have preferred to present the results using the 
simple linear model specification because, first, when we tried the non linear 
model neither FAIDOECD nor FAIDOECDSQ were significant for any phase. 
Second, we can use these results to compare with earlier studies and third, 
since our variable of interest is the impact of net private flows, the non linear 
model does not affect our conclusion. Table 7.7 presents the results for these 
different phases. 
When we compare the three phases, we find that during the oil price crisis, 
column 1, the massive inflows of private funds (most of which were at 
commercial lending rates) from oil producers had a positive and significant 
effect on growth of developing countries. A possible reason which could 
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explain this is the fact that recipients were using these funds efficiently in 
sectors with high rates of return. The foreign aid variable, as measured by 
FAIDOECD, did not have a significant effect on growth during this "shock" 
period. The domestic savings coefficient although being positive and 
significant has a lower coefficient than the coefficient for the 1970-1993 
period. During this period countries with macroeconomic stability seemed to 
have more growth potential, thus growth is enhanced in an environment where 
the budget deficit is relatively low and where inflation is less volatile. Also 
note that high oil prices are reflected in the inflation variable which captures 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Its coefficient is higher than in any other 
regressions. With regard to regional growth differences, it seems that countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa were more affected than other developing countries. 
With the onset of the debt crisis, the financing of those contracted commercial 
private loans became very costly. In column 2 the capital flows variables were 
not significant. These support the view that developing countries were 
diverting resources to finance their debts and rising interest rate payments 
rather than investing in productive sectors. Although the level of foreign aid 
was constantly flowing in during this period, it is still insignificantly different 
from zero. Again statistics show that most of these funds were in the form of 
debt relief. Countries in the Latin American region had lower growth than other 
developing countries which is not surprising given their debt problems. 
With the ending of the debt crisis and the recent emphasis on trade reform, 
economic growth in developing countries has started to resume. Phase III, has 
generated new evidence on the effectiveness of foreign assistance. In columns 
3 and 4 the foreign aid variable turns out to be positive and significant. With 
the end of the debt crisis, domestic resources were put to more productive use 
as observed by the domestic savings coefficient which is significantly different 
from zero. But contrary to our expectations, the openness measure is not 
significantly positive in any of these phases. When we compare regressions 
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covering the whole period 1970-93 with the results in column 3, they might 
suggest that gains from trade is a long-run rather short-run phenomenon. Our 
macroeconomic uncertainty variable, the standard deviation of the inflation 
rate, performs rather well as expected. 
Table 7.7: Cross-section Regressions for Different Phases (OLS). 
(Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth). 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Independent (Phase I) (Phase II) (Phase III) (Phase III) 
Variables 1974-81 1982-87 1988-93 1988-93 
Constant 3.9616 4.5398 2.9929 3.0527 
(0.010)*** (0.003)*** (0.031)** (0.031)** 
FAIDOECD 0.16749 0.022718 0.08678 0.08088 
(0.247) (0.735) (0.025)** (0.028)** 
PRIV 0.35006 0.00148 0.36864 
- 
(0.002)*** (0.992) (0.014)'1* 
PRIVLO 
- 
- 
- 
0.21306 
(0.458) 
FDI 
- 
- 
- 
0.46443 
(0.014)** 
SAV 0.072525 0.02565 0.11754 0.11578 
(0.060)* (0.578) (0.035)** (0.040)** 
OTHERIFS 
-0.0000707 0.03081 0.2230 0.24547 
(0.994) (0.589) (0.067)* (0.062)* 
WOPEN 
-0.01117 0.00714 -0.00645 -0.00794 (0.237) (0.145) (0.829) (0.793) 
MONEY 0.007956 
-0.005146 -0.15366 -0.015198 (0.752) (0.812) (0.316) (0.337) 
BSUR 0.17080 0.051447 0.04575 0.0495 
(0.035)** (0.412) (0.441) (0.414) 
INFSTD 
-0.017945 -0.000747 -0.002701 -0.002614 
(0.016)** (0.240) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
DUM3 
-2.0331 -3.4079 -1.7862 -1.8512 (0.009)*** (0.001)*** (0.015)** (0.016)** 
DUM6 
-2.4171 -2.5447 -2.5256 -2.5224 
(0.023)** (0.022)** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** 
R 0.35755 0.33335 0.61911 0.62312 
Adj. R 0.22906 0.19730 0.52843 0.52201 
F 2.78*** 2.45** 6.83*** 6.16*** 
RSS 303.47 311.24 169.67 167.89 
Breusch-Pagan x 21.12** 15.00 33.71 *** 30.68*** 
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.33 0.33 1.08 0.88 
N 61 60 53 53 
Note- Details as in Table 7. 4. 
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Due to the recent upsurge in foreign direct investment, we have decomposed 
total net private flows into net private loans and foreign direct investment both 
as a proportion of GDP (PRIVLO and FDI respectively) in column 4. 
Immediately one can observe the high impact of FDI flows while the private 
loans coefficient is insignificantly different from zero. Another less significant 
but interesting result is that developing countries have even started to make 
greater use of other foreign inflows, the variable OTHERIFS being positive and 
significant. 
Given that the 1970-93 period can be regarded as being a `long-run' 
relationship, the next question to ask is whether a country needs to have some 
economic pre-conditions for the impact of foreign aid to be effective. To do so 
we divide our sample, first, into `low' growth and `high' growth countries (the 
term 'low' and `high' are as defined as countries being below and above the 
median value respectively). It is therefore possible to compare what the World 
Bank often refers as 'under-' and 'over-' achievers respectively. Second, we 
compare whether the level of foreign aid matters by distinguishing between 
`low' and `high' foreign aid receivers, and third, we investigate between 
income level, i. e., low-income group versus middle income group. 
When running the non linear model for low and high growth countries, the 
foreign aid and its square were not significant in case which motivates us to use 
the linear model. The results are presented in Table 7.8 below. We can find that 
the effectiveness of foreign aid is higher for high growth countries than it is for 
low growth countries. The former is in fact almost two and half tinges higher in 
magnitude (0.17456 compared to 0.072396). Notice that the domestic savings 
and other inflows coefficients are significant for the over-achievers while they 
are not for low growth countries which include mainly Sub-Saharan African 
countries. With regard to the openness measure, not surprisingly it is 
significant only for the high growth country group which includes countries 
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such as Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. This would 
tend to imply that trading opportunities have been more beneficial to high 
growers. Regarding the macroeconomic variables, because the budget surplus 
was correlated with other variables we have used instead government 
expenditure in both equations so that it makes comparison easier. For the low 
growers government intervention seems to distort incentives and reduce 
efficient resource allocation while it is insignificantly different from zero for 
high growers. Macroeconomic uncertainty has also been of much more concern 
for low growers than for high growers. For both country groups financial 
liberalisation promotes economic growth as the coefficient on MONEY is 
positive and significantly different from zero. 
Table 7.8" Cross-Section Regressions (OLS) for Low and High Growth 
Country Groups. (Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth). 
Independent 
Variables 
Column I 
Low Growth 
Countries 
Column 2 
High Growth 
Countries 
Constant 
FAIDOECD 
PRIV 
SAV 
OTHERIFS 
WOPEN 
MONEY 
EXP 
INFSTD 
RZ 
Ädj. W 
F 
RSS 
Breusch-Pagan x? 
2.3220 
(0.000)*** 
0.072396 
(0.018)** 
0.10451 
(0.315) 
0.04624 
(0.156) 
0.008633 
(0.362) 
0.00505 
(0.289) 
0,049936 
(0,005)*** 
-0.11912 (0.000)*** 
-0.0011388 (0.009)*** 
0.55090 
0.36181 
2.91 ** 
12.63 
4.80 
NI 28 
Note: Details as in Table 7.4. 
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0.79924 
(0.311) 
0.1745 6 
(0.017)* "l` 
-0.33 756 (0.1 16) 
0.16272 
(0.002)*** 
0.087025 
(0.095)* 
0.012844 
(0.019)* * 
0.039717 
(0.034)** 
-0.008585 (0.264) 
-0.00935 (0.663 ) 
0.550s 3)
0.37972 
;. 22*** 
41 
. 
33 
9.85 
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The level of foreign aid flowing in and the level of economic development 
might shed further light on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Table 7.9 reports 
results for different country groups. Low foreign aid receivers seem to rely 
more on their domestic resources to promote growth than on foreign resources 
(column 1). On the other hand, for high foreign aid receivers none of the 
different sources of capital is significant. In fact column 2 reports the poorest 
fit of all regressions (an adjusted R2 of 0.012). 
When we split the sample into low income and middle income groups, we 
obtain unsurprising results. Foreign aid is more productive in middle income 
countries than in low income countries. This is not too surprising as in low 
income countries most of foreign aid funds are directed to poverty alleviation, 
debt relief, infrastructure, etc., while in middle income countries they gain from 
an already established infrastructure so that these flows are more productive. 
The private flows variable is negative and significant only in the low income 
group. Again we stress that this might be the result of its trend and also 
possibly also due to the effect of accumulated private loans contracted during 
the oil price crisis to which repayments have to be made. Domestic savings is 
significant for both groups. Note also that middle income countries being more 
open to trade and having a lower current account deficit, the openness measure 
has a positive and significant effect on growth. Because there was a correlation 
between MONEY and SAV, and MONEY and INFSTD, we used FINREP5-a 
dummy variable to represent financial repression instead of MONEY -it takes 
a value of 1 for real interest rates below 
-5%, 0 otherwise. For the low income 
countries it can be observed that financial repression is a deterrent to growth 
while it is insignificant for middle income countries. Hence, splitting the 
sample into low-income and middle-income countries suggests that foreign aid 
is more effective in countries which are above a certain level of economic 
development. 
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Table 7.9, 
- 
Cross-Section Regressions (OLS) for different country 
groupings 
Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Low High Low Middle 
Independent Aid Aid Income Income 
Variables Receivers Receivers Countries Countries 
Constant 1.9093 0.08553 3.443 1.9529 
(0.235) (0.960) (0.019)** (0.171) 
FAIDOECD 0.70193 0.34178 0.05174 0.33896 
(0.526) (0.164) (0.778) (0.086)* 
FAIDOECDSQ 
-0.1066 -0.01059 -0.003536 -0.00604 (0.715) (0.191) (0.590) (0.410) 
PRIV 
-0.19959 -0.16175 -0.8614 -0.27963 (0.387) (0.188) (0.030)** (0.178) 
SAV 0.12816 0.07682 0.14860 0.13973 
(0.013)** (0.304) (0.023)** (0.016)** 
OTHERIFS 0.06246 
-0.008815 -0.001484 0.12294 
(0.162) (0.106) (0.928) (0.053)* 
WOPEN 0.007374 0.01726 
-0.017366 0.015167 (0.193) (0.494) (0.187) (0.018)** 
MONEY 0.051985 0.0095496 
- - 
(0.026)** (0.837) 
FINREP5 
- 
- -1.0421 -0.984 (0.096)* (0.216) 
EXP 
-0.10272 0.0051 0.008992 -0.01974 (0.073)* (0.139) (0.201) (0.638) 
INFSTD 
-0.001482 0.000013 -0.003047 -0.001942 (0.121) (0.984) (0.084)* (0.095)* 
R2 0.56077 0.35384 0.67730 0.50749 
Adj. R 0.37252 0.01176 0.48369 0.31473 
F 2.98** 1.03 3.50** 2.63** 
RSS 52.51 72.92 7.56 75.75 
Breusch-Pagan X` 8.40 49.61 *** 25 3.50 
N 31 27 25 33 
Note: Details as in Table 7.4. 
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7_. 4.3 Conclusion on Cross Section Estimation 
The investigation carried out using cross-section data has been very 
informative and points to a positive and significant aid-growth relationship. 
There are multiple reasons why many previous studies were unable to find a 
positive and significant impact of foreign aid on growth at a macro level. The 
first concerns sample composition 
-many studies seem not to have scrutinised 
their sample properly, for instance, in many cases we find the inclusion of 
small countries and many outliers. In this study we excluded small countries 
(those having a population less than one million in 1993) and countries 
receiving foreign aid in excess of 40% of their GDP. The results reported in 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 would suggest another important issue in sample selection. 
If a sample has, for instance a lot of low-income countries then we are bound to 
conclude that foreign aid is ineffective for developing countries. Looking at the 
last row in these tables we can find that our sample has a representative mixture 
of low and middle income countries. 
The second reason pertains to the sample period. In fact studies which have 
used data before the trade liberalisation period (as we defined it), have mostly 
found evidence of an insignificant impact of foreign aid on growth, while 
recent studies would support its effectiveness, for example Hadjimichael el al. 
(1995) and our result. Our reason for believing this is that when we split the 
sample period into different phases we fail to find any significant impact of 
foreign aid in the pre-trade liberalisation phase. Even though we tried to pool 
the first and second phases we were unable to find any significant impact. This 
supports the findings of previous studies using such sample periods. When we 
investigated the third phase, 1987-93, then a positive and significant effect of 
foreign aid emerged. All these suggest either that the beneficial effects of 
foreign aid were/are dampened when there is a negative external shock making 
it impotent or that foreign aid investments in the 1970s and 1980s have started 
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to payoff. Another possibility is that trade liberalisation and macroeconomic 
stability are necessary but not sufficient conditions for aid to he effective for 
growth. 
7.4.4 Panel Data Analysis 
The advantage of using panel data techniques is that it contains "the 
information necessary to deal with both the intertemporal dynamics and the 
individuality of the entities being investigated" (Diehnan, 1989). This 
technique allows the equation intercepts to vary as a way of representing 
country and/or time effects. These country or time effects "are typically 
thought to arise from the omission of important variables whose explicit 
inclusion in the model was not possible"8. 
A general representation of the model is designed as follows: 
Yic ý µi + ß'Xic + Sit (7.3) 
where s;, takes different forms and lei is described as we proceed, and s;, is the 
classical disturbance with mean zero and constant variance. Note that the X 
matrix also includes the Z variables discussed earlier. To allow for country and 
time period effects equation 7.3 can be rewritten as: 
Yet 
= as + a1 + ; ý, + ß'Xit + sit (7.4) 
where is ao an overall constant, a; represents the country effects and X, 
represents the time period effects. As indicated these represent unmeasurable 
effects, for instance, a; represents the net effect of omitted time-invariant 
variables such as political instability, military governments, climatic 
conditions, etc., and X would represent the net effect of country-invariant time 
effects such as commodity prices or interest rates. s;,, hence, represents the net 
effect of omitted variables which vary over both country and time. Equation 7.4 
is a two-way fixed effects model. This type of model is usually estimated by 
using dummy variables, hence the name least squares dummy variables 
(LSDV). Due to limited time series data for all the variables we have averaged 
s Ibid. pp 49. 
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the data into four time periods. The time periods are 1970-75.1976-81,1982- 
87 and 1988-93, and they are named as PER1, PER2, PER3 and PER4 
respectively (therefore t=1,2,3,4). An advantage of using averages in the 
case of testing the impact of foreign aid on growth is that we are not certain 
whether foreign aid disbursed in a particular year has an immediate impact on 
growth in that particular year or later. There are 63 countries in the 
sample, (therefore i=1,2,....... 63). Note that for some time periods some data 
were not available and we therefore used an unbalanced panel dataset. The total 
number of observations are 238. 
Following Hadjimichael et al. (1995) we set out to test a non-linear relationship 
between foreign aid and growth similar to the cross-section model. We can 
hence compare the results from the cross-section with those of the panel data. 
For the panel data, the model to be estimated is in the following form: 
Growth;, 
= a0+ ai + ; ý, + (3,; FAIDOECD;, + ßz; FAIDOECDSQ;, + fi. j; PRIV;, + 
134; SAV;, + I3 OTHERIFS;, + J3(,; ZTOTIj, + ß7; MONEY;, + f3X; BSUR;, + 
ßq; INFSTD;, + E;, (7.5) 
The variables are as defined earlier. In this model since we use period averages 
we have substituted the weighted openness measure (WOVEN) by changes in 
the terms of trade (ZTOTI). This seems to be a reasonable measure of 
openness as many developing countries experienced major terms of trade 
shocks during the phases between the period 1970-93. Another advantage of 
using this variable as Fischer (1993) mentioned is that it also accounts for 
macroeconomic performance. 
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The estimated parameters of the above model are reported in Table 7.10. (The 
country and time dummies are not reported below, the full output of the model 
is available from the author on request). 
The foreign aid coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level but the 
square of foreign aid to GDP ratio carries a significant negative sign. The latter 
implies that too much foreign aid hurts developing countries beyond a certain 
threshold level. We also observe that, ceteris paribus, net private flows have a 
higher impact on growth individually than other sources of capital. 
Table 7.10: Two-way fixed effects model (OLS). 
Number of observations: 238 ; Parameters: 76 ; Degrees of Freedom : 162 
Residual Sum of Squares: 875.44 
R2 = 0.63775 ; 2= 0.47004 ;F[ 75,1621 = 3.80*** 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-ratio Probability 
Value 
FAIDOECD 0.17604 0.08021 2.195** 0.029 
FAIDOECDSQ 
-0.001963 0.00095 -2.064** 0.040 
PRIV 0.39631 0.08218 4,822*** 0.000 
SAV 0.018366 0.04027 0.456 0.648 
OTHERIFS 0.45762 0.00842 0.543 0.587 
ZTOTI 0.070834 0.03049 2.323** 0.021 
MONEY 0.008783 0.02329 0.377 0.707 
BSUR 
-0.03128 0.04294 -0.729 0.467 
INFSTD 
-0.001203 0.00053 -2.282** 0.023 
Constant 1.7166 1.2873 1.334 0.184 
Note: * significant at least at the 10 % level. 
significant at least at the 5% level. 
*** significant at least at the I% level. 
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As we have suspected, its contribution on growth was not being picked up in 
the cross-section model. Taking the time factor into consideration gives an 
appropriate indication in the panel model. The coefficient of net private flows 
is positive and significantly different from zero. Testing whether this non-linear 
relationship with the quadratic term improves the fit, we re-run the model 
without the quadratic term and performed an F-test. The resulting F test 
supports the inclusion of the quadratic term, the calculated F-value being 4.24 
and significant at the 5% level. The drawback, however, of using such a model 
is the large loss of degrees of freedom. One way of reducing this loss is to 
arrange the data using time periods and to include regional dummies for Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAT) and for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Hence it is 
as if running a one way fixed-effect model with these regional dummies. The 
results are presented in Table 7.11. 
Despite a fall in the coefficient of foreign aid from 0.17604 to 0.10532 it is still 
significant at the 5% level. The macroeconomic variables: changes in the terms 
of trade, budget surplus and the inflation volatility perform rather well and 
have their expected signs. Also we can observe that the regional dummies and 
the time period effects are significant in the regression. For the latter we can 
infer that, ceteris paribus, growth was lower during the debt crisis (period 2) 
for the Latin American and Caribbean region compared to other developing 
countries in any other period. 
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Table 7.11: One-way fixed effect model with regional dummies (OLSi 
am 
Number of observations: 238 ; Parameters: 15 ; Degrees of Freedom : 223 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1506.49 
R2 = 0.38045 ;R 2= 0.34155 ; F[ 14,223] = 9.78*** Independent 
Variables 
FAIDOECD 
FAIDOECDSQ 
PRIV 
SAV 
OTHERIFS 
ZTOT I 
MONEY 
BSUR 
INFSTD 
LAT 
SSA 
Coefficient 
0.10532 
-0.001284 
0.23379 
0.065115 
0.006064 
0.086528 
0.0086517 
0.067342 
-0.001454 
-1 
. 
6470 
-1.7307 
Standard 
Error 
0.04852 
0.00066 
0.06739 
0.02176 
0.00772 
0.02949 
0.01112 
0.03576 
0.00049 
0.47584 
0.50081 
t-ratio 
2.170** 
-1.937* 
3.469*** 
2.992**" 
0.782 
2.934*** 
0.778 
1.883* 
-2.922*** 
-3.461 *** 
-3.456*** 
Probability 
Value 
0.031 
0.054 
0.001 
0.003 
0.433 
0.004 
0.437 
0.0609 
0.004 
0.001 
Estimated Fixed Effects 
Error 
Period 1 
Period 2 
Period 3 
Period 4 
Group Size 
58 
63 
62 
55 
Coefficient 
4.4444 
3.4385 
2.3451 
2.7829 
Standard 
0.74351 
0.80671 
0.8589 
0.89526 
0.001 
t-ratio 
5.978*** 
4.262*** 
2.730*** 
;. 108*** 
Note: Details as in Table 7.10. 
When comparing these with the cross section results in Table 4 we notice that 
foreign aid is significant and positive in both cases while its effectiveness is 
higher in the cross-section case. An important result as mentioned above is 
when we use the panel framework to take the time factor into consideration as 
compared with the cross-section period average over the period 1970-93. This 
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was our suspected effect of net private capital flows which was not being 
picked up due to its observed trend as explained earlier. The panel formulation 
confirms this hypothesis and when the time factor is considered the coefficient 
of private flows becomes positive and highly significant, a result which we 
obtained when we split the cross-section data into different time periods. 
When assessing the effectiveness of different sources of capital using either 
cross-section or pooled data we find that foreign capital (foreign aid and private 
capital net flows) has a greater impact than domestic savings when comparing 
individual coefficients. These results were also obtained by Papanek (1972) 
and Dowling and Hiemenz (1983). There is no doubt that net private capital 
flows have a greater impact than foreign aid as these flows are mostly directed 
to projects and activities with higher private rates of returns while the latter is 
mainly directed towards infrastructure building, education, health, 
communication, water supply and so on whose rates of return are observed in 
the longer run (the social rate of return in this case is much higher). 
Coming to the model specification the fixed-effect models we estimated suffer 
some drawbacks, for instance, using up a large number of degrees of freedom 
and the coefficients of the dummy variables are not easily interpretable. They 
represent, as Maddala (1971) pointed out, "some ignorance-just like the 
residuals sit". Variables that might cause the regression line to shift are not 
specified; dummy variables are simply inserted to measure such shifts. 
Maddala suggested that this "specific ignorance" might just as well be treated 
in a manner similar of our "general ignorance" (E;, ). In other words, the 
coefficients a; and ?, could be viewed as normally distributed random variables 
with zero mean and unknown variance (from Dielman, 1989, pp. 53). Such a 
model has become known as random effect, variance components or error 
components model and is in the following form: 
Y; ý=ao+ß'Xir+Ei, +p; (7.6) 
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where i. is treated as an individual specific disturbance and E[µ; I=0. Var I-µ; ]
= ß2 
,,, 
and Cov [s;,, t]=0. The model is estimated using a feasible generalised 
least squares procedure (GLS). The main advantage of this technique is that it 
accounts for heterogeneity (country or time depending how the model is 
specified). The results when allowing for both country and time heterogeneity 
are given in Table 7.12 below. 
Table 7.12" Two-Way Random effects model (GLS). 
Number of observations. 238 ; Parameters: 10 ; Degrees of Freedom : 228 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1828.76 
GLS R2 = 0.247908 ; OLS R2=0.237459 
Independent 
Variables 
FAIDOECD 
FAIDOECDSQ 
PRIV 
SAV 
OTHERIFS 
ZTOT 1 
MONEY 
BSUR 
INFSTD 
Constant 
Coefficient 
0.093 86 
-0.001156 
0.31382 
0.04663 
0.003819 
0.085334 
0.018377 
-0.004548 
-0.0013295 
1.5991 
Standard 
Error 
0.04392 
0.00056 
0.05880 
0.02303 
0.00639 
0.02325 
0.01166 
0.03083 
0.00040 
0.96405 
t-ratio 
2.137** 
-2.050** 
5.337*** 
2.025** 
0.598 
3.670*** 
1 
. 
576 
-0.148 
-3.311*** 
1.659* 
Probability 
Value 
0.033 
0.040 
0.000 
0.043 
0,549 
0.000 
0,115 
0.883 
0.001 
0.097 
Note: Details as in Table 7.10. 
One can still see a positive contribution of foreign aid (and other sources of 
capital) on growth. Because we found that from both, the cross-section and 
fixed effects regressions, the growth effects were different in different time 
periods we now estimate Equation 7.6 with the inclusion of the regional 
dummies. This means that the data are arranged in a similar fashion as when 
1' The OLS R` is reported as a more approximation of the "goodness of fit". Note that in using 
the feasible GLS the R` no longer has its usual interpretation (see Judge and others, 1985, pp 
31). 
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running the one-way fixed effect model. Thus the GLS is produced in two 
steps. First, ordinary least-squares is used to estimate the regression equation 
with the pooled data. The residuals from this step are then used to calculate the 
standard deviation of the residuals for each time period. Then the standard 
deviation for each time period is used to scale all the included variables for that 
time period. An OLS procedure is applied again to the pooled transformed data 
to obtain the feasible GLS estimators. The results using the error components 
model are presented in Table 7.13. 
When we compare the results of the fixed-effect model in Table 7.11 with the 
GLS one, we find that the explanatory power is almost identical. The 
magnitude and significance of the parameters differ little. Although the 
coefficient of foreign aid falls slightly under the GLS method foreign aid 
effectiveness is almost the same (see Table 7.17) in both cases. Overall we can 
conclude that the results are quite similar whether we use the one-way fixed 
effect or random effect model with regional dummies. 
Although there are advantages and disadvantages associated with each 
estimation method (see Greene, 1993, pp. 479) yet the slope coefficients are 
still assumed constant for all countries. So far we have found out that there are 
county group or regional effects either when using cross-section or pooled data, 
these motivate us to test for foreign aid effectiveness in the Latin American and 
Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African region since in our sample we have a large 
proportion of countries in these two regions. In doing so we use the GLS 
procedure but this time to account for country heterogeneity in each region. 
The GLS procedure will therefore be, first, to apply ordinary least-squares to 
the pooled data. The residuals from this step are then used to calculate the 
standard deviation of the residuals for each country. Then the standard 
deviation for each country is used to scale all the included variables for that 
country. Then an OLS procedure is applied again to the pooled transformed 
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data to obtain the feasible GLS estimators. To take account of the time periods 
we incorporate time period dummies PER2, PER3 and PER4. 
Table 7.13. Generalised Least Squares Regression with regional dummies. 
Number of observations: 238 ; Parameters: 12 ; Degrees of Freedom : 226 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1647.99 
GLS R2 
= 
0.322251 ; OLS R2=0.334395 
Independent 
Variables 
FAIDOECD 
FAIDOECDSQ 
PRIV 
SAV 
OTHERIFS 
ZTOTI 
MONEY 
BSUR 
INFSTD 
LAT 
SSA 
Constant 
Coefficient 
0.10127 
-0.001235 
0.23713 
0.06391 
0.00595 
0.08977 
0.00744 
0.06606 
-0.00148 
-1.6667 
-1.7345 
3.3342 
Standard Error 
0.04489 
0.0061 
0.06240 
0.02017 
0.00716 
0.02725 
0.01026 
0.03308 
0.00046 
0.44131 
0.46473 
0.91359 
t-ratio 
2.256** 
-2.012** 
3.800*** 
3.168*** 
0.830 
3.294*** 
0,725 
1.997** 
-3.199*** 
-3.777*** 
3.732*** 
3.650*** 
Probability 
Value 
0.024 
0.044 
0.000 
0.002 
0.406 
0.001 
0.468 
0.046 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: Details as in Table 7.1 0. 
Table 7.14 presents the results for the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
The foreign aid variable has a larger coefficient than for the whole sample of 
developing countries and is significant at the 10 % level. But the square of the 
foreign aid variable carries a significant negative sign at the 5% level. Note 
that the domestic savings ratio is not significant which might suggest that 
individually foreign capital has more impact on growth than domestic sources. 
An unusual outcome is the coefficient of financial liberalisation proxy, 
MONEY, which is negative and significant. A possible explanation could be 
that because we used nominal instead of real money stock (M2) as a ratio of 
227 
Chapter Seven Empirical Testing of the Aid-Growth Relationship 
GDP as inflation rates for countries in this region were abnormally high. This 
result should also be considered carefully because there might be a case for 
financial repression, as we pointed out earlier in the case of Argentina (World 
Bank, 1990, pp. 101), where the government, for instance, needs resources to 
finance its deficit in order to support macroeconomic stability. 
Table 7.14: Generalised Least Squares Regression for Latin American and 
Caribbean region. 
Number of observations: 74 ; Parameters: 13 Degrees of Freedom : 61 
Residual Sum of Squares: 261.06 
GLS R2 = 0.598965 ; OLS R2=0.61077 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-ratio Probability 
Value 
FAIDOECD 0.21840 0.12046 1.813* 0.070 
FAIDOECDSQ 
-0.002453 0.00127 -1.927* 0.054 
PRIV 0.37362 0.10402 3.592*** 0.000 
SAV 
-0.010875 0.04808 -0.226 0.821 
OTHERIFS 
-0.00933 0.00962 0.970 0.334 
ZTOT1 0.11359 0.04705 2.414** 0.016 
MONEY 
-0.01454 0.02641 -1.718* 0.086 
BSUR 0.08568 0.04669 1.835* 0.067 
INFSTD 
-0.12619 0.00037 -3.374*** 0.001 
PER2 
-0.7006 0.61405 -1.141 0.254 
PER3 
-2.2750 0.69196 -3.288*** 0.001 
PER4 
-1.3731 0.67206 -2.043 ** 0.021 
Constant 5.3826 1.3276 4.052*** 0.000 
Note: Details as in Table 7.10. 
The variables accounting for macroeconomic performance are in line with our 
discussion and expectations. Among the time dummies, celenis pcn"ihus, period 
three (PER3) which accounts for the debt crisis phase generates a lower growth 
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than other periods (the constant in this regression the is growth rate for period 
one (1970-1975)). 
In the case of Sub-Saharan African region, the results are given in Table 15. 
Immediately one can notice a lower coefficient (0.19652) than in the Latin 
American and Caribbean case. The coefficient is marginally significant at the 
10% level, while its square is not. 
Table 7.15: Generalised 
African region. 
r S R S Sub- 
Number of observations: 90 ; Parameters: 13 Degrees of Freedom : 77 
Residual Sum of Squares: 756.04 
GLS R2 
= 
0.337226 ; OLS R2=0.37536 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-ratio Probability 
Value 
FAIDOECD 0.19652 0.12286 1.600 0.109 
FAIDOECDSQ 
-0.002352 0.00265 -0.887 0.375 
PRIV 0.32432 0.11299 2.870*** 0.004 
SAV 0.04372 0.04015 1.089 0.276 
OTHERIFS 0.00302 0.01038 0.291 0.771 
ZTOTI 0.09460 0.04763 1.986** 0.047 
MONEY 0.02273 0.03251 0.699 0.484 
BSUR 
-0.03693 0.06020 -0.613 
0.539 
INFSTD 
-0.00359 0.00192 -1.872* 
0.061 
PER2 
-2.0316 0.79015 -2.571*** 0.010 
PER3 
-2.6074 0.85664 -3.044*** 0.002 
PER4 
-2.6458 1.006 -2.644*** 
0.008 
Constant 1.8498 1.44376 1.287 0.198 
Note: Details as in Table 7.10. 
To see whether these two regions' coefficients are all the same, a Chow test 
was performed based on the residuals sum of squares. The test indicated that 
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we could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same at the 
10% level (the F-value being 0.67 with degrees of freedom 13 and 138). Hence, 
statistically, we can argue that foreign aid effectiveness is the same in both 
regions. The pooled panel result is given in Appendix 7.3 in Table 7.15A. 
Just like we tested aid effectiveness for different country groupings in the 
cross-section analysis, a similar investigation is carried out using panel data. 
The results are presented in Table 7.16 using the generalised least squares 
estimation technique. The interesting result is that it reinforces the finding from 
cross-sectional analysis that foreign aid is more effective in middle income 
countries than in the low income country group. Not only that, from the table 
we can observe that high aid inflows (foreign aid above the median value) have 
a positive impact on growth. These results could lead us to suggest that for 
foreign aid to be effective it should be above a certain threshold level and that 
the recipient country also should be above a certain minimum level of 
economic development. Does it mean that low income countries should not 
receive aid? Certainly not. Aid should still be given, for instance, to alleviate 
poverty which impedes economic development. Our arguments about aid's 
effectiveness are based on its contribution to growth, not necessarily capturing 
all the facets of economic development so that we cannot judge in fairness. 
More work in relation to aid's contribution to economic development should be 
carried out. 
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Table 7.16: GLS Panel Regressions for different groupings 
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth rate 
Independent Low Middle Low High 
Variables Income Income Foreign Aid Foreign Aid 
Countries Countries Receivers Receivers 
Constant 3.6378 2.7549 3.7198 1.9874 
(0.000)*** (0.012)** (0.001)*** (0.065)* 
FAIDOECD 
-0.091347 0.23091 0.0079192 0.17863 (0.301) (0.010)*** (0.984) (0.010)*** 
FAIDOECDSQ 0.002104 
-0.002579 0.01124 -0.002032 (0.279) (0.008)*** (0.836) (0.017)** 
PRIV 0.21327 0.35506 0.57814 0.18834 
(0.084)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.032)** 
SAV 0.01502 0.06058 0.014711 0.062001 
(0.705) (0.070)* (0.669) (0.106) 
OTHERIFS 
-0.002812 0.011125 0.004545 0.004595 (0.730) (0.358) (0.569) (0.682) 
ZTOTI 0.12380 0.042935 0.058588 0.10581 
(0.010)*** (0.192) (0.052)* (0.016)** 
MONEY 0.018523 0.016365 0.008576 0.02294 
(0.347) (0.330) (0.569) (0.319) 
BSUR 
-0.01357 -0.005932 -0.00337 0.040544 (0.802) (0.894) (0.930) (0.464) 
INFSTD 
-0.004217 
-0.000999 -0.002685 -0.000629 (0.005)*** (0.035)** (0.000)*** (0.316) 
PER2 
-0.2554 -1.5960 -1.3419 -1.004 (0.678) (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.124) 
PER3 
-0.68078 -3.2669 -2.3541 -2.2957 (0.309) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
PER4 
-0.16311 -2.0514 -0.97803 -2.3379 (0.836) (0.001)*** (0.070)* (0.006)*** 
GLS R 0.263888 0.371122 0.35566 0.296242 
OLS R 0.28441 0.40089 0.40676 0.3181 10 
RSS 417.46 1084.97 849.36 761.47 
N 98 140 125 113 
Note: Details as in "fahle 7.10. 
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7_. 5 Conclusion of Foreign Aid fectiveness on Growth 
The econometric approach adopted to test the effectiveness of foreign aid on 
growth has led to new results either when using cross-section or panel data 
methods: Foreign aid contribution on growth is positive. Tables 7.17 and 7.18 
summarise the results of the impact and effectiveness of foreign aid on growth 
using both approaches respectively. 
Some of the reasons for obtaining significant and positive effects of foreign aid 
on growth have been outlined in the cross-section part such as sample 
composition, size, gestation lags, etc.. To support our conclusion that foreign 
aid is found to be effective when we include the trade liberalisation period 
(1987-93), we have run a panel regression for the pre-trade liberalisation phase 
(i. e. t=1,2 and 3). We found no relationship between foreign aid and growth, 
as with other studies. Hence it is quite reasonable to speculate that foreign aid 
effectiveness has begun to be observed mainly because of its gestation time 
periods, the nature of investment projects and the external environment which 
play a vital part in determining aid effectiveness. 
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APPENDIX 7.2 
Table 7.4A: Cross Section Regressions (OLS): Alternative measures of 
openness (N=58) Dependent Variable: Average GDP Growth 1970-93 
Column Column Column 
Independent Variables 2A 2B 2C 
Constant 1.6025 2.5638 2.9149 
(0.182) (0.016)** (0.006)*** 
FAIDOECD 0.20484 0.21122 0.17176 
(0.063)* (0.062)* (0.137) 
FAIDOECDSQ 
-0.004129 
-0.004657 -0.00251 (0.231) (0.192) (0.544) 
PRIV 
-0.19063 
-0.23041 -0.10310 (0.155) (0.076)* (0.466) 
SAV 0.1360 0.12636 0.12845 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
OTHERIFS 0.01618 0.01798 0.02046 
(0.057)* (0.037)**` (0.176) 
TTAX 0.05551 
- - (0.147) 
LNBMP 
- -0.66334 - (0.256) 
OPEN1 
- - -0.04097 (0.053)* 
MONEY 0.039607 0.037006 0.039328 
(0.007)*** (0.013)** (0.020)''`* 
BSUR 0.3117 0.30941 0.27461 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
INFSTD 
-0.000959 -0.0009286 -0.001368 
(0.015)** (0.024)** (0.031)*''' 
DtJM3 
-1.1074 -1.1948 -1.2784 (0.066)* (0.039)** (0.025)** 
DUM6 
-1.3830 -1.2922 -1.2193 (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.037)** 
R 0.61405 0.61155 0.63712 
Adj. R 0.52175 0.51866 0.55035 
F 6.65*** 6.58*** 7.34*** 
RSS 94.82 95.44 89.15 
Breusch-Pagan x 18.53* 17.75* 12.89 
Jarque-Bera statistic 2.73 3.50 2.44 
Note: Details as in Table 7.4. Pro bability values in brackets. 
TTAX is total international trade taxes divided by total trade. 
LNBMP is the defined as ln(I+BMP) where BMP is the black market 
exchange rate premium. The data is from Barro and Lee (1994). 
OPEN I is average of export and import as a proportion of (; I)P. 
236 
Ckanter Seven 
mnir/ýý/ Tec inpýof the Aid Growl/r Relations/, /p 
Table 7.4B" Cross Section Regressions 
, 
S)" Alternative measures of 
r 
0 enn N=58). DeneledentV u p GDp am I 1970-93 
Equation I Equation I Equation 
Independent Variables 2D 2E 2F 
Constant 2.3514 1,6937 2.3535 
(0.021)** 1 (0.145) (0.0261) 
FAID 1 0.20988 0.21794 0.20158 
(0.055)* 1 (0.066)* 1 (0.092)* 
FAIDOECDSQ ] 
-0.004396 -0.005089 -0.004259 (0.224) 1 (0.225) 1 (0-3319) 
PRIV 1 
-0.18684 -0.21919 1 -0.1987 (0.200) 1 (0.113) 1 (0.154) 
TGG 1-10.06030 
(0.222) 
MONEY 1 0.038898 1 0.037185 1 0.03781 
(0.011)** 1 (0.032)** 1 (0.032)** 
BSUR 1 0.31587 1 0.2948 1 0.31884 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** 1 (0.000)*** 1 
INFSTD 1 
-0.001026 1 -0.0008898 1 -0.000994 (0.012)** 1 (0.145) 1 ((). 110) DUM 3) 1 
-1.2100 1 -1.2174 -1.2446 (0.049)** 1 (0.036)** 1 (0.035)** 
DUM6 1 
-1.3210 1 
-1.3561 1 -1.3591 (0.008)*** 1 (0.023)** t_(0.025)** 
R' 1 0.60656 0.61880 0.60639 
Ad_j. R 0.51248 0.52764 0.51227 
F 6.45*** 6.79*** 8.4414** 
RSS 96.66 93.66 96.70 
Breusch-Pagan X1 18.47* 14.22 16.46 
. 
larque-Bera statistic 3.09 1.09 3.90 
Note: Details as in Table 7.4. Probability values in brackets 
OPEN2 is the openness measure as defined in the Penn World 'f'able Mark 5.5. 
TGG is the rate of growth of total trade as a percentage of GDP. 
ZTOT1 is the log difference of the change in the terms of trade. 
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APPENDIX 7.3 
Table 7.15A: Generalised Least Squares Regression Pooling, Latin 
American and Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African countrieti 
Number of observations: 164 ; Parameters: 13 Degrees of Freedom : 151 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1080.88 
GLS R2 
= 0.39763 OLS R2=0.40433 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-ratio Probability 
Value 
FAIDOECD 0.13567 0.05215 2.602*** 0.009 
FAIDOECDSQ 
-0.00162 0.00068 -2.397** 0.017 
PRIV 0.36351 0.08256 4.403*** 0.000 
SAV 0.032753 0.02914 1.124 0.261 
OTHERIFS 0.004947 0.00785 0.630 0.529 
ZTOT1 0.088159 0.03636 2.425** 0.015 
MONEY 0.009099 0.02054 0.443 0.658 
BSUR 0.04445 0.0408 1.089 0.276 
INFSTD 
-0.001243 0.00492 -2.526** 0.012 
PER2 
-1.5318 0.56993 -2.688*** 0.007 
PER3 
-2.6479 0.61205 -4.326*** 0.000 
PER4 
-2.1180 0.65555 -3.231 *** 0.001 
Constant 3.045 0.86773 3.509*** 0.000 
Note: Details as in Table 7.10 
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FOREIGN AID, DOMESTIC SA VING AND INVESTMENT 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, from the growth model of Harrod-Domar through the 
Solow-Swan neo-classical to the endogenous growth models capital 
accumulation was the major theme. In fact the 1990s have seen a renewed 
interest in issues of capital accumulation and growth. The association between 
gross domestic investment ratios and long-term growth performance is well 
established. Levine and Renelt (1992) find that the ratio of physical investment 
to GDP is the only robust regressor in their sensitivity analysis. Although 
empirical literature supports the view that investment may not be the sole 
engine of growth, it continues to place capital accumulation at the centre of the 
growth process (see Schmidt-Hebbel et al. (1996) Ibr a review of' studies). 
Physical investment is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
growth. Emphasis are also laid upon human capital investment, technological 
innovation, and appropriate policies for sustained high growth. 
Thus from a theoretical and empirical point of view investment is necessary to 
economic growth and from this it follows, in a passive sense, that saving is 
necessary to growth, because investment has to be matched by saving. Many 
studies have found strong positive correlation for example, Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980), Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991), Dooley el al. (1987) and 
Summers (1988). Across the regions, Figures 8.1 and 8.2 depict the correlation 
between domestic saving and investment as a percentage of GDP. When we 
compared domestic savings rate and the growth performance in Chapter 4 (see 
But as Lewis (1955) argued it "remains open to ask whether the process of investment will 
not automatically create all the saving that is required, so that we need not worry about the 
level of savings, and can concentrate on investment". 
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also the figures in Appendix 4.1), there seem to he an apparent implication for 
a policy to raise domestic saving to be a high priority to enhance growth (for 
instance take the case of the East Asia and the Pacific region). Schmidt-llebbel 
el al. Argue that "ensuring adequate levels of saving remains a central policy 
concern......... to guarantee sufficient financing for capital accumulation". 
Figure 8.1: Gross Domestic Savings as a Percentage of GDP. 
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2. Gross Domestic Investment as a Percentage of GDP. 
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Since Griffin (1970) there has been a continuing debate about whether tbreign 
capital inflows, foreign aid in particular, crowd out domestic savings, and on 
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the way foreign aid is spent on consumption and investment. 't'his chapter 
elaborates on the relationship between foreign aid and savings and provides 
some evidence on the aid-investment relationship. Section 8.2 reviews Griffin's 
argument on foreign aid and domestic savings. In section 8.3 we review some 
of the existing empirical literature and provide some criticisms. Due to the 
problems entailed in the measurement of domestic savings we approach the 
issue of fungibility and implicitly test the aid-savings relationship using 
consumption theory. In this context, in section 8.4 we outline and extend the 
life-cycle/permanent income model for empirical estimation using panel data 
on the sample of developing countries identified earlier. The empirical results 
are also provided in the same section. Section 8.5 investigates into the aid- 
investment nexus built on a simple accelerator model. We specify and test the 
model to assess the effectiveness of foreign aid on investment. Section 8.6 
provides some concluding remarks. 
8 
.2 Griffin's Debate on Foreign Aid and Domestic Savings 
Griffin (1970) criticised the critical assumptions on which the two-gap model is 
based, arguing that in the long run `no country is so rigid that it can produce 
neither capital goods, nor exports nor import substitutes....... it is the 
unwillingness to reduce domestic consumption 
...... 
which is the source of the 
difficulty'. In this sense only savings is seen as the binding constraint on 
investment, not foreign exchange. He further argued that capital inflows will 
lead to an increase in current consumption (hence reducing domestic savings). 
His argument is that a recipient country will treat an anticipated aid inflow as 
an increase in income and, unless the marginal propensity to consume is zero, 
the resources will he allocated between both savings and consumption. Since 
the publication of Griffin's article many authors have expressed concerns about 
the way Griffin outlined his argument. Some of the critiques are summarised in 
Riddell (1987) and White (1992a). We review some of the main arguments 
here. 
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Kennedy and Thirwall (1971), Eshag (1971) and Stewart (1971) have all 
dismissed Griffin's argument that only savings is "the" binding constraint on 
growth as in the long run extra foreign exchange can he obtained by 
substitution of domestic production. Kennedy and Thirwall argue that 
substitution would incur costs in terms of lost output, and that the provision of 
foreign exchange through aid flows would increase output by utilising 
redundant domestic resources, hence, generating an increase in domestic 
savings without the need for thrift. Moreover, Eshag questions just how mobile 
resources are, alleging that developed countries such as the United Kingdom, 
France and Belgium did not attain adequate flexibility and mobility of 
resources to free themselves from the foreign exchange constraint to 
investment after a century and a half of industrialisation and diversification of 
economic activity. 
Colman and Nixson (1978,1994) stated that the relationship between domestic 
savings and foreign aid which Griffin derived is misleading. This is because he 
models consumption as being a function of income plus aid, with savings being 
a function of income alone. Once this is corrected a positive relationship 
emerges. But as White (1992a) argues both Griffin and Colman and Nixson's 
conclusions could be correct depending on whether a distinction is made 
between domestic and foreign savings (pp. 177-8). 
Moreover, Newlyn (1973) further criticised Griffin's representation for the 
absence of an economic model since only an accounting identity is being used. 
Criticisms of the model were numerous, for instance, the model does not allow 
any feedback effects where aid may increase income by more than the value of 
the inflow. In such a case there would be a positive feedback effect on domestic 
savings. Such an effect was formulated by Tendulkar (1975) where aid has the 
possibility of leading to higher levels of domestic savings through higher 
income. That is in Griffin's analysis the aid multiplier is one when elementary 
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textbooks tell us that at least under certain conditions, for e. g. underdeveloped 
resources, this is certainly not the case. In such a case the budget constraint will 
shift out not by the amount of the aid inflow but by the amount times the 
multiplier value. A high multiplier can increase the current savings level so that 
the relationship between aid and savings in the current period is positive. 
Grinols and Bhagwati (1976), on the other hand, argued that in a dynamic 
context increased growth will exert a positive impact on savings although in 
their analysis they incorporated a negative relationship between aid and 
savings. Their simulation exercise suggests that on average it would take 40 
years for developing countries' domestic savings to catch up with what they 
would have been in the absence of aid. 
White (1992a) picked on an important issue which Griffin overlooked: tied aid. 
White showed theoretically a case where it is possible that all aid is tied to 
investment so that the country is forced to save a higher proportion of income 
than its marginal propensity to save. He also suggested that "aid will he less 
than perfectly fungible where (i) the ratio of aid to income is high, and (ii) 
where the share of savings (without aid) in national income is low" (pp. 180). 
Kennedy and Thirwall pointed out that by using a social welfare function for an 
optimising economy as used by Griffin for which present and future 
consumption are normal goods, any increase in income will he divided partly 
between current and future consumption. On this assumption domestic savings 
will fall because of the way it is defined. This shows nothing beyond the effects 
of relaxing a domestic savings constraint as would be the case for foreign aid. 
Theoretically though total savings can increase by the full amount of the 
inflow, but they do not because the social planner is maximising social welfare. 
If all of an aid inflow is saved the economy would end up on a lower 
indifference curve. In such a case Stewart stated that the decline in domestic 
savings is not a reflection of the fecklessness of the people and their 
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government but of their wisdom in heading straight for the highest possible 
social welfare' (pp. 143). Most of the authors criticised Griffin for relying too 
much upon the Harrod-Domar model of growth, which implies that only 
investment is beneficial to growth. Griffin ignores the view that some 
expenditure classified as consumption may have a high positive return or that 
some aid is typically designed to go to consumption, for example, food aid, 
health and emergency aid. 
From the empirical point of view not only Griffin but other authors who have 
been testing the aid-savings relationship have received a lot of criticisms in 
terms of sample, data measurement, model specification and estimation 
techniques. The next section summarises some of the empirical findings along 
with some critiques. 
U Empirical Findings and Criticisms. 
Griffin's evidence is based on a simple cross-country bivariate linear regression 
between domestic savings and capital flows. Using a sample of 32 countries he 
found a negative relationship between the two variables. Similar tests were 
performed by Weisskopf (1972a, b) and Voivodas (1973). While the former 
concurred with Griffin's findings, the latter reported a positive relationship 
using time series for the South Korean case. Various defects were subsequently 
brought out. First, the current account deficit was used as a measure of capital 
inflows to derive conclusions for foreign aid. Further, as Papanek (1972,1973) 
and Over (1975) pointed out the authors conflated foreign aid with other 
foreign resource inflows. It should be noted, however, that foreign aid, the 
current account deficit and foreign capital inflows are not synonymous. Hence 
it would he preferable to concentrate on studies which distinguish among these 
flows. Second, many still ignore the data problems arising from using savings 
as an independent variable when it is often calculated as a residual. Mikesell 
and Zinser (1973) further argued that since gross domestic savings are based on 
244 
Chapter EiLh PreJPl1 on '(/V(IiS. S and /, cn I 
the ex post gross domestic saving rates as calculated from the national income, 
any regression analysis based on such an ex post accounting relationship 
between savings and capital inflows will show a negative correlation. Third, 
Stewart (1971) was among the first to point out that regression results should 
be taken with care as correlation does not necessarily mean causality. Dacy 
(1975) also argued that the issue of causality is most difficult to resolve 
especially if foreign aid is allocated on the basis of need, "then cross-country 
regressions of domestic savings on aid would produce a negative coefficient as 
long as growth and domestic savings are positively correlated" (pp. 549). 
Consequently we should not interpret the relationship to imply that foreign aid 
caused low domestic savings. Dacy also suggested that one needs to 
distinguish between the short-term and long-term impact of aid on recipient 
countries. In his simulation exercise he found that if aid does lead to an 
increase in consumption but does not fall back to its original level when aid is 
withdrawn, then the overall effect of aid will be to lead to an increase in 
domestic savings. 
In a cross sectional analysis of 50 LDCs, Gupta (1970) found no significant 
relation between the savings rate and capital imports, and (iulati (1978) found 
that there is a lack of evidence on the supposedly adverse effect of capital 
transfers to LDCs on their savings and growth of incomes. Although Papanek 
(1973) found a positive relationship between aid and growth. a strong negative 
correlation between savings and aid was obtained, but he argued that it is more 
likely to be due to exogenous factors affecting both rather than a causal 
relationship. The model estimated was in the following form: 
Savings Rate 
=a+ (31Aid/GDP + ß2Private Investment/GDP + [[Other 
Inflows/GDP + ß4Primary Exports/GDP + I34Other Exports/GDP +c 
It should, however, be noted that in this regression domestic savings is treated 
as a dependent variable while in his growth equation savings was one of the 
independent variables. The estimated parameters will hence be inconsistent and 
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feedback effect and relationship. 
An important result emanates from Gupta and Islam (1983) comparison of 
single versus simultaneous regression models. When they used a single 
equation regression for a sample of 52 countries for the time period 1970, 
although foreign aid appeared to have no statistical effect on domestic savings, 
the negative coefficient of foreign aid was statistically significant at the 10% 
level in their so-called `general model' which they defined as being a model to 
include variables other than capital flows (Table IV. 2, pp. 44). The model was 
defined as: 
Domestic Savings Rate 
=a+ ßjAid/GNP + ß, Foreign Private 
Investment/GNP + ß30ther Inflows/GNP + NReal per capita income + 
ß; Dependency Rate + ß6Growth of GNP +c 
They also divided their sample into first, income groups: Group I (up to $124), 
Group II ($125 to $249) and Group III ($250 to $675), second, into 
geographical groups: Asia, Africa and Latin America. For the income group 
decomposition, foreign aid had a positive impact on the savings ratio for Group 
II but was negative for Group III (Table IV. 8, pp. 51). For the geographical 
regions, it was significant only for the Asian countries, but negative. When 
they used a simultaneous equation model consisting of nine equations, the 
2SLS estimates of foreign aid was not statistically different from zero for the 
whole sample at the 10% level. When splitting the sample according to income 
and geographical groups they reported only the OLS estimates because they 
argued that the "2SLS estimates for the two groupings were invariably had on 
the basis of usual statistical criteria". Not surprisingly, therefore. the same 
result were obtained for both groupings as when using single equations. The 
conclusion which is emerging from Gupta and Islam's findings is that foreign 
aid displaces domestic savings only for high income and Asian countries. 
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a savings, equation. The former was derived from the traditional export- 
augmented neo-classical production function of the one proposed by Feder 
(1982), while the latter was the traditional Keynesian-type augmented by 
exports, per capita income and the growth rate variables. They were as follows: 
Growth Rate 
= a, + ß, Aid/GDP + ß2Foreign Private Jnvestment/GDP + 
ß3Savings/GDP + Whange in Export/GDP + 3SChange in labour force +e 
Savings/GDP 
= a2 +X 1Aid/GDP + X, 2Foreign Private Investment/GDP + 
X3Change in Export/GDP + a, 4GDP per capita +X Growth of GDP +v 
The period of his study was 1965-82 using pooled data for the Asian countries. 
Using indirect least squares he found that studies considering only the direct 
effect of foreign capital (foreign aid and foreign private investment) in general, 
tended to overestimate the favourable effect of foreign capital on growth and 
exaggerate the adverse effects on domestic savings. When Rana disaggregated 
the sample by income levels, a rather unexpected outcome emerged. It was 
found that private foreign investment has contributed more than foreign aid to 
growth in the low income group while it is the other way round for the middle 
income countries. The results should, however, be interpreted with caution 
because a test performed by Ravallion and Sen (1986) for the period 1965-80 
for 6 Asian countries suggested that the data should not be pooled. In fact they 
argued that there is considerable variation among the countries especially in the 
importance of their traditional agricultural sectors and that local capital is not 
very mobile. These generate high error variance from the residuals of the 
pooled data and many empirical studies have not corrected for this error 
structure. 
Since then there have hardly been any studies using simultaneous equation 
models. Most of them still use single equation to test the aid-savings 
relationship. Although recent attention has turned to study government fiscal 
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behaviour (for example, Mosley et al. (1987)), as it is the government who 
receives the funds and decides how to allocate them, the savings debate still 
remains important. Gupta (1987) found positive coefficients on foreign 
savings that are significant for Latin America, although not for Asia. Sobhan 
and Islam (1988) found that in the short run overall aid has a negative effect on 
internal resource mobilisation in Bangladesh. Morisset (1989) re-examined the 
relationship between foreign capital inflows and domestic savings in the case 
of Argentina for the period 1960-81 and found that the estimated coefficient of 
foreign aid was not significant and that foreign capital inflows did not crowd 
out domestic savings by allowing domestic residents to consume more. Also 
Nord and others (1993) focused on a subset of more successful adjustment 
programs countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and concluded that large increases in 
foreign aid did not appear to have led to a decline in domestic savings rates. 
The World Bank (1994) found that high program adjusters during 1987-91 
although part of foreign savings financed consumption, domestic savings rates 
improved during the period. 
White (1992b) re-examined Griffin's model and showed that the negative 
impact of aid on savings is much less than he claimed. He highlighted also that 
the model used has nothing to say about the behavioural determinants of 
savings but collapses to an identity. He further argued that empirical work 
should be based on better-formulated macroeconomic models, which probably 
require simultaneous estimation and that it would be preferable that studies are 
carried out at the country level rather than employing cross-country data. 
Mosley and Hudson (1995) carried out some single country regressions using 
time series to test the impact of foreign aid on growth and domestic savings. 
They found that out of 14 countries, when the following model was estimated 
the period 1963-90: 
Savings Rate 
=a+ (3, Aid/GNP, 
_s 
+ (32Other Financial lnllows/GNP, 
_s 
+ 
f ; Growth of literacy + ß4lnflation Rate + v,. 
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only in 2 cases was foreign aid negative and significant while being positive 
and significantly different from zero in 3 cases. When they substituted the real 
exchange rate for the inflation rate only in one case was it negative and 
different form zero, while being positive and significant in 4 countries. 
Hajimichael ei al. (1995) performed a savings regression using some 
macroeconomic indicators for 39 Sub-Saharan African countries. "Their model 
being: 
Savings Rate 
= a; + at + (31Aid/GDP , t_, + (32[Aid/GDP]2 ß1_1 + 113(irowth ; t_, 
+ ß4Real GDP per capita 
, t_, + f3 [Government Investment/GDP] 1t_, + (36 
Inflation Rate ;, 
_, 
+ (37[Budget Deficit/GDP] ; t_, + 18[Broad Money/GDP] ; t_, + 
ß9Change in terms of trade + ß1f1[External Debt/Exports] ;, 
_, 
+ [3[External 
Debt/Exports]21t_] + ß12Dependency Ratio + (313Dummy Variable for 
Sustained Adjusters + (314Dummy Variable for countries with protracted 
imbalances + [315Dummy Variable for CFA zone + slt. 
The pooled data estimated coefficient of foreign aid on domestic savings was 
negative. However they found that the negative impact is concentrated in those 
countries with protracted imbalances and negative per capita growth, whereas 
for the group of sustained adjusters, foreign aid appeared to have stimulated 
domestic savings. Another recent study by Boone (1994) using panel data 
based on 97 developing countries found that the marginal propensity to 
consume from aid is insignificantly different from one, and the marginal 
propensity to invest is insignificantly different from zero. Ile concluded that 
"virtually all aid goes to consumption". The problems in Boone's regression 
are that first he incorporated too many dummy variables which makes 
interpretation difficult, second there is simultaneity bias as growth is 
sometimes being treated as an endogenous as well as an exogenous variable in 
separate regressions. Also there is no reason being given as to why the sample 
is split into different time periods. His sample also suffers from many outliers, 
for example small countries and very high aid receivers. 
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The conclusions that can be drawn from the empirical literature review are that 
empirical estimates of the effects on domestic savings of loreign aid vary 
widely with the sample, period of study, model specifications and model 
estimation techniques. In the next section we attempt, first, to use consumption 
theory to assess the impact of foreign aid and second, to estimate it using panel 
data. 
8.4 Foreign Aid and Consumesion " An implication 
saves 
8.4.1 The Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis 
or domesti 
One important deduction that can be made from the empirical literature review 
of foreign aid's impact on domestic savings is the need to build a framework to 
enable an assessment of any linkage between aid and savings, either implicitly 
or explicitly, before performing any regression using those variables. Previous 
studies have regressed the savings rate on foreign aid and other capital inflows 
along with a series of variables which are thought to affect savings decisions. 
We intend to use some theoretical foundations to obtain a convincing argument 
about the impact of foreign aid on domestic savings. Early critics on aid's 
impact on savings (e. g. Griffin, 1970 and Griffin and Enos, 1970) have argued 
that aid flows will lead to an increase in consumption rather than investment. 
We start here from analysing how consumers will react to such inflows under 
certain assumptions. 
Since decisions to consume affect decisions to save, an understanding of the 
theory of consumer behaviour can throw some light on the relationship 
between foreign aid and domestic savings. It becomes important to know how 
aid receiving countries treat foreign aid, whether they conceive it as an increase 
in current income (for consumption purposes) or as a supplement to domestic 
savings (for investment purposes). If they regard foreign aid as an increase in 
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income the question which arises is whether they treat this increment as 
transitory or permanent. 
Traditionally, aggregate consumption function has been a key element of 
macro-models, as in for example the Keynesian absolute income hypothesis 
(Keynes, 1936). However, a number of problems associated with theoretical 
and empirical inadequacies of Keynes' model led economists to develop new 
hypotheses about consumer behaviour. Without doubt, the most influential of 
these, which have revolutionised consumption theory at the theoretical and 
empirical front have been the combination of the life-cycle and permanent 
income hypotheses. The life-cycle hypothesis of Modigliani and 13rumberg 
(1954) states that real consumption expenditure depends on the total wealth of 
the consumer during the entire lifespan. Underlying the life-cycle hypothesis is 
the concept of intertemporal utility maximisation: economic agents attempt to 
smooth consumption over time, saving in their prime working years and 
dissaving during their retirement. With the permanent income hypothesis, 
Friedman (1957) postulates that current consumption is a fraction of 
permanent, and not current, income. Under both hypotheses the consumer 
might be expected to maintain a more or less constant, or perhaps slightly 
increasing level of consumption. The Life-Cycle/Permanent Income (LC/PI) 
hypothesis predicts that risk averse consumers will use the capital market to 
absorb transitory income changes, accumulating assets in booms and dissaving 
in slumps, in order to smooth life-time consumption (Olekalns, 1997). The use 
of the capital market (e. g. access to foreign aid and other types of capital flows 
in our context) to smooth consumption means that the current period's level of 
expenditure varies only in response to permanent changes in expected lifetime 
wealth. Hence if consumption depends on Life-Cycle/Permanent Income the 
marginal propensity to consume out of current income should be negligible. 
Under this model, demand management policies will shill consumption only if' 
people believe that there has been a change to their total lifetime earnings. 
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The Life-Cycle/Permanent Income model gained much emphasis since the 
seminal work of Hall (1978). It is hypothesised that `consumers form estimates 
of their ability to consume in the long run and then set current consumption to 
the appropriate fraction of that estimate' (Hall, 1978, pp. 971). Obtaining 
information about the `estimate' has been unclear in empirical research, often a 
form of fixed distributed lag has been used, which has effectively been 
criticised by Lucas (1976) and also the `estimated distributed lag is usually 
puzzingly short' (Hall, 1978). To resolve such problems Hall incorporated 
rational expectations into the permanent income framework such that when 
consumers maximise expected future utility,... the conditional expectation of 
future marginal utility is a function of today's level of consumption alone-all 
other information is irrelevant' (pp. 972). In other words, future consumption 
growth should be orthogonal to variables in the consumer's current information 
set. In particular, consumption should not respond to predictable movements in 
income (Shea, 1995). Hence, consumption expenditure can be modelled to 
follow a random walk with drift where the current period's level of 
consumption differs from the previous period's level only by a random error 
term. This can be written more formally as2: 
C1=a+OCt-, +E, (8.1) 
where C, is consumption expenditure in period t, a is a constant term and 0= 
(1 + p)/(1 + r) =I if p, the subjective rate of time preference, and r, the real 
return on assets, are equal. E, is the error tern which is independently 
distributed3. Under the LC/PI hypothesis only consumption lagged one period 
should have a nonzero coefficient. This is because C', 
_1 embodies all 
information relating to permanent income that is known up until period t-1. 
Hence expected income in period t, conditional on the information set known 
in period t-1 should enter with a zero coefficient if added to the right hand side 
2 For some recent developments in the LC/P1 modelling see Campbell and 1. )eaton (1989), 
Carroll (1994), Chyi and Huang (1997), Craigwell and Rock (1995), Patterson (1995), Shea 
(1995) and Zeldes (1989) among others. 
For an exposition of Hall's result using intertemporal optimising model sce Muelbauer 
(1983) and Branson (1989). 
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of the equation. The model can be rewritten following Campbell and Mankiw 
(1990) as: 
AC, =a+2. SY`, +E, (8.2) 
where A is the first differencing operator and Y`, is the expected level of 
income in period t conditional on information known in period t-1. ']'his model 
can be estimated and under the Life-Cycle/Permanent income hypothesis, A, = 0. 
It is worth quoting Hall's implication for macroeconomic forecasting and 
policy analysis under the LC/PI hypothesis: 
"If every deviation of consumption from its trend is unexpected and 
permanent, then the best forecast of future consumption is just today's level 
adjusted for trend. Forecasts of future changes in income are irrelevant, since 
the information used in preparing them is already incorporated in today's 
consumption. In a forecasting model, consumption should be treated as an 
exogenous variable. For policy analysis, the pure lilt cycle-permanent 
income hypothesis supports the modern view that only unexpected changes 
in policy affect consumption-everything known about future changes in 
policy is already incorporated in present consumption. Further, unexpected 
changes in policy affect consumption only to the extent that they affect 
permanent income, and then their effects are expected to be permanent. 
Policies that have transitory effect on income are incapable of having a 
transitory effect on consumption. " (pp. 973). 
Empirically, many studies have consistently found evidence against the Life- 
Cycle/Permanent Income hypothesis. In particular Flavin (1981) and Campbell 
and Mankiw (1990) found that the U. S. aggregate consumption tends to react 
to changes in the predictable component of aggregate income. In other words 
consumption is excessively sensitive to current income. Campbell and Mankiw 
(1990) found that a predictable one percent income increase leads to a 
statistically significant consumption increase of between 0.351 percent and 
0.713 percent. 
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There are many factors that could explain the failure of the LC/Pl hypothesis. 
For instance, Zeldes (1989) attributes such failure to the existence of liquidity 
constraints. In such a case individuals are denied credit and are unable to 
optimally smooth their consumption (Olekalns, 1997). Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989,1991) further model a case where some fraction of the aggregate income 
belongs to agents who follow the `rule of thump' of consuming their current 
income; the rest of aggregate income is accrued to those agents consuming 
according to their permanent income levels. The existence of' `rule of thumb' 
has been found by Jappelli and Pagano (1989) and Campbell and Mankiw 
(1991) reflecting the imperfection of consumer credit markets. The rationale is 
that a liquidity-constrained agent is often forced to consume his/her current 
income, especially when the desired current consumption level is greater that 
the current income level (Chyi and Huang, 1997). Another reason for rejection 
of the LC/PI hypothesis is due to myopia (Flavin, 1991). Olekalns (1997) 
describes individuals to be myopic if "they exhibit the traditional Keynesian 
response to income changes where the (non-zero) marginal propensity to 
consume is the same regardless of whether income is expected to increase or 
decrease". 
From the above description of the LC/PI hypothesis we can now use such a 
model to see the implications for foreign aid inflows. In particular, it will 
enable an explicit test of the impact of foreign aid on consumption, whether 
foreign aid is used to smooth consumption or saved for investment purposes. 
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8.4 
.2 Impactt oreign aid under the LC/PI hypothesis 
We start by assuming that there is a representative consumer in each country 
which maximises utility, subject to his/her budget constraint. Using the simple 
model proposed by Campbell and Mankiw (1990) where 
AC, =cc +a, AY`c+61 (8.2) 
we can now augment the income variable to include foreign capital inflows. 
This exercise has not until now been investigated using the LC/PI model. We 
redefine the expected level of income so that it includes not only domestic but 
also foreign sources of income such as foreign aid, private capital and other 
capital flows. In so doing we will be able to provide an explicit test of whether 
the representative individual consumes, in particular, current flows of foreign 
aid as proposed by aid critics. In this context the change in the expected level 
of income is redefined as: 
AYec = AYed I+ AYeli 
where AYed, is the change in expected level of domestic income and AY", is 
the change in the expected level of income from foreign sources. We also 
define AY`', to include the foreign income sources as: 
AY`', = AAe, + AP"t + AOCF`t. 
Where AA`,, AP`, and AOWt are the change in the expected levels of foreign 
aid, net private capital flows and other net capital flows respectively. 
Substituting AY"d, and the expression for AY°It in AY`, above, we get: 
AY, = Ayed, + AA`, + AP`, + A0CF°, 
Substituting the expression for AY`, in equation 8.2 and rewriting the 
consumption model for a panel data setting we get: 
AC;, =a+X, AY`dit + 7,, 2AA% + 7,, 3AP`j, +2 4AOCF`;, +r il (8.3) 
where i=1.... N representing the countries. Under the LC/PI hypothesis A, = X2 
= 
213 
= 
7,, 4 = 0. Also we can test 7vß =0 and see whether expected changes in 
foreign incomes follow the LC/PI hypothesis, that is, ý-, = 7v3 = ý'4 = 0. This can 
be done through an F-test. We can now proceed to test such a model. 
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8.4.3 Data and Empirical Results. 
lid. Dome Yim, S ü cl /nve mý 
Since data are available for all the variables over the period 1970 to 1992 f'or 
most of the 68 countries in the sample4, we have used annual series to run the 
panel model. Due to some missing observations we use an unbalanced panel 
data set. The data are from the World Bank CD-ROM version (1995) and the 
Penn World Table (Mark 5.5). For the econometric technique our preference 
rests with the random effects model which uses feasible generalised least 
squares and is also more efficient than the least squares dummy variable 
technique. We can reasonably assume that the developing countries in the 
sample share the same set of institutional factors and characteristics. In addition 
such a technique will enable us to take time and/or country heterogeneity into 
consideration. 
The model is re-specified so that the variables are expressed in per capita terms 
as: 
Oc=a+XjAy"j, +AX2aoit+kIOp`;, +X4Aocfit +Fi, (8.4) 
where the lower case c, y, a, p and ocf represent equivalent upper case terms. 
Before testing the above model we first need to find instruments for the 
expected level of domestic and foreign incomes. For the expected change in the 
level of domestic income, the common practice of most studies has been to use 
lagged values of income per capita as instruments'. Flavin (1981) used lagged 
detrended values while Mankiw and Shapiro (1985) showed that this leads to 
statistical problems. Given this, we use the lagged values and also some other 
instruments as suggested by Runkle (1991) and used by Shea (1995) (these will 
be discussed as we proceed). Concerning the other variables we use lagged 
values as instruments. Hence we test the following model when i;, 
_, 
is used as 
an instrument for expected change in domestic income: 
4A list of the countries can be found in Appendix I of Chapter 5. 5 See Campbell and Mankiw (1990) for some caveats associated with such use. 
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ýc; r =a+ ý'IYit-i + ý. zAa; t-i + ý13APit-l + ý144ucft-i + Eil 
s 
(8.5) 
To generate the feasible generalised least squares, the time variable (to 
compute the residual variance for period heterogeneity) is assigned a value of I 
to 4 to capture the main international events between the period 1972 to 1992 
as described previously. That is, the years 1972 to 1975 take a value of 1,1976 
to 1981 a value of 2 (the oil price shock period), 1982 to 1987 a value of 3 (the 
debt crisis period) and 1988 to 1992 a value of 4 (the trade liberalisation 
period). When we use the time series 1972 to 1992 (assigning a value of I to 
21) the results did not change. 
Column I of Table 8.1 displays the results when the lagged change in income 
per capita (Ayi1_, ) is used as an instrument the expected changes in domestic 
income. The F-test, F1, leads to the rejection of the LC/PI hypothesis6 that a= 
ý-i = 42 = ý3 = ý4 =0 also the individual t-test on Dy; i_i), but the F-test, F2, 
which tests HO: X2 = ý-3 = `4 =0 cannot be rejected and would suggest that 
expected changes in the level of foreign incomes do not affect permanent 
consumption decision, hence the LC/PI hypothesis cannot he rejected for this 
type of incomes. The result on the separate impact of domestic income is 
similar to the previously mentioned studies. In particular, consumption is found 
to be highly sensitive to current income. It seems that the representative agents 
reduce their per capita consumption level with increases in their current per 
capita domestic income level. When we compare the individual coefficients, 
ceteris paribus, we find that consumption is not sensitive to lbrcign aid flows 
which is contrary to the prediction of aid-sceptics (e. g. Griffin, 1970, Griffin 
and Enos, 1970, and Mosley, 1980) who argued that aid will be spent lavishly 
and used for consumption purposes. Concerning the other variables, they are 
not individually significant. 
`, Note that the F-test is based on the OLS R2 rather than the GLS R. The advantage of using 
the OLS R2 is that it is based on the original data. See Judge et al. (1985, pp. 31-32) for more 
details on this issue. 
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There have been many studies which have divided the time period 1972-92 into 
two decades: pre-1980 and post-1980 (e. g. Boone, 1994) to reflect the effects 
of the oil price shocks and stabilisation policies pursued in respective period. In 
column 2 we introduce a dummy variable, FACT, taking a value of I for the 
years 1981 to 1992 and zero otherwise. We also introduce some interaction 
terms to see whether the slope coefficients were different in the two time 
periods. To do so we multiply each explanatory variable by the dummy 
variable, FACT. We then run the following model: 
Ac;, =a+ý, iAYjc i+ý;; Dy8192;, 
-; 
+ ý, Zýa;, 
_; 
+ ýZ; Daý'I>2;, i+ ý-A, t_i + 
ý-31Ap8192;, 
-1 + 
ý, 4Aocf;, 
-1 + 
ý, 41Aocf81921t-1 + kSFACT + s;, (8.6) 
where y8192, a8192 
, 
p8192 and ocf8192 are the interaction terms. The 
parameters a, ii, %. 21, X31 and 241 represent the differential slope coefficients 
while X5 is the differential intercept between the two periods. Column 2 of 
Table 8.1 displays the parameter estimates of model 8.6. It can be seen from 
the F-test, F1, the LC/PI hypothesis is rejected while the value of F, suggests 
that the LC/PI hypothesis cannot be rejected for foreign incomes. We can 
derive for each period from column 2 as follows (Note: FACT =I for the 
second period): 
Pre-1980 Period : 
ý Ac;, = 6388700 
-352460***4y;, 
_, 
+ 2144500u;, 
_, 
1233.1 Aocf;, 
_, 
Posl-1980 Period: 
+ 393930*z\p; i_i + 
A c;, = 
-5972300 - 4400***Dy;, 
_i + 4146100a;, _i - 
17500*Op;, 
_i - 141 1.20ocf;, _i 
Although in both time periods consumption is sensitive to expected changes in 
domestic income, the impact is quite different. While in the first period the 
agents myopically consume any expected increase in their current income, in 
Note '***', '**' and '*' mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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the second period they reduce their per capita consumption level. The foreign 
variables are not significant in either period while, ceteris paribus, we find that 
an expected increase in net private flows in the period 1972-80 would lead to 
an increase in real consumption per capita but lead to a fall in real consumption 
per capita for the period 1981-92. This result is not surprising given that during 
the oil price shocks private loans were `cheap' and in abundance (see figure 1.1 
in Chapter 1). Most of these funds have contributed to increases in domestic 
consumption while when they started to dry up and real interest rates were 
rising in the latter period, consumption eventually fell. 
The consumption and domestic income variables in columns I and 2 were 
expressed in levels, while many studies have been using a log-linear approach 
which will also be followed here. Hence instead of using Ac;, (= c;, - c; t_t) we 
use slog c;, which is log c;, 
- 
log c; t-t. This transformation has also the 
advantage in that it reflects the growth rate of the variable. The same technique 
is applied on all the other variables in the model. Because in our data set the 
foreign income variables have some negative values as they are expressed in 
net terms, we had no option but to use changes in their lagged levels. The 
model is hence re-specified as: 
slog ci, =a+ Xis logy1j-1 + , ýkZsait-I + X3APit-i + ?. 4socf-i + pit (8.7) 
The parameter estimates of the above model are reported in column 3 of 'Fable 
8.1. Once again the LC/PI hypothesis is rejected based on the F-test, F,. In 
particularly, it can be seen that real consumption per capita growth is sensitive 
to expected changes in the growth rate of domestic income per capita. Ceteris 
paribus, a 1% increase in the growth rate of domestic income per capita leads 
to 0.07% increase in the growth rate of real consumption per capita. This is in 
conjunction with the findings of previous studies. The F-test. F,, suggests that 
expected changes in foreign incomes do not affect permanent consumption 
decisions and the LC/PI hypothesis cannot be rejected lbr these types of 
income. 
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Table 8.1: Generalised Least Squares Regression Results using nanel data. 
Dependent Variable 
Ac; t Alog c; t Independent Column Column Column C'olunln 
variables 1 2 3 4 
Constant 7011700 3688700 0.27192 0.59 353 
(0.699) (0.748) (0.261) (0.010)**ý° 
A y;, 
_, 
-87692 
-352460 - - (0.004)*** (0.000)*** 
A y8192; t_, - 348060 - - (0.000)*** 
Alog y, t-, - - 0.07025 0.06181 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Aa, t_, 58908 214450 -0.0008 -0.0007 (0.820) (0.654) (0.846) (0.859) 
Aa8192; t_, - -200160 - - (0.727) 
Ap;, 
_, 
43811 393930 
-0.0022 -0.0022 
(0.694) (0.054)* (0.206) (0.208) 
Ap8192;, 
_, 
- -411430 - - 
(0.092)* 
Ao; t_, 250.09 1233.1 -0.000012 -0.000011 (0.969) (0.854) (0.908) (0.913) 
Ao8192; t_, - -2644.3 - - (0.917) 
PER2 
- 
- - 
0.0685 
(0.786) 
PER3 
- 
- - -0.7256 
(0.009)*** 
PER4 
- - 
- -0.5212 (0.062)* 
FACT 
- -12361000 - - 
(0.549) 
OLS Adj. R 0.00357 0.01858 0.02603 0.03111 
GLS R 0.00636 0.02439 0.02607 0.03579 
F, 2.22* 3.86*** 10.09*** 7.24*** 
F2 0.086 0.535 0.545 0.554 
N 1361 
Note: `***', `**' and `*' mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. F, is an F- 
test testing the overall significance and F2 tests whether the foreign income variables improve 
the fit, it is described in the text. 
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In column 4 we explicitly incorporated some time dummies to reflect the 
effects of the four main international events during the period 1972-92. The oil 
crisis period is represented by the dummy variable PER2 taking a value of I for 
the years 1976 to 1981 and zero otherwise, PER3 captures the debt crisis 
episodes of 1982 to 1987 taking a value of 1 for those years and zero otherwise 
while the trade liberalisation period is represented by the dummy variable 
PER4, taking a value of I for the years 1988 to 1992 and zero otherwise. Note 
that the constant then represents the period 1972 to 1975. Although there are no 
major changes in parameter values, they are similar to those in column 3. The 
same deductions can be made about the LC/Pl hypothesis. The time dummies 
tell us that the post 1980 period is significantly different from the pre-1980 
period. Notice that during the period 1972-75 real per capita consumption 
growth was higher than any other periods. As discussed earlier, during the debt 
crisis real consumption growth (especially government consumption) fell 
dramatically mainly because of the limited supply of external capital, sharp rise 
in real interest rates and stabilisation policies which were in force. For the 
period 1987-92, although foreign capital supply resumed, consumption growth 
was still lower than pre-1980 period. This could be accounted lör by the effect 
of stabilisation policies with effective policy dialogue and a better 
consciousness for saving. A Wald test revealed that the parameter values of 
PER3 and PER4 were equal. 
Ignoring the results when using changes in levels (columns I and 2), we have 
not so far found that an expected change in foreign aid affects (especially to 
increase) the growth of consumption per capita as argued by aid sceptics. This 
could be, first, because we have not taken the time dimension explicitly in the 
model by introducing interaction terms in light of the above findings. Second, 
it might be that the LC/PI hypothesis holds only with this form of income. 
Third, it could be because the consumption variable includes public and private 
consumption while it is the public sector which receives such flows. Private 
individuals cannot directly make consumption decisions oil such flows. 
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Disaggregating the consumption data might shed some light on this issue. 
Fourth, foreign aid inflows have been closely monitored by donors so as to be 
certain that they are being used properly. Donors monitor the way foreign aid is 
being used by either attaching some conditionality or by tying the aid. Stokke 
(1995) defines aid conditionality as "the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms 
of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if 
conditions are not met by the recipient" (pp. 12). Stokke states that there has 
been two generations of conditionality. The first generation conditionality is 
related to the structural adjustment programmes and stabilisation policies under 
the auspices of International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the early 
I 980s aimed at reform of the economic policy of the recipient country which 
came in the wake of the growing economic crisis of many devloping countries. 
On the other hand, the second generation conditionality was triggered by the 
systemic transformation of the Soviet bloc and its core power, the USSR. 
Second generation conditionality has been aimed at political reform involving 
both systematic and substantive aspects. Its objectives have been "to promote 
democratic reform, human rights and administrative accountability in the 
South" (Ibid. pp. 1). Stabilisation policies had some impact on public sector 
consumption making recipients aware of the problems entailed in spending aid 
funds lavishly (for e. g. the `Dutch-Disease' effect). It can reasonably he 
assumed that recipients have/are learning from their past mistakes in managing 
foreign aid funds. 
We start first by including the interaction terms on each explanatory variable as 
discussed earlier to account for the pre- and post-1980 periods. We hence 
estimate the following model: 
A log c; t =a+ ? iA log Y; t-, + XA log yS192;, 
-, 
+ X2Ac,;, 
-, 
+ 221AuS/92;, 
-, 
+ 
X3APR-I + ý9, Ap8192;, 
-, 
+ ý, 4Aocflt-i + X41Aocf8192;,., + X.. SFAC'"l' + s:;, (8.8) 
The estimated feasible generalised least squares estimates of the above model 
are presented in column 1 of Table 8.2. Interestingly this time both F-tests 
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reject the LC/PI hypothesis. The dummy variable FACT is in line with our 
expectation that the `policies' did have an impact in reducing real consumption 
in the post 1980 period and ceteris paribus, it suggests that consumption 
growth was 0.78% lower in the post 1980 period. We can also derive separate 
regressions for each period as follows: 
Pre-1980 Period: 
A log c;, = 0.67669*** + 0.0754***A log y;, 
_, 
+ 0.01425*Aa;, 
_i - 0.0004APP;, 
_, 
- 
0.00005Aocf; ', 
_, 
Post-1980 Period: 
A log c it = -0.10289*** + 0.0754***A logy; t- i-0.18995*Aa;, 
_1 - 0.00327Ap-i 
+ 0.00083**Aocft_i 
Comparing the above two regressions we can see that in both cases the LC/PI 
hypothesis is rejected. Although individually effect of the expected change in 
per capita domestic income is the same in both periods, the impact of an 
expected change in aid per capita is quite different. In fact, celer/s paribus, for 
the pre-1980 period a $1 expected increase in aid per capita increases 
consumption growth by 0.0 14%, while a similar amount reduces consumption 
growth by 0.19% in the post-1980 period. This implies that more resources 
were saved in the latter period while in the former period there is a strong case 
for the fungibility issue supporting Griffin's argument. As Mosley and Hudson 
(1995) argued, effective policy dialogue during the 1980s could have led to the 
decline in the fungibility of aid in developing countries. A significant outcome 
from the derived regressions suggests that consumption per capita in the post 
1980 period has been crowded out due to expected increases in foreign aid. 
This is plausible in cases where the donor imposes some fund-matching by the 
recipient before disbursing any aid. In such a case the recipient is tbrced to 
postpone its consumption to satisfy such requirements. 
Interestingly the individual impact of other capital flows has a significant, 
although minor, positive effect on consumption growth. On the other hand, the 
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individual impact of net private flows supports the LC/1111 hypothesis. It would 
seem that these flows are directed for investment purposes rather than 
consumption. 
Table 8.2: L 
Dependent Variable: flog cs 
Independent Column Column Column Column 
variables 1 2 3 4 
Constant 0.67669 
-1.1047 1.1388 1.0865 (0.000)*** (0.255) (0.323) (0.000)*** 
Alog y;, 
-, 
0.07540 
- 
- - 
(0.007)*** 
Alog y8192;, 
-, 
-0.02540 - - - (0.482) 
log yibH 
- 
0.06994 
- - 
(0.800) 
log c;, 
-, 
- 
- -0.02880 - (0.936) 
Alog c;, 
-, - - 
- -0.03756 (0.159) 
Aa;, 
-, 
0.01425 0.01428 0.01428 0.01458 
(0.060)* (0.058)* (0.050)** (0.055)* 
Aa8192,, 
-, 
-0.02042 -0.01963 -0.01965 -0.01993 (0.025)** (0.029)** (0.025)** (0.028)** 
Ap;, 
-, 
-0.0004 0.00099 0.00102 0.00108 
(0.887) (0.747) (0.735) (0.727) 
Ap8192; 
r-, -0.00287 -0.00394 -0.00397 -0.00367 (0.451) (0.292) (0.274) (0.329) 
An;, 
-, 
-0.00005 -0.000044 -0.000044 -0.00004 (0.631) (0.681) (0.669) (0.707) 
Ao8192,, 
-1 
0.00083 0.00088 0.00088 0.0009 
(0.039)** (0.028)** (0.024)** (0.025)** 
FACT 
-0.77958 -1.1047 -1.0989 -1.1329 (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
OLS Adj. R 0.04271 0.03255 0.03282 0.03114 
GLS R 0.04858 0.03732 0.03649 0.03564 
F, 7.74*** 6.72*** 6.77*** 6.46*** 
FZ 2.15** 2.08* 2.10** 2.15** 
N 1361 
Details as in Table 8 
. 
1. 
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Concerning the limitations of the use of a lagged variable as instruments, we 
use those as suggested by Runkle (1991) for the expected changes in domestic 
income. As for the other explanatory variables we continue to use the same 
instruments. In column 2 we use the log of real income per capita at t-l (log y;, 
_ 
,) as an instrument for the expected changes in domestic income and log real 
consumption at t-1 (log c,,., ) in column 3 (Table 8.2). Olekalns (1997) has also 
used the lagged dependent variable (Olog cit., ) as an instrument, we report this 
result in column 4 of Table 8.2. 
Interestingly the LC/PI hypothesis cannot be rejected individually on any of 
Runkle's and Olekalns' instruments. Shea (1995) also obtained similar results 
when Runkle's instruments were used. In all these three cases some robust 
results are obtained supporting the findings in column I of Table 8.2 
concerning the foreign aid variables (see the F-test, F2. and the individual t- 
tests). The results suggest that the fungibility of aid has declined in the post- 
1980 period. 
Since the foreign aid variable is of particular interest to our analysis we now 
proceed to test how our representative consumer in the aid receiving country 
will react to changes in anticipated and unanticipated aid inflows. According to 
the LC/PI hypothesis any anticipated inflows will already be incorporated in 
present consumption and only unexpected changes (i. e. unanticipated flows) 
will affect consumption (refer to the previous quote of 1-fall, 1978). In relation 
to this we use a simple expectation hypothesis model to obtain information 
regarding changes in anticipated and unanticipated foreign aid inflows. We first 
derive the expected trend in foreign aid for each individual country in the 
sample by regressing foreign aid per capita (AIDP) on time to obtain the 
residuals for the years 1970 to 1992. Since the residuals are deviations from the 
trend, they can be regarded as unanticipated flows. To undertake this exercise 
we had to create 68 files as there are 68 countries in the sample. We proceed to 
estimate the following model for each of the 68 countries in the sample: 
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(8.9) 
I ?S MV S. well 
We denote the fitted trend values, that is the anticipated aid flows as FIT and 
the unanticipated flows as RES. We need to be careful about the residual values 
which may suffer from some noise in the data while estimating the `trend' 
values. From these obtained values we then take changes of the respective 
variable and lag them to be used as instruments for the expected change in 
foreign aid. We first estimate the following model using the lagged changes of 
the residuals (ARES1t_1) as instruments for the expected change in foreign aid 
per capita (we also introduce its respective interaction term, ARES8192t1_1): 
A log cit =a+X 
,A logyt_, + ß. 11A log y8192; 1_1 + 7c2RES; 1_1+ 2,, IARES<S'192; 1.1 + 
X34&-1 + ý, 31Ap8192; t_1 +? 4Aocft_i + X41Aocf81921, 
_1 + 
1, SFACT+ r i, (8.10) 
The estimates of the above model are given in column I of ]'able 8.3. Once 
again the significant individual effect of the growth of per capita domestic 
income leads to the rejection of the LC/PI hypothesis. Notice that the collective 
impact of foreign income, as shown by the F2 value of 1.54, is in support of the 
LC/PI hypothesis. To see what is the response of the representative agents in 
relation to an expected change in the level of anticipated aid flows, we add the 
lagged changes of the fitted aid per capita, AFIT, 
_i, and its respective 
interaction term, AFIT8192;, 
_i. 
The results are reported in column 2 of Table 
8.3. Here also the LC/PI hypothesis is rejected. The individual coefficient of 
AFIT, 
_, 
suggests that during the period 1972-92 increases in expected aid flows 
reduce real consumption growth. This is contrary to the prediction of the L, C/PI 
hypothesis. It seems that recipients in the sample not only abstain from 
consuming anticipated aid flows, but also reduce consumption levels in the 
event of an expected increase in these flows. This could be the effect of first 
and second generation conditionality along with donors' use of tied aid or the 
recipients are undertaking some projects or programmes which might require 
fund-matching from their own domestic resources. The latter can he a potential 
reason for such a result. As we pointed out earlier, the consumption variable 
includes private and public consumption on goods and services. The main 
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recipient of aid flows is the government which actually manages such funds. 
Well before an amount of aid is disbursed, government officials have to 
undertake some "marketing" to obtain the funds from international 
organisations in order to finance some projects. There are a number of reasons 
why the government might reduce its consumption level in association with an 
increase in the expected foreign aid level. For instance, 
(a) There might be some urgency in undertaking certain projects which have to 
be carried out. Knowing that foreign aid is expected to increase, the projects 
could be undertaken without delay, with the government reducing its present 
level of consumption. 
(b) The expected increase in foreign aid may be attached to some conditions 
where the recipient has to supply additional funds from their own domestic 
resources. In such a case if the government foresees this. (hen cuts in the 
current level of consumption might be a plausible option to provide matching 
funds. 
To see whether public or private consumption is affected by anticipated aid 
flows we run two separate regressions. In Table 8.3, column 3 has as the 
dependent variable the change of log public consumption per capita (Alog gc;, ) 
while column 4 has the change of log private consumption per capita (Alog 
pc;, ). The results when the interaction terms were included are not reported as 
none were significant. The results still remain the same. When growth of real 
government consumption per capita is the dependent variable, individually the 
growth of domestic income per capita is significantly different from zero which 
ultimately rejects the LC/PI hypothesis. Although the collective impact of 
foreign income cannot reject the LC/PI hypothesis, it can he seen that 
individually an increase in anticipated foreign aid flows reduces government 
consumption growth but not when the dependent variable is the growth of 
private consumption per capita. Notice that when the dependent variable is the 
growth of private consumption per capita the LC/Pl hypothesis cannot he 
rejected. 
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Dependent Variables: 
Alog c;, flog gc;, Alog pc;, 
Independent Column Column Column Column 
variables 1 2 3 4 
Constant 0.70321 0.9931 0.75163 1.227 
(0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.021)** (0.006)*** 
M1og yi, 
_1 
0.07924 0.06936 0.16493 0.02341 
(0.005)*** (0.014)** (0.000)*** (0.310) 
Alog y8192;, 
-, 
-0.02943 
-0.02018 - - (0.421) (0.582) 
4Fit;, 
_1 - -1.1130 -0.68201 -0.7884 (0.000)*** (0.056)* (0.167) 
AFit8192;, 
_, 
- 
0.43112 
"1 -11 
- - 
dRes;, 
_j 
4Res8192;, 
_, 
OPii-i 
Ap8192;, 
_, 
Aoit-I 
Ao8192; c_ I 
FACT 
ol., s aai. RZ 
GLS RZ 
F, 
F, 
N 
Details as in Table 8.1. 
0.0545 
(0.216) 
-0.0371 (0.517) 
-0.00048 (0.879) 
-0.00289 (0.447) 
-0.000056 (0.600) 
0.00089 
(0.028)** 
-0.8224 (0.003)*** 
0.04013 
0.04593 
7.32*** 
1.54 
1361 
0.0508 
(0.249) 
0.0222 
(0.641) 
0.01661 
(0.634) 
-0.03403 (0.552) 
-0.00076 (0.812) 
-0.00020 (0.946) -0.00269 (0.219) 
-0.00248 (0.514) 
-0.000055 (0.610) 
0.000079 
(0.655) -0.00025 (0.848) 
0.00088 (0.029)** 
-0.9541 (0.001)*** 
-0.7516 
(0.056)x` 
-1.3360 
(0.001)*** 
0.05304 
0.06052 
7.93*** 
3.73*** 
0.04587 
0.04506 
10.65*** 
1.12 
0.02736 
0.02908 
7.38*** 
0.688 
All the results which have been reported need to he cautiously interpreted as it 
is implicitly assumed that the real rate of interest is constant over the period. 
Any rejection of the theory might be attributable to the täilure of this 
assumption. During the period 1970-92 it can hardly he assumed that real 
interest rates were constant. In fact during the debt crisis period, developing 
countries were facing high real interest rates on previously contracted loans 
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during the 1970s. Given such variations over the period it seems desirable to 
control for expected changes in the real interest rate when testing the LC/Pl 
hypothesis. Unfortunately given the lack of time series data for all the 68 
countries it was not possible to carry out this investigation. This can be 
analysed in the future for countries where data are available. 
8.4.4 Conclusion 
The analysis using the LC/PI hypothesis has been very useful in deriving some 
implications for foreign aid inflows and it has made interpretations easier. 
Overall our results lead to the rejection of the LC/PI hypothesis which other 
studies have also found. In the beginning it was observed that real per capita 
consumption growth was sensitive only to changes in expected domestic 
income per capita which led to the rejection of the L('/ff hypothesis 
individually. On the other hand, expected changes in foreign incomes were 
collectively in support of the LC/PI hypothesis. But once the post-1980 period 
was considered through the introduction of interaction terms, the LC/PI 
hypothesis was rejected. Among the foreign incomes, consumption was found 
to be sensitive to foreign aid in particular. Although one could not reject the 
fungibility hypothesis during the period 1972-80, it was found that in the post- 
1980 period increases in expected foreign aid flows was in fact significantly 
crowding out consumption. This could be the effects of the `policy improving 
factors', such as the first and second generation conditionality under the 
auspices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. donors' 
interest in managing and controlling aid funds. fund matching projects or 
programmes and also recipients' awareness and lessons firom past mistakes. 
Another important result was that increases in expected anticipated aid flows 
have led to a reduction in consumption levels, in particular government 
consumption. This is not surprising as it is the governments of' developing 
countries which receive these funds. Expected changes in either domestic or 
269 
Chanter W1 Foreien Airs Dnmeclk Snvirrýýý and Inv fitment foreign incomes did not have any impact on private consumption decisions. In 
this case the LC/PI hypothesis could not be rejected. 
The impact of foreign aid on consumption through the LC/PI model is quite 
robust, it does affect consumption decisions. It has been found that increases in 
foreign aid increased the consumption level during the period 1972-80 while 
effective policy dialogue and other factors in the 1980s have enabled a decline 
in consumption, and encouraged more savings. The question is whether foreign 
aid flows not consumed are efficiently invested. This drives us to the next 
section to test empirically the aid-investment nexus. 
8.5 Foreign Aid and Investment 
8.51 Model Specification 
Surprisingly as it may be, there are not many empirical studies assessing the 
impact of foreign aid on investment. The very few studies which have been 
undertaken have mostly concluded that the relationship between foreign aid 
and investment is positive. Levy (1988) found that between the period 1968 to 
1982 an additional `dollar' of foreign aid would raise domestic investment by 
1.08 dollars on a sample of 22 Sub-Saharan African countries. Mosley and 
Hudson (1995) found, using single country time series data (1963-90), that in 5 
out of the 14 countries in their sample (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal. Tanzania 
and Gambia) the foreign aid variable was positive and significantly different 
from zero. In none of the other remaining countries was foreign aid found to 
reduce domestic investment. 
Using panel data based on ten year averages, Boone (1994) did not find any 
impact of aid on investment, using instrumental variable techniques. Note that 
his analysis has some drawbacks, for example, the investment and aid variables 
were expressed as ratios of GNP rather than GDP (see Newlyn (1991) for the 
shortcoming of such use) and the investment regression model does not have 
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any theoretical underpinning. Hadjimichael et al. (1995), on the other hand, 
have assessed the impact of aid on private investment rather than on aggregate 
domestic investment. They reported some mixed results for countries in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa. While the impact of aid has been positive Im the group of 
sustained adjusters, in countries with negative per capita growth performance 
foreign aid appeared to have discouraged private investment. 
It is not difficult to see why there have been only a few studies investigating in 
this area. First, the determinants of investment have been subject to debate, for 
example, political factors, the level of risks, etc.. Also the data on these läctors 
are not always available'. Another factor is whether we should investigate 
using aggregate investment data or by decomposing investment into public and 
private. In fact limited data series seriously prevents examination of such 
relationships. Although we have a large number of observations, which is an 
improvement over previous studies, we are still constrained to use aggregate 
investment. Had the data been available, we could test whether loreign aid 
crowds in/out public and/or private investment, or whether publicly aid- 
financed projects crowds in/out private investment. 
Before testing the aid-investment relationship, we start by using a theoretical 
model. Theoretical models of investment suggest several determinants of 
investment behaviour. At the aggregate level, the early accelerator theory of 
investment captured the dependence of investment on expected returns. 
According to the accelerator model, investment is related linearly to changes in 
output. We can write the investment function as: 
INV =f (AY) 
or 
IYV 
f( Y 
For estimation purposes in a panel setting, the following model can be used: 
For some data on these see Barro and Lee (1994) but they mostly use dummy variables. 
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l;, 
= yi + ßGROWTH;, + E;, 
where lit is the investment rate and GROWTH is the growth rate of GDP. The 
above model can he augmented to include the various sources of foreign 
savings (foreign aid, private capital flows and other capital flows) and domestic 
savings. When estimating the simple accelerator model, many have used lagged 
output growth rather than current growth. This is because investment decisions 
take some time to be executed and are based on lagged information about 
output changes. Lagged output growth also captures the macroeconomic 
environment which affects investment decisions. Also in a panel setting, this 
variable might lead to some indication of whether developing countries are 
technologically catching-up. This will be observed if the coefficient on lagged 
output growth is negative and significant. We hence test the following model: 
I;, = yi + ß1OECD;, + ß2PRIV;, + ß3OTHERIFS;, + (34SAV;, + ß; GROWTI-I;, 
_, 
+ 
it 
where OECD is foreign as a percentage of GDP, PRIV is net private capital 
flows as a percentage of GDP, OTHERIFS is other capital flows as a 
percentage of GDP and SAV is domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. 
8.5.2 Empirical Results 
The parameters of the above model are given in column 1 of Table 8.4. All the 
variables are individually significantly different from zero. It can he noticed 
that the impact of foreign aid on investment is positive and highly significant. 
In fact, ceteris paribus, a I% increase in foreign aid raises the investment rate 
by 0.28%. Individually, net private capital flows have a much higher impact 
than other sources of savings. Notice also that the other capital flows variable is 
also positive and significant. The lagged growth variable is positive and 
significant which might suggest that the accelerator effect is stronger than the 
technological catching-up effect. 
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li ADauarc ress Results using panel d: 
Dependent Variable: Investment Rate 
Independent Column Column Column Column 
variables 1 2 3 4 
Constant 10.164 6.3718 4.6858 6.3208 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
OECD 0.27927 0.28073 0.27743 0.27847 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
PRIV 0.48716 0.44508 0.44674 0.44748 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0. ()00)*** 
OTHERIFS 0.00605 0.00537 0.00532 0.0056 
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
A 
GROWTH, 
-! 
INF 
OPEN 
MONEY 
CINVY 
CINVC 
FACT 
OLS Adj. RZ 
GLS 
F 
N 
Details as in Table 8.1. 
0.45252 1 0.43068 
(0.000)*** 1 (0.000)*** 
0.19456 
(0.000) 
0.19504 
(0.000)*** 
0.000003 
(0.991) 
0.04219 
(0.000)*** 
0.06601 
(0.000)*** 
-0.00077 (0.692) 
0.44033 
(0.000) 
0.1950 
(0.000)*** 
0.0421 
(0.000)*** 
0.02224 
(0.000)*** 
0.01319 
(0.312) 
0.43177 
(0.000)*** 
0.19554 
(0.000)* 
0.0414 
(0.000)*** 
0.06642 
(0.000)*** 
-0.0935 (0.860) 
0.59339 
0.58680 
397.94*** 
0.62292 
0.59909 
250.63*** 
0.62068 
0.59669 
279.18*** 
0.63129 
0.59958 
292.07*** 
1361 
In column 2, we augmented the model to include some policy variables such as 
the inflation rate (INF) to control for macroeconomic instability, the openness 
measure (OPEN), the financial liberalisation variable (MONEY) and the cost 
of investment (CINVY). When these variables were added, the estimates on 
foreign aid, net private capital, other capital flows, domestic savings rate and 
lagged growth remained similar. Individually, the inflation rate was not 
significant. This is not surprising due to the presence of the growth variable 
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which was picking up the effect of macroeconomic stability. Dropping the 
growth variable made the inflation rate significant, but we have preferred to 
instead keep the growth variable due to the theoretical relation with the 
investment rate. For the trade variable, we used the crude openness measure- 
export plus imports as a percentage of GDP (OPEN). This is because the 
volume of trade indicates the level of trading activities as private investors, in 
particular, are usually engaged in export and/or import activities. The 
parameter estimate of the openness measure (OPEN) is seen to be positive and 
significantly related to the investment rate. The coefficient of the financial 
variable, MONEY, suggests that financial liberalisation encourages domestic 
investment, the estimate being positive and significant. Concerning the cost of 
investment variable, CINVY, which is calculated as the price of investment as 
a percentage of the price of GDP" is not significant. Even when the cost of 
investment was recalculated as the price of investment relative to the price of 
consumption, CINVC, this variable still remained insignificant (column 3). The 
other variables maintained their overall impact and significance. 
In column 4 we dropped variables which were found to he insignificant and we 
added the dummy variable FACT as described earlier to account for the `aid 
improving factors'. In essence, it would also tell us whether the investment rate 
in the period 1972-80 was different from the period 1981-92. We can see that 
in column 4 this dummy variable is not significant which implies that, ceteris 
paribus, the investment rate in these two time periods was not different. When 
we investigated the aid-consumption relationship we found that consumption 
per capita dropped in the latter period. In particular it was found that increases 
in anticipated foreign aid reduced government consumption per capita. One of 
the reasons for such reduction in government consumption is due to the first 
generation conditionality which was initiated by the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank. It is argued that stabilisation policies have improved the 
macroeconomic environment and that international aid donors' effort to 
The data to compute the cost of investment were obtained from the Penn World "fables. 
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monitor and manage foreign aid (for e. g. tied aid) have reduced tangibility of 
aid. But do these policies and aid monitoring increase the effectiveness of aid 
on investment? Or, if the recipients are forced not to spend part of the aid flows 
on consumption, does this mean that diverting these aid flows into investment 
activities are necessarily productive? It is well known that in the presence of 
conditionality and strings attached to foreign aid the recipients cannot attain the 
optimal point on their indifference curve, hence they cannot maximise their 
utility unless the aid-monitoring agencies have perfect information (see Pack 
and Pack, 1993). In such a case `forced' investment might not always he 
appropriate. 
To test these effects (whether the effectiveness of foreign aid has improved 
under these conditions since the 1980s), we make use of an interaction term on 
the foreign aid variable10. The interaction term is denoted and defined as: 
OECDFACT 
_ 
OECD x FACT 
The model then becomes: 
I 
= y, + (3, OECD, t + (312OECDFACT,, + 02PRIV,, + PA)" HFRIFS,, + J34SAV,, 
+ß5GROWTH_, + J36FACT,, + other variables + c;, 
so that for the effectiveness of foreign aid for the period 1972-80 is given by: 
E(I,, / FACT 
= 
0, OECD; ) 
= y, +p1 OECD;, 
and for the period 1981-92 as: 
E(I / FACT = 1, OECD,, ) = (y, + P,, ) + ((3, +(312 )OFCU;, 
The parameter estimates of the above model is given in column I of "fable 8.5. 
Individually, all the previously included variables are significant, except the 
dummy variable FACT. Focusing on the foreign aid variable we find that the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in the period 198 1-92 is lower than in the period 
1972-80. In fact, ß12 represents the differential slope coefficient between the 
two periods. The effectiveness of aid on investment (excluding the intercept 
term) for the period 1981-92 is equal to 0.25745 (0.36565 - 0.1082) 11, while 
10 See Gujarati (1995, pp. 512) for such a technique. 
I' We also used foreign aid lagged by one period along with its respective interaction term and 
we found a similar result, a value of 0.21542. 
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for the period 1972-80 it is 0.36565. Although the impact of foreign aid on 
investment still is positive and significant in the later period, its effectiveness 
or productivity has fallen. There might be many reasons to explain such 
crowding out or reduced effectiveness especially since the 1980s. First, it is 
well known that the positive impact of foreign aid may be dampened by the 
conditionalities imposed by donors, particularly in bilateral cases. This might 
suggest that the productivity of foreign aid is lessened when strings are 
attached. Also it indicates the potential distortionary effects of tied aid as found 
by Yeats (1990) in the case of former colonies. Second, foreign aid may be 
crowding out private investment. Government capital expenditure is 
substantially financed by aid. In the process, resources are withdrawn from 
other sectors (mainly from the private sector) which may lead to crowding out. 
But in the long run crowding in may well result. This would require further 
investigation, by disaggregating investment into public and private 
components. Thirdly, investment undertaken during the 1980s may have long 
run social returns and benefits which are not being captured in our model. 
There is also debate about the effectiveness of the macro-policy adjustment 
package introduced by the IMF and World Bank. Some analyses of the effects 
of structural adjustment lending have shown relatively disappointing results. 
Mosley (1994, pp. 7) argues that although overall performance of the 
`adjustment lending' countries was better than `non-adjusting' countries, the 
investment rate was disappointing. Elbadawi (1992, pp. 5) also concludes that 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, "World Bank adjustment lending..... has contributed to a 
statistically significant drop in the investment ratio". Note that since in our 
sample we have a significant number of Sub-Saharan African countries which 
undertook structural adjustment, this might be driving our results on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid on investment. 
Many authors have questioned the exogeneity of using current values of 
foreign aid and other forms of capital inflows as explanatory variables. To 
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address this issue of any potential endogeneity problems we lagged these 
variables by one period. The estimates of these parameters are reported in 
column 2 of Table 8.5. OECDLAG is foreign aid lagged by one period, 
PRIVLAG is net private capital flows lagged by one period and OTHERLAG 
is other capital flows lagged by one period. We can see that even when using 
the lagged variables, the same conclusions can be drawn, except for the 
individual coefficient of lagged `other capital inflows', OTHERLAG. 
In column 3 we included both the current and lagged variables. It can be 
observed that, ceteris paribus, the lagged variables have a lesser impact on 
investment than the current variables. The other variables continue to be 
individually significant and positive as before. 
Finally, we run a quadratic model on the foreign aid variable as used by 
Hadjimichael et al. (1995). Note that their dependent variable was private 
investment and their explanatory variables are different than those used here. 
Column 4 in Table 8.5 reports the estimates of the model and OECDSQ is the 
square of the foreign aid variable, OECD. The parameter estimate on the 
OECDSQ is not significant, rejecting the non-linearity relationship between 
foreign aid and investment which Hadjimichael et al. found. Other variables 
did not change much. 
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Table 8.5: Gener lised Least Squares. Regression Results using l data. 
Dependent Variabl 
" inypstment Rate 
1Independent 
variables 
Constant 
fOECD 
OECDFACT 
OECDLAG 
OECDSQ 
PRIV 
Column I Column Column Column 
11 2 lý ý4 5.8658 6.8740 5.994 6.2171 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** ° ((). 000)ý, x: * 
0.36565 
- 
0.22597 0.2776 
. 
000 *** ý: ý:: r *** (0 ) (O. oOO> ýO. ao(1) 
-0.10820 (0.001)*** 
0.23052 
(0.000)*** 
0.45094 
(0.000)*** 
0.0820 
(0.037)** 
0.38766 
(0.000)*** 
0.0075 
(0.961) 
0.44527 
(0.000)*** 
PRIVLAG 
- 
0.29735 0.12353 
- 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
OTHERIFS 0.00534 
- 
0.00474 0.00535 
(0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.002)*** 
OTHERLAG 
- 
-0.00243 -0.0013 - (0.134) (0.418) 
SAV 0.43637 0.40966 0.43022 0.43169 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
GROWTH1_, 0.19744 0.20459 0.18523 0.19530 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
OPEN 0.03994 0.04699 0.0404 0.04169 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
MONEY 0.06428 0.07024 0.0671 0.06641 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
2 
r 
Details as in Table 8.1 
278 
Cho, r. i, h! 
8.5-3 Conclusion 
Dome U Suvi. 
"n d es"tmen 
Overall we have found a robust positive and significant impact of foreign aid 
on investment for the period 1972-92. Although we noticed reduced aid 
effectiveness on investment during the period 1981-92 by 0.1 1% compared to 
the period 1972-80, its impact is still positive. Some of the reasons which 
might have led to such a fall in effectiveness are tied aid, too much aid- 
monitoring and possibly unsound stabilisation policies which did not suit the 
developing countries and conditionality attached. For foreign aid to be 
effective, there should be an effective policy dialogue which suits the recipient 
environment and situation, and also meets donors' requirements. 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
It has been observed earlier that countries with high savings rates have 
performed quite well in the sense that their investment rates and growth have 
been high. Foreign aid has been criticised to have reduced domestic savings 
(e. g. Griffin, 1970). It has been claimed that aid leaks into consumption rather 
than investment, although this was not clear in the statistical exercise 
performed in Chapter 5. The empirical studies testing the aid-savings 
relationship have been subject to many criticisms concerning sample size, 
estimation techniques, omitted variables, data measurement error, etc.. In 
regard to omitted variables and data measurement problems entailed in 
obtaining savings data, we have tested the aid-savings relationship through the 
life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis. 
The life-cycle/permanent income model that we have specified has enabled an 
explicit test of the fungibility issue and has implicitly taken care of omitted 
variables. Using log transformation on key variables, it was found that the life- 
cycle/permanent income hypothesis could not be accepted as found by previous 
studies testing this hypothesis. Current domestic income is found to be highly 
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sensitive with current consumption. Since it was found that the pre-1980 period 
was significantly different from the post-1980 period, we made use of 
interaction terms on all the explanatory variables to assess their impact in the 
two time periods. Interestingly, it was found that foreign aid in the pre-1980 
period was leaking into consumption (i. e. reducing domestic savings) while in 
the post-1980 period, it was reducing the consumption level (i. e. increasing 
domestic savings). The latter could be explained through the effects of the first 
and second generation conditionality imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, donors' interest in monitoring aid funds and so on. 
These findings show that there has been a decline in the fungibility of aid in 
developing countries. 
Concerning the effectiveness of aid on investment, it is found to have positive 
and significant impact. Ceteris paribus, private capital flows have relatively 
higher impact than foreign aid. This is not surprising given the nature of these 
flows. When we assessed the effectiveness of aid on investment for the pre- 
and post-1980 periods, we found that aid was more effective in the pre-1980 
period than the post-1980 period. This could be explained by the fact that 
during the 1970s abundant private capital flows have helped to improve aid's 
effectiveness while with the debt crisis in the early 1980s its effectiveness fell. 
Also the decline in aid's effectiveness might suggest that `forced' investment 
by donors is not always beneficial. But overall, the effectiveness of aid on 
investment is still positive. 
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Chapter Nine 
SUMMARYAND FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
9. I Introduction 
After a generation of foreign aid transfers, donor agencies, the public in donor 
countries, politicians and aid lobbyists have become weary about its 
achievements. The only way to ascertain the contribution of foreign aid is 
through systematic evaluation. As Cassen et al. (1986) put it, "knowledge 
about the effectiveness of aid is needed both to make judgements about its 
worthiness and to improve its management" (pp. 294). Whether aid is effective 
or not is purely empirical. The present study has embarked on an empirical 
investigation between the relationships of aid and growth, aid and savings, and 
aid and investment. Overall, we have found that the effectiveness of aid on 
growth, savings (implicitly) and investment is positive. This supports the 
positive contribution of aid found earlier from micro level evaluations, see 
Cassen ei al. (1986). The positive contribution of aid was also acknowledged 
much earlier, for example, by a former director of the DAC of the OECD in 
1982 who stated that: 
"very heavy concentrations of economic aid have helped lay 
the base for burgeoning economic expansion. There also has 
been a good deal of progress- failures as well, but mainly 
significant, ramifying successes- in helping build such key 
development- promoting institutions as agricultural 
universities, technical institutes and enterprise management 
training establishments in many countries. Directly and 
indirectly, aid has contributed to the downward trend in birth 
rates that begun to appear in certain countries,.... without 
aid.. 
. 
Third World growth..... would have been slower, the 
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outcomes for the poor would have been worse, social and 
political turbulence would have been greater and less 
groundwork would have been laid for further advances. In 
particular, without aid, the poorest countries, where growth 
was slower, would have lagged more. " (Lewis, 1982, pp. 102- 
108). 
In a similar line, White and Vos (1996) argue that aid has helped recipients in 
repaying debt burdens which could not be met from the recipients' own 
resources, and without aid there would be no domestic resources for economic 
development, and reform would be difficult to sustain. This does not mean that 
aid `works' on every count. As Browne (1990) explains, its effectiveness has 
mainly been positive in countries where there is a relatively egalitarian 
structure affording a relatively high labour participation and early investment in 
education and technical training measures. Aid has been hindered in countries 
when it was ill-matched by counterpart resources, low participation rates and 
inefficient public sectors. Although the impact of aid in each developing 
country is a special case, it can nevertheless be generalised to some degree. It is 
in this context that we have used a sample of developing countries and used 
both cross-section and panel data to generalise the effectiveness of aid. 
9.2 Summary 
The case for giving foreign aid is an important issue which has received a lot of 
attention. Although this has been subject to a continuous debate, foreign aid 
has been constantly flowing to the developing world. Donors and recipients are 
optimistic that foreign aid can achieve some of its objectives. Even though the 
main objective of foreign aid is to promote economic development and welfare 
(in the long run) to alleviate poverty, in the immediate future, it is believed to 
relieve some bottlenecks inhibiting growth. It is often claimed that markets fail 
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to work in developing countries and additional investment, although it would 
have a high rate of return, would be constrained by low domestic savings rates 
thereby holding back growth. There is hence an emphasis on increasing capital 
as the way to raise incomes and the economic objective is to support 
investment and assist growth in developing countries. Apart from 
developmental objective which the donors also want the developing countries 
to benefit from, they have political and commercial objectives as well (which 
can undermine the beneficial impact of aid). 
The volume of aid flows and other forms of capital transfers have an influence 
on aid effectiveness. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the trends of the net 
resource transfers have been unstable in the past four decades. The period 
1973-81 witnessed massive capital flows largely in the form of private loans 
but a subsequent fall in these flows (between 1982-87) described the debt crisis 
period. Recovery in developed countries allowed resource transfers to surge. 
Due to capital market imperfections low income countries have relied heavily 
on foreign aid while private flows were more important for middle income 
countries. Although foreign aid has been relatively more stable than other 
flows, it has been rising at a slow rate. In per capita terms, South Asia, East 
Asia and the Pacific have received the lowest aid per capita due to the presence 
of the two most populated countries in each region. Even though Sub-Saharan 
Africa has received substantial amounts of aid in per capita terms, it is now 
countries in Europe and Central Asia that are claiming more aid per head. This 
is mainly because of the break up of the Soviet bloc since 1990. 
Of all the forms of capital flows to developing countries. we focused our 
attention particularly on foreign aid to assess its relative impact. Not many 
studies have provided a clear analysis of the theoretical link between aid and 
growth. It is in this context that in Chapter 2 the motivation was to incorporate 
foreign aid in some growth models. These models will hence enable us to 
incorporate aid as a potential determinant of growth which can be tested 
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empirically using econometric techniques. We started with a simple Harrod- 
Domar model which is Keynesian in spirit, principally based on a fixed capital- 
output ratio. It was shown that an increase in aid will supplement domestic 
savings to increase the growth rate. Foreign aid, in this model, enables the 
economy to achieve higher growth as long as it is flowing in but growth will 
drop back to its previous level once aid stops. Solow (1970) challenged the 
constancy of the capital-output ratio to make it endogenous in the model so that 
in the long run the economy settles to a steady state. There are some important 
implications for foreign aid in the neo-classical model: first, when aid takes the 
form of capital goods (e. g. aid is tied to a project), the capital-labour ratio rises 
to enable a higher level of income per capita as long as aid is injected but will 
again shrink back to its original steady-state position when aid stops. Second, if 
aid is in the form of consumer goods, a higher income per capita than in the 
previous case can be enjoyed if an equivalent amount is disbursed (compared 
with the case where aid takes the form of capital goods). But in both cases aid's 
impact will only prove to be temporary once it is removed. Does this mean that 
aid's impact is short lived? Not necessarily so. Once some assumptions in the 
model are altered, a permanent effects can take place. For instance, in the 
Solow model, if the growth rate of population is a function of income per 
capita (see Crouch, 1973) and if aid is able to move the economy beyond the 
poverty trap level, permanently higher income per capita and growth can be 
achieved. We also developed a model to illustrate that aid can have permanent 
effects even when it is removed provided the recipient is able to assimilate 
some labour technology endowed when aid was flowing in. We further 
demonstrated, using the endogenous model, a case where labour in the 
recipient country can reasonably be assumed to have some unexplored form of 
knowledge which we treat as being `dormant' knowledge due to the existing 
inferior technology level. Once aid is made available with a superior form of 
technology, the labour augmenting technology becomes `active' and higher 
growth can be attained. When aid ceases to flow, it was shown that the growth 
rate is higher than the `non-aid' rate but less than when aid was flowing in. In 
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such circumstances, aid is seen to have a long term beneficial impact. This is 
not to say that aid will always have this kind of impact. It will depend on many 
other factors such as the appropriateness of the imported technology. In fact 
there have been many instances where the recipients were faced with 
inappropriate technology transfer. These resulted in a wastage of 
resources(Duncan, 1986). In the case an `appropriate' technology is made 
available to the recipient, the beneficial impact of aid will also depend on the 
capability of the recipient to adapt this technology. In fact, the adaptation of 
technology depends on how fast the developing country is able to `catch-up' 
with the foreign technology. As Abramovitz (1986) argues, this will depend on 
the country's `social capability'. This could be regarded as including factors 
such as years of schooling, commercial, industrial and financial institutions for 
instance. In a similar line, Dowrick and Gemmell (1991) found that to 'catch- 
up' developing countries should be above a certain `structural poverty 
threshold'. Although there are many developing countries which are still below 
this threshold, it does not mean that aid should be not be directed to these 
countries. On the contrary, aid should help in building institutions and meet the 
requirements to move the economy above that threshold level. The growth 
models also encourage aid to be directed towards labour-intensive projects with 
appropriate technology. This can simultaneously target the poor to alleviate 
poverty. 
Aid is not the only channel through which donors can help developing 
countries. Another way is through trading practices, for example, aid tied to 
trade, special prices and granting of special trade preferences. The last two 
cases are not strictly speaking classified as foreign aid. We depicted a case in 
Chapter 2 where tied aid, for instance, in the form of import support for 
intermediate goods, can improve the quality of the recipient country's product 
by making it more competitive on the world market. The donor in this case has, 
as it were, `opened the door' for the recipient country to trade internationally. 
This will be beneficial if the price of the donor's tied-aid products are equal to 
285 
Chapter Nine Summary and Future Research Suggestions 
the world price. It has been argued that tied aid will not lead to any 
distortionary effect such as a real exchange appreciation since aid leaks abroad 
in the form of purchases from the donor. This implies that the money is spent 
in the donor country. However, the problem which is often confronted in 
practice is that is that the price charged to the recipient is in most cases higher 
than the world price. Empirically, it was found that this is often the case, for 
instance, Yeats (1990) found that many former colonies, in particular, paid a 
price premium of around 20-30 percent on their imports during the 1980s. In 
such a case, this will lead to a rise in the cost of production rendering the final 
product of the recipient country to be less competitive. Also tied aid might lead 
to an increase in the demand for nontradables, causing an increase in its price, 
which in turn results in a real exchange rate appreciation-the Dutch disease 
phenomenon. Hence tied aid, whether to capital or intermediate goods, can 
have distortionary effects on the recipient's economy. 
So far it was assumed that aid supplements domestic savings to achieve 
economic growth. But it was also found that growth in large aid-recipient 
countries has not been high due other factors constraining growth, such as a 
lack of foreign exchange. The foreign exchange shortage view is sufficiently 
important in relation to analysing the role of aid to receive more consideration. 
Obtaining foreign exchange through foreign aid is often seen as superior to 
earning it through exports. This is because it requires scarce resources to 
produce the goods that are exported, while the receipt of aid does not. Also it is 
not easy for the developing countries to increase their exports as they are faced 
with exogenously low prices for their primary commodity exports. As 
explained in Chapter 3, aid will have a higher impact if it relieves a foreign 
exchange constraint than when savings is the relevant constraint. This is 
because when the foreign exchange gap is relieved, it brings redundant 
resources into use and hence increases the productive capacity of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the gap model has its critics as empirically it has been a poor 
predictor. Although the model optimistically assumed that the economic 
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structures of developing countries would change as a result of aid inflows, none 
of these were taking place. The assumptions on the which the model was based 
were also criticised. Also, Joshi (1970), Findlay (1973) and Luxton (1979) 
argued that a pure foreign exchange gap exists because of unstructured 
industrialisation, haphazard production ventures and poor sales and marketing 
strategies. They would all suggest that the relevant constraint on growth is 
savings and that increases in savings will enable an increase in growth. In this 
sense savings becomes crucial in having an impact on growth and the empirical 
growth models implicitly make such an assumption. More recently, there has 
been an increasing interest in a third gap where the traditional savings gap of 
the two gap model has been disaggregated-the fiscal gap. This is seen as a 
possible gap limiting the growth prospects of the highly-indebted group of 
countries (Bacha, 1990; Solimano, 1992; and Taylor, 1993). Although the 
fiscal gap is receiving some attention in the aid literature, we have preferred to 
concentrate on the savings gap and to leave the fiscal gap to be explored in 
future research work to analyse mainly the fiscal behaviour of developing 
countries' government. 
In the aid-growth literature many investigators have regressed growth on 
domestic savings, foreign aid, private capital flows and other capital flows to 
test the relative effectiveness of foreign aid and other sources of capital. In 
Chapter 4, as a supplement to the trends analysed in Chapter 1, we investigated 
further the trends and composition of the capital flows to the six regions. This 
enabled us to infer which regions have been more favoured than others or 
which types of capital flows are more important. It was observed, for instance, 
that the bulk of private flows went to the Latin American and Caribbean region 
while foreign aid flows were more important to South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa where the majority of poor countries are found. But with the breaking up 
of the Soviet bloc, foreign aid has become a major source of capital transfer for 
developing countries in Europe and Central Asia. Before establishing any link 
between capital transfers and growth, we also analysed the trends in growth 
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rates for the countries in these regions along with the savings and investment 
rates. We observed mainly that the growth performances of the countries in 
each region were adversely hit by the oil price shocks and the debt crisis, but 
recovered with the recent emphasis on trade liberalisation. Although the 
unfavourable shocks have caused some regions to experience lower growth and 
higher volatility in their growth rates, it was relatively higher in regions where 
the investment and savings rates were high. This descriptive exercise pointed 
out that these international events have been important in determining growth 
performance. These unfavourable events could have undermined the 
effectiveness of aid. 
In relation to these, we then explained in Chapter 5 the relationship between aid 
and growth. As Mosley and Hudson (1995) explained, there is an `expected 
sequence' where in the beginning the recipient receives low aid and 
experiences low growth. Even when high aid flows in, it experiences low 
growth but will eventually move at some time to a high growth position. But in 
the end donors expect that high growth will be sustained even with low aid 
inflows. This `expected sequence' can only be achieved if there are no hiccups 
in the domestic and external economic position. Because the developing 
country cannot be isolated from the world economy, any major economic event 
(domestic or external) has some implications. We used a simple taxonomy to 
show how a recipient country's position can be affected by either a favourable 
or unfavourable external event. A very useful exercise which we have not been 
able to carry out, because of the amount of work involved, is to build a 
transition matrix for the sample of developing countries which we identified. 
This would have indicated the countries which have followed the `expected 
sequence' of Mosley and Hudson and those countries which did not. This type 
of exercise will also enable us to point out the factors responsible for a country 
to display any particular pattern. Hence more information would he available to 
evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid. Although there are many factors at the 
domestic level that can affect a country's position, we were not able to analyse 
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all of them statistically. Since we are interested in explaining how aid flows 
affect the growth performance, we took a sample of developing countries and 
analysed the association between aid, growth, savings and investment. The 
association between aid and growth is looked at from two angles. First, we 
analysed the associated aid inflows with particular levels of growth and second, 
the associated growth with particular level of aid inflows. In each case the 
respective savings and investment rates were computed. Although there were 
many instances where high aid was associated with high growth, there were 
cases where high growth is associated with low aid (but high investment rates). 
One obvious indication is that there is a strong association between aid and 
domestic savings, countries with high savings are associated with low foreign 
aid flows and vice-versa. Of course, even though a negative correlation exists, 
it does not imply any causation. We also divided the sample into low and 
middle income groups and similar deductions were made. 
After the preliminary statistical exercise, a critical empirical review of the aid- 
growth literature was conducted in Chapter 6 to enable us to improve on 
specifying a suitable model for empirical testing and to apply appropriate 
econometric methodologies. It was noticed that early studies treated lbreign aid 
and capital flows as synonymous even though their impact may be different for 
various reasons. Although it has been possible to disaggregate the various 
components of foreign inflows into foreign aid, private net flows and other 
capital flows, previous econometric models suffered from omitted variables 
and limited sample size. In fact due to limited time series data, cross-section 
analyses were more common. Concerning omitted variables, there are a host of 
factors which affect growth that were excluded in the aid-growth literature. 
Among the first to rectify this was Dowling and Hiemenz (1983) who 
introduced trade, fiscal and monetary variables along with the different sources 
of capital. Most models were criticised for not allowing for any lag structure. 
Another criticism of studies using single equations was that the ordinary least 
squares estimates would be biased if aid is endogenous. Although simultaneous 
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models were also used by some (though without any prior causality tests), the 
results at the macro level remained ambiguous. Nevertheless, aid has not been 
found empirically to be detrimental to growth. 
Taking into account the shortcomings of previous studies, we specify in 
Chapter 7a growth model for our estimation purposes. Most aid-growth 
investigations either pre-date or ignore many of the recent advances in growth 
theory which have allowed more sophisticated empirical growth equations to 
be specified. If aid is to be reliably identified as a growth determinant it is 
important, however, that it is included within a robustly specified empirical 
growth model. First, we attempt to remedy an important weakness of almost all 
previous studies: that of omitted variables. The taxonomy presented and the 
preliminary statistical exercise undertaken in Chapter 5 has indicated that 
domestic as well as external economic factors affect growth. On the domestic 
front, the importance of macroeconomic stability has been highlighted. 
Although it is claimed that macroeconomic stability is not necessary for 
sustainable growth, it is conducive to growth. This is one of the reasons that the 
World Bank has been lobbying for a supportive macroeconomic framework to 
achieve growth. By ignoring the impact of the macroeconomic environment, 
the beneficial impact of aid might have been masked in previous analyses. The 
main macroeconomic indicators that we have used are: 
(i) the standard deviation of the inflation rate-to measure the extent of 
inflation volatility. Effort to control the variability in the inflation rate 
indicates the ability of the government to manage the economy. An 
economy which is faced with high inflation volatility indicates that the 
government has lost its control. 
(ii) the budget surplus-this is also viewed as an indicator of a government that 
is able to exert some control. It has also been a major policy platform of the 
World Bank and the IMF. Reducing fiscal deficits have typically been at the 
core of successful stabilisation programmes. 
(iii) changes in terms of trade-this variable is included as a macroeconomic 
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indicator due to the fact that in the period of our study most developing 
countries have experienced major terms of trade shocks. 
These indicators have been used in previous growth studies by Fischer (1993) 
and Easterly (1993). To model a robust growth model, we have also included 
some other variables which affect growth. 
a) a series of openness measures such as the crude openness measure defined 
as total trade as a percentage of GDP, a weighted openness measure to 
reflect both trade intensity and trade equilibrium, collected trade taxes as a 
percentage of total trade, and the black market exchange rate premium. 
Openness to trade raises growth through several channels such as access to 
advanced technology from abroad, possibility to catch-up, greater access to 
a variety of inputs for production, the scale of effects and externalities. 
b) a financial variable, measured by broad money as a percentage of GDP to 
reflect financial liberalisation. It is argued that financial liberalisation will 
foster growth and will increase the financial sector's ability to intermediate 
savings efficiently. 
Our second attempt was to use a non-linear approach as proposed by 
Hadjimichael et al. (1995) to capture any potential distortionary effect of aid 
and allow for diminishing marginal returns, and third, we used both cross- 
section and panel data techniques. 
The empirical investigation has been a very labour and data intensive exercise. 
We first estimated the model using cross-section analysis. The variables 
included were foreign aid, private capital flows, other capital flows, domestic 
savings, the macroeconomic variables and some trade and financial variables. 
The data for all the variables were averaged over the period 1970-93. The main 
result that emerged was that the effectiveness of foreign aid on growth is 
positive and significant, ceteris paribus. The other controlled variables were in 
line with their theoretical expectations (except the impact of private capital 
flows). The macroeconomic indicators support the view that growth will be 
higher where there is macroeconomic stability. Even when the Ibreign aid 
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variable was expressed in per capita terms, the positive contribution of aid was 
still observed. Also it was found that official concessional flows were more 
effective than nonconcessional flows. This is not too surprising when the latter 
are mostly provided on a bilateral basis and are primarily motivated by 
commercial and political motives. 
The taxonomy in Chapter 5 indicated that any major international event can 
have serious repercussions on the developing country and affect the 
effectiveness of aid. In this context, we ran separate regressions for the time 
periods 1974-81,1982-87 and 1988-93 to reflect the oil price shocks, the debt 
crisis and the trade liberalisation phases respectively. Foreign aid was found to 
be significantly positive in the 1988-93 period. The results indicate that the 
effectiveness of aid might have been overshadowed in earlier periods by 
unfavourable events. 
We also divided the sample into various country groupings, for instance 
between low and high growth countries, low and middle income countries, and 
low and high aid receivers. It was found, in particular, that the effectiveness of 
aid was higher in high growth and middle income country groups. The use of 
cross-section data has some drawbacks. When averaging the data over the 
period of 1970-93, no account is being taken for the time dimension and the 
individuality of the entities being investigated. Data averaging over a long 
period does not give a clear picture of any relation between certain variables 
and may lead to misinterpretations, for instance concerning the coefficient of 
net private flows in tables 7.4 to 7.6. Also in table 5.3 countries like China, 
Korea, Mauritius and Turkey have been clustered in a group of countries which 
have received low private flows while it has been observed that these countries 
have experienced some significant increase in the volume and the ratio of 
private flows since the mid 1980s. This clearly depicts a case where cross 
section analysis can be misleading. Also the cross section model is not able to 
capture the major international developments that took place during the period 
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1970-93. It is mainly because of this that a panel framework is more 
appropriate. This in turn also enables us to take into account time and/or 
country effects (in the fixed effects model) and time and/or country 
heterogeneity (in the random effects model). 
Using both, two-way fixed and random effects models, the effectiveness of aid 
is reconfirmed as being positive and significantly related to growth. We have 
preferred to use the latter technique for several reasons. First, there are gains in 
the degrees of freedom which leads to more efficient estimates. Second, it uses 
the feasible generalised least squares as compared to the ordinary least squares 
in the fixed effect model. Third, this technique enables us to account for the 
main international events that took place. Similar country groupings as in the 
cross-section analysis were used and it was found that aid is more effective in 
middle income countries and in countries which have received foreign aid 
amounting to more than 13% of their GDP. Overall, the results from both the 
cross-section and panel data analyses indicate that the effectiveness of foreign 
aid on growth is positive and significant. 
Although we have managed to control for some important variables in our 
growth model, yet the model has its own limitations. It is well known that 
regressions of the kind that we have used indicate only correlation. In essence, 
we have established that there is a positive association between foreign aid and 
growth, but nothing can be said about any causal relationship between these 
two variables at this stage. For this, we need a sufficient number of 
observations to perform causality tests, for example Granger causality tests in a 
time series framework for individual countries or using the Dynamic Panel 
Data technique. Another limitation in our model is that we have not included 
any lag structure but we have used period averages to address this problem. 
Inclusion of lags will perhaps give better results if there are any lag effects. 
Concerning the estimation technique, we have used the ordinary leased squares 
and the feasible generalised least squares on the assumption that foreign aid is 
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exogenous. However, our estimates will be biased if foreign aid is endogenous 
in the model. In such a case, instrumental variables or the two stage least 
squares would be more appropriate. Although individual country studies would 
bring more light concerning the effectiveness of foreign aid in each country, we 
were constrained by limited data to assume it, perhaps wrongly, to he the same 
for all the developing countries. 
Critics of aid argue that aid displaces domestic savings and that it will lead to 
increases in consumption rather than investment. This has been the fungibility 
issue raised in the literature which is also important in assessing the 
effectiveness of aid. From the statistical exercise, it was found that a correlation 
exists between aid and domestic savings. Many studies have tested this 
relationship through regression analysis. Although the regression results 
typically imply correlation, nothing can be said about causality which aid- 
sceptics often refer to. In fact, only one study, that of Bowles (1987) undertook 
some Granger causality tests. The results were inconclusive and the techniques 
had many shortcomings. There are also many problems that have been 
identified in the aid-savings literature which are similar to those identified in 
the aid-growth literature. But more important is the way that the savings data 
are measured. They are computed as residuals which is questionable. Because 
of these problems, we test the aid-savings relationship indirectly in Chapter 8 
by analysing the effect of aid on consumption. 
Although Boone (1994) found that the marginal propensity to consume from 
aid is not significantly different from one by using a balanced growth model, 
we believe that the use of a well established framework for analysing consumer 
behaviour might be more appropriate to assess the impact of aid on 
consumption. Consumer theory was revolutionised both at the theoretical and 
empirical front by the combination of Modigliani and Brumberg's (1954) life- 
cycle hypothesis and Friedman's (1957) permanent income hypothesis. We use 
the framework put forward by Hall (1978), and refined subsequently by many 
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others, to test the impact of aid on consumption. 
However the model is based on some restrictive assumptions, for instance it is 
assumed that the government is the representative consumer in the model. This 
is of some importance since most of the aid flows are received and managed by 
the government. It is assumed that the government is a utility maximiser and 
behaves as an individual consumer. Another assumption is that in some 
regressions we have modelled the residuals of aid from its trend as a measure 
of anticipated aid due to the problem of incorporating lagged aid in the model. 
Including lags in the model would require more advanced econometric 
software such as the Dynamic Panel Data and more observations to test for unit 
roots and time series properties. Although the use of the life-cycle/permanent 
income model can be informative about consumption (and saving) behaviour, 
there is another set of models which can be explored in the future that deals 
with the fiscal behaviour of government explicitly (for e. g. Heller, 1975; 
Mosley ei al., 1987; Gang and Khan, 1991; Khan and Hoshino, 1992; Pack and 
Pack, 1991 and 1993). These models assess the flypaper effect, fungibility of 
aid-whether foreign aid is used to reduce tax, the impact of aid on 
government consumption and investment and borrowing decisions. 
Using the panel data technique, the feasible generalised least squares estimates 
led to the rejection of the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis as found by 
previous studies. Interestingly, it was found that consumption growth in the 
pre-1980 period was significantly different from the post-1980 period. 111 this 
context, we used interaction terms on each of the explanatory variables to 
separate these periods. It was noticed that current consumption per capita is 
highly sensitive to expected changes in domestic income and foreign aid. While 
an increase in expected aid per capita appeared to have led to an increase in 
consumption per capita in the pre-1980 period, in the post-1980 period an 
increase in expected aid per capita in fact led to a fall in current consumption 
per capita. The latter could be the result of the first and second generation 
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conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 
donors interest in managing and controlling aid funds, and recipients' lessons 
from past mistakes and awareness. It can also reflect cases where the donor 
imposes some fund-matching conditions whereby the recipient is forced to 
postpone its current consumption to meet the requirement. Overall, our results 
reject the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis for domestic and foreign 
sources of income. Although aid was fungible in the pre-1980 period, effective 
policy dialogue and other factors in the post-1980 period appear not only to 
have contributed in reducing this fungibility but also to a tall in current 
consumption (i. e. domestic savings increased). 
Since it was found that aid, in the later period, was in fact reducing 
consumption, we tested whether aid has any impact on investment. Most 
studies have reported a positive and significant impact of aid on investment. 
Based on a simple accelerator type model and using the same panel data 
technique, we found aid to have a positive significant impact on investment. 
But an important finding is that in the post- 1980 period the effectiveness of aid 
on investment was reduced, although still positive. Such a decline in 
effectiveness can be associated with the side-effects of tied aid, too much aid- 
monitoring and possibly unsound conditionality and stabilisation policies 
which do not favour the recipient countries. In such a case an effective policy 
dialogue would be advisable to address the situation. Also, in the beginning of 
the post-1980 period many countries with huge debt burdens were using aid 
flows to repay their debts instead of investing these flows. 
The analysis that we have undertaken concerning the impact of aid on growth, 
domestic savings and investments has some important policy implications for 
both the recipient and the donor. For the recipient, it has been shown that the 
role of macroeconomic policies is important. Aid's effectiveness will be higher 
in an environment where the macroeconomic framework is supportive. Hence 
there is a need not only to control for inflation and having a viable fiscal 
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deficit, but also to have a stable fiscal policy, competitive and predictable real 
exchange rate and a balance of payments which is perceived as viable. This 
implies implicit support for the motivations of adjustment programmes. 
Regardless of the soundness of an individual aid-financed project, growth is 
likely to remain slow when domestic policies discourage it. As for the donor, 
aid can have not only growth potentials, but also developmental effects if aid is 
directed towards labour-intensive projects. This in turn can alleviate poverty 
and improve the welfare of the poor. It has also been found that for aid to he 
effective, it should be above a certain threshold level (around 13% of GDP). 
Although aid is more effective in countries which are classified as middle- 
income, it does not mean that aid should not be directed to low-income 
countries. In fact, aid should be directed to countries where the infrastructural 
level is poor and where there is a need to reform institutions to improve the 
environment for investment and for the proper functioning of economic 
activities. To encourage the recipient to save foreign aid flows, the use of 
conditionality (as shown in Chapter 8) does increase the effectiveness of aid on 
savings. In fact, the first and second generation conditionalities have made 
recipients reduce their consumption levels in conjunction with increases in the 
level of foreign aid. Hence the structural adjustment programmes and 
stabilisation policies together with the political reforms undertaken by the 
World Bank and the IMF enable the recipient to use aid in an efficient manner. 
It would be advisable for policymakers in the donor countries to monitor aid 
flows with effective policy dialogue which suits the recipients. It is hoped that 
the analysis has been able to provide useful insights for some policy 
implications to both the recipients and the donors on foreign aid. 
9.3 Suggestions for Future Research. 
Our empirical results suggests that aid effectiveness on growth, savings and 
investment is positive. It is hoped that the theoretical and empirical 
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assessments carried out in this thesis have addressed some of the many issues 
in supplying evidence about the effectiveness of aid. On the theoretical front, 
using conventional growth models we were able to incorporate foreign aid and 
traced out its potential impact. While on the empirical front we have managed 
to tackle many flaws in the existing literature. This study is by no means 
complete, much work in determining the developmental effectiveness of aid 
needs to carried out. Since we were not able to investigate all the facets of 
economic development, we would like to make some recommendations for 
future work. 
First, due to limited time series data we did not carry out any causality tests 
among the variables of interest. Although we could have used one or two lags, 
we have preferred to leave this exercise to when single country cases are 
investigated. In such cases, the lag structure can be determined by the data 
generating process itself rather than arbitrarily imposing some lag structure, 
since the lag structure need not be the same for all countries. Second, even 
though we have generalised the effectiveness of aid for the developing 
countries, it would be interesting to take individual country cases to see the 
extent to which it `works' in different countries. Third, but closely related to 
the second, is to take a number of countries which have received similar 
amounts of foreign aid in each region, having more or less the similar 
economic backgrounds, and to compare aid's effectiveness. It will he helpful to 
build a transition matrix and observe the countries as they move from one state 
to the other. This will shed more light on which other factors and policies are 
necessary for aid to be effective. Fourth, as mentioned above. the very purpose 
of aid is to promote economic development and in this study we have not 
addressed issues related to poverty alleviation or income inequality. These 
could be carried out on a country level basis in the future. This will enable us to 
see whether aid is reaching the very poor. Due to limited data we have treated 
aid as a 'bundle', it would be interesting to analyse the impact of project versus 
programme aid, food aid versus capital aid, or aid in a particular sector when 
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data are available. 
It must be noted, however, that we have tried to assess aid's effectiveness from 
the recipients' point of view and have ignored donors. Aid effectiveness is 
evaluated from what the recipients have received. But have they received the 
`right' amount or type? For this, one must consider donors performance in 
allocating aid. Some work has been covered in this area but more still needs to 
he done. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the aid 
literature and that future empirical work will adopt the model (or a variant of 
the model) that is being advanced and some of the techniques that have been 
discussed. It is also hoped that the analysis will help in understanding better the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. 
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